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ABSTRACT 
For the past few decades the remuneration of directors has been in the spotlight, 
especially in view of the corporate scandals that occurred around the turn of the 20th 
century. Generally, managers need to manage firms in such a way that shareholders’ 
value is maximised. Unfortunately, shareholders of firms and the general public have 
the perception that directors are over-compensated, and that there is no relationship 
between the remuneration of directors and the financial performance of the firms to 
enhance shareholders’ value. A lack of transparency, inadequate disclosure by firms 
and remuneration committees’ conflict of interest are reasons cited for these 
perceptions. Although South Africa is ranked as a global leader in terms of its corporate 
governance practices, many firms still do not adhere to the King reports’ principles. 
This research study investigated whether a relationship exists between the 
remuneration of directors and the financial performance of firms. The firms selected for 
the study included both listed and delisted firms from the Industrial Sector of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the time period 2002 until 2010. Ninety-three 
firms complied with the requirements to be included in the study. All these firms had 
effective remuneration strategies in place to promote financial performance and growth 
of the firms. Secondary data were collected for the nine consecutive years of the study 
period, representing a period prior to substantial changes in accounting and disclosure 
regulation that influenced the comparability of financial reporting of the firms. 
It is important to note that directors’ remuneration is not the only motivating factor for 
firm performance, but one of many. Directors’ remuneration and incentives should be 
optimally utilised to increase performance and growth in the firms, and it should not 
merely be a case of directors being overcompensated for services rendered. 
In order to operationalize directors’ remuneration, it was converted and sub-
categorised into four variables. These dependent variables for directors’ remuneration 
consisted of basic salary, bonuses (performance), gains on share purchases or share 
options and what was termed as “other” remuneration. “Other” remuneration included 
pension, medical, motor, and telephone allowances. To measure the financial 
performance of the firms, the following market and accounting measures were 
employed: turnover, earnings per share (EPS), total share return (TSR) and market 
value added (MVA). Analysing these variables’ data by means of selected descriptive  
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statistical measures and inferential regression analysis, it appeared that the data were 
significantly skewed, but that financial performance of the firms was a strong 
determinant of the change in directors’ remuneration. 
Additional regression analyses were performed to investigate whether a lagged 
relationship existed between the dependent variable, namely directors’ remuneration, 
and the independent variables, as reflected by the various financial performance 
measures. Results from these regression analyses strengthened the findings of the 
study to show that a relationship existed between directors’ remuneration and the 
financial performance of the firms investigated. 
Keywords: directors’ remuneration, financial performance, incentives, Industrial 
Sector, shareholders’ value. 
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ABSTRAK 
Direkteursvergoeding trek vir die afgelope paar dekades gereeld aandag, veral weens 
die korporatiewe skandale wat aan die lig gekom het rondom ongeveer die 
eeuwisseling. Normaalweg stel firmas direkteure aan om aandeelhouerswelvaart te 
verhoog. Daar bestaan ongelukkig ŉ opvatting onder talle aandeelhouers asook die 
algemene publiek dat direkteure oorbetaal word, en dat daar geen verwantskap 
bestaan tussen direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas om 
aandeelhouerswelvaart te verhoog nie. Redes wat aangevoer word vir hierdie sienings 
sluit in die tekort aan deursigtigheid, onvoldoende openbaarmaking deur firmas en 
vergoedingskomitees se botsende belange. Alhoewel Suid-Afrika geklassifiseer word 
as ’n wêreldleier op die gebied van korporatiewe bestuur, is daar steeds firmas wat nie 
voldoen aan die beginsels van die King-verslae nie. 
Hierdie navorsingstudie ondersoek die moontlike verwantskap tussen 
direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas. Die geselekteerde firmas 
vir die studie was genoteerde en voorheen-genoteerde firmas in die nywerheidsektor 
op die Johannesburgse Aandelebeurs (JSE), vir die periode 2002 tot en met 2010. 
Drie-en-negentig firmas het voldoen aan die vereistes om ingesluit te word in die 
steekproef van die studie. Al die geselekteerde firmas het doeltreffende 
vergoedingstrategieë in plek gehad om finansiële prestasie en groei in die firmas aan 
te spoor. Sekondêre data is vir die nege agtereenvolgende jare van die studie 
ingesamel. Veranderinge in regulasies voor en na die studieperiode het dit moeilik 
gemaak om periodes buite hierdie tydgleuf vir vergelykingsdoeleindes in te sluit. 
Dit is belangrik om daarop te let dat direkteursvergoeding nie die enigste faktor is wat 
ŉ firma se finansiële prestasie kan beïnvloed nie, maar slegs een van vele. In die lig 
hiervan, moet direkteursvergoeding en ander aansporingsmaatstawwe optimaal 
gebruik word om finansiële prestasie in firmas aan te moedig. 
Om ŉ duideliker skets rakende direkteursvergoeding te verkry, is vergoeding 
onderverdeel in vier sub-kategorieë veranderlikes. Die afhanklike veranderlikes van 
direkteursvergoeding is soos volg geklassifiseer: basiese salaris, bonusse (prestasie), 
opbrengste uit aandeelaankope en aandeleopsies en ŉ laaste kategorie wat as “ander” 
vergoeding geklassifiseer is. Hierdie “ander” vergoedingskomponent het grootliks 
bestaan uit pensioen- en mediese bydraes asook motor-, en telefoonvoordele. 
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Ten einde die onafhanklike veranderlike, naamlik die finansiële prestasie van firmas, 
te meet, is die volgende mark- en rekeningkundige maatstawwe gebruik: omset, 
verdienste per aandeel (VPA), markwaarde toevoeging (MWT) en aandeelopbrengs. 
Met die ontleding van al die veranderlikes het beskrywende statistiek en inferensiële 
regressietoetse aangedui dat die data ŉ merkbare skewe verspreiding het, maar dat 
finansiële prestasie in die firmas ŉ beduidende faktor was wanneer 
direkteursvergoeding aangepas is. 
Bykomende regressietoetse is gedoen om te ondersoek of daar vertragingstydperke 
was tussen die afhanklike veranderlike, naamlik direkteursvergoeding, en die 
onafhanklike veranderlike, finansiële prestasie van firmas. Hierdie toetse het die studie 
se bevindinge bevestig dat daar inderdaad ŉ verwantskap bestaan tussen 
direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas. 
Sleutelwoorde: direkteursvergoeding, finansiële prestasie, insentiewe, Nywerheid-
sektor, aandeelhouerswelvaart. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The remuneration of firm directors is an issue that has attracted considerable interest 
from shareholders, business groups and the wider community across the globe. 
Adapting to sustainable business practices and formulating strategic plans for proper 
director remuneration are becoming increasingly important in order to enhance 
performance growth and the profitability of firms. This study investigated the 
relationship, if any, between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of 
firms listed on the Industrial Sector of the JSE during the period 2002 to 2010. 
The motivation for conducting this study is to assist management, shareholders, 
stakeholders and the general public to address the conflict between management and 
shareholders, and to find a balance to maximise both these parties’ interests in the 
firm. These interests can be aligned by ensuring that shareholders have a better 
knowledge and understanding of the incentives and components of directors’ 
remuneration. Directors’ remuneration is often criticised and seen as one of the 
problem areas in a firm from an external point of view. This criticism is normally due to 
a lack of knowledge concerning how the remuneration is determined, who determines 
it and what the total remuneration for directors consists of. This study addresses all 
these matters by clarifying misconceptions, informing the shareholders and the public 
on the method according to which directors are remunerated, and investigating the 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of firms. 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the possible relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of the firms considered in the 
study. In this study, questions regarding possible overcompensation and the potential 
disconnect between how directors are remunerated and the financial performance of 
firms are investigated. By ensuring wealth creation for shareholders and by explaining 
the pay for performance method used to motivate directors, the agency theory problem 
may be minimised. 
This study focuses on applying possible methods to determine the relationship 
between directors’ remuneration and the firm’s financial performance. The pre-
selection of firms was important and entailed a sample of listed firms (those firms that 
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remained listed during the study period) and delisted firms (firms that delisted during 
the study’s time period) on the Industrial Sector of the JSE. The Industrial Sector was 
selected due to various factors explained later in this study. One reason for not 
considering other sectors, such as the Financial Sector and the Basic Materials Sector, 
is that there are differences in the financial statements and business operations of firms 
operating in the different sectors, limiting their comparability. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the background to the study and the relevant 
literature, which includes a discussion regarding the maximisation of shareholders’ 
value, the agency theory, an overview regarding a firm’s top management structure, 
determining remuneration for directors and concludes with similar research studies 
conducted in the field of pay for performance. The chapter then continues to identify 
the research problem, in order to develop the primary and secondary objectives of the 
study. The research method explains the process used for the data analysis and 
highlights the research design for the study. Among others, data capturing-, data 
processing-, descriptive and inferential statistical-methods all form part of the research 
method section. The chapter concludes with the orientation of the study and outlining 
its possible contribution to the field of study. 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The literature review for this study comprises two main sections. In the first section the 
focus is placed on corporate performance. The section starts with a discussion of the 
concepts shareholders’ value and shareholders’ value principles. The section is 
followed by an overview of the agency problem that exists between the shareholders 
and the managers of a firm. For the purpose of this study, the focus is placed on its 
directors. Overall corporate performance is finally narrowed down to focus specifically 
on the financial and non-financial performance of firms. 
The second section of the literature review examines remuneration in general and 
provides a breakdown of a firm’s typical management structure. This is followed by a 
detailed discussion of the remuneration of directors, highlighting the typical strategy, 
structure and components of directors’ total remuneration packages. 
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1.2.1 Corporate performance 
(a) Shareholders’ value maximisation 
Shareholders’ value maximisation should be the primary financial objective of all firms 
(Brigham & Daves, 2010:13). Shareholders’ value is the value delivered to 
shareholders based on directors’ ability to let the firm grow by means of operations. In 
other words, shareholders’ value is the result of all strategic and managerial decisions 
that affect a firm's ability to efficiently increase the amount of free cash flow it generates 
over a time period (Simms, 2001:34). Therefore, it is important for directors to apply 
value based management (VBM) which states that management should first and 
foremost consider the interests of shareholders when making business decisions 
(Martin, Petty & Wallace, 2009:5) before considering their own situation. 
Unfortunately, problems arise when directors are making decisions that negatively 
affect shareholders and shareholders’ value in a firm. Shareholders need to be 
compensated as they are the owners of the firm and directors only control the firm on 
behalf of its owners (Sinha, 2006:2). Therefore, it is important that the directors of a 
firm should take its shareholders into consideration when establishing and 
implementing strategies and objectives. As mentioned, the shareholders are the 
investors who provide capital to the firm, while the directors oversee the overall 
wellbeing of the firm and appoint managers who manage the firm. Directors and 
managers thus also need to be remunerated and rewarded for how they manage the 
shareholders’ investment. According to Tchouassi and Ouedraogo-Nosseyamba 
(2011:198), one of the reasons why the maximisation of shareholders’ value is so 
important is that it helps to discipline management. If other metrics should be used to 
evaluate directors’ performance and to determine directors’ remuneration, it could only 
confuse management and make it easier for them to use their positions for their own 
financial interest above those of the shareholders. For this reason, it is suggested that 
management should receive appropriate incentives to reward them for maximising 
shareholders’ value. 
Increasing shareholders’ value immediately creates a chain reaction in which a much 
broader spectrum of people could benefit from this wealth creation. Keown, Scott, 
Martin and Petty (1998:2) concurred with this view by stating that the goal of 
maximising shareholders’ value will not only directly influence the shareholders of the 
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firm, but also provide benefits to society. They argue that scarce resources, such as 
competent directors, need to be directed to their most productive and useful use for 
firms to be competitive in creating wealth. Friedman (1962:133) asserted that 
management has a duty towards shareholders and all other stakeholders to create 
wealth and activities that will benefit all. Although shareholders’ wealth is consequently 
the main guiding principle for the management of the firm, it is not always perfectly 
dealt with. 
Arguments against shareholders’ value maximisation emerge from the premise that it 
may not benefit everyone. Problems regarding shareholders’ value maximisation have 
been widely voiced, especially after the global financial crisis in 2008 when 
unemployment, environmental and ethical issues emerged, but were neglected to 
ensure that shareholders’ value increases (Aglietta & Reberioux, 2005:4). It is thus 
important to identify how maximising shareholders’ value is achieved and what it 
entails before making decisions on whether shareholders’ wealth creation is good or 
bad for all of the firm’s stakeholders. 
To maximise shareholders’ value, directors can consider the following seven value 
drivers. This is a popular model used in the majority of large firms and focuses on the 
next factors (Bender & Ward, 2008:17): 
• Revenue; 
• Operating margin; 
• Cash tax rate; 
• Incremental capital expenditure; 
• Investment in working capital; 
• Cost of capital; and 
• Competitive advantage period. 
These seven value drivers could help to increase profit maximisation in conjunction 
with the maximisation of shareholders’ value. These drivers are generally included in 
measures and ratios to determine the financial performance of firms and enable 
stakeholders to compare performance among firms and determine relationships 
between various variables like directors’ remuneration in this study. In order to increase 
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profits and revenue, directors need to invest in projects that will promote shareholders’ 
value and should not take unnecessary risks to achieve gains for their own interests, 
placing shareholders’ value at risk. 
Jesse and Curral (2011:2) identified four factors to assist directors and employees to 
create value in the firm more effectively, viz.:  
• Discouraging to take taking long-term risks for short-term gain; 
• Making it impossible to delay issues – problems get dealt with quickly; 
• Largely removing the effect of industry cycles from the firm’s valuation; and 
• Supporting a focus on long-term value creation. 
These four factors should ensure that sustainable value creation is possible for the 
firm. By implementing a proper set of values for the firm, proper incentives for directors 
in return could be ensured. The relationship between the shareholders and 
management needs to be respected to enhance shareholders’ value maximisation. 
However, when management and shareholders differ regarding the control and 
management of the firm, it may lead to the agency theory problem. 
(b) The agency theory 
More than two centuries ago, Smith (1776:607) stated that although agents 
(managers) manage firms with other people’s money, directors cannot be expected to 
watch over other people’s money the same way anxious people watch over their own 
money. This results in a situation referred to as the agency problem, and forms the 
basis of the agency theory, as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
The agency relationship stated by Smith (1776:607) can be defined as the contract 
between one or more persons (principal/s) that engage with another person (agent) to 
perform services on their behalf, which involves delegating some authority regarding 
decision-making to the agent. There is a good chance that the agents (managers), will 
not always act in the best interest of the principal. This may be due to a lack of 
incentives for the agents (managers), which easily drives agents to rather focus and 
promote self-interests above those of the shareholders (Appelbaum, Batt & Clark, 
2011:3). 
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Fama (1980:288) placed the agency theory as the theoretical framework for corporate 
governance. An example like inside information, which is not known by shareholders, 
allows the management of a firm to pursue objectives that are in contrast with those of 
the shareholders. In this regard management focuses on self-interest above that of the 
shareholders, thus illustrating the agency problem and creating a corrupt agency 
relationship between the management and shareholders. The first alternative to ensure 
that the focus is placed on maximising shareholders’ value and to solve the agency 
theory problem is to properly monitor managers managing the firm. This option, 
however, can become very expensive and might influence the trust relationship 
between the firm’s management and the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:305). 
The relationship between the shareholders and the directors of a firm plays an 
important role when the future of the firm is at stake. 
To ensure sustainable performance over the long term, incentives for directors need to 
be adequate so that the directors will manage the firm in such a way that shareholders’ 
value maximisation is enhanced. With the second option to solve the agency problem, 
the shareholders can use incentives to ensure that the directors are motivated to act 
according to the shareholders’ interests. Payments to the directors can also be made 
to ensure that no unnecessary risks are taken to harm the shareholders. When 
resources are broadening, the shareholders will also be rewarded for such risk (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976:306). 
Directors’ remuneration is a prominent topic in contemporary corporate governance. 
The general view that derives from the principal-agent framework is that well-designed 
remuneration contracts help to reward directors to enhance shareholders’ value 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990:225). Agents and principals could have divergence when it 
comes to decision-making, but in general both parties should experience positive 
outcomes when directors are remunerated sufficiently (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:306). 
The agency relationship guidelines are well-known for the pay for performance 
incentive structure. According to White (1985:192), the remuneration aspect is at the 
core of the agency relationship. Structural contractual relationships (incentives) 
between the principal and agent will ensure that decisions made by the agent maximise 
the welfare of the principal. In this study, the possible relationship between directors’ 
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remuneration and the financial performance of the firm is investigated. If a relationship 
exists it is suggested that a positive relationship might minimise the agency problem. 
1.2.2 Scope of directors 
In the previous section, the agency problem was highlighted and it was concluded that 
a thorough understanding of the agency theory relationship and the role of directors is 
important. Although a firm's shareholders are usually authorised by regulations to 
appoint directors, in practice, the board of directors appoints most directors. These 
appointments are confirmed at the first Annual General Meeting (AGM) after the 
nominations have been made (The Companies Act, 2008). Continuing downwards 
within a firm’s management hierarchy structure, the directors will then appoint 
managers. These managers will play an active role in assisting the directors with the 
daily executive management responsibilities of the firm. It is vital to understand what 
the role of directors is, as well as what the responsibility, accountability and objective 
for each director entail. 
In Section 71 of the Companies Act (2008) no precise definition of the term ‘director’ is 
provided; this Act merely states that a director includes any person that is occupying 
the position of director or a director that rotates in a firm, by whatever title or name the 
person may be designated. The term ‘board of directors’ is the collective term used to 
designate the directors when they act jointly as a group. 
A director’s objective and role in the firm is to ensure its growth and success, by 
complying with the relevant legislature and regulations. These legislation and 
regulations include corporate governance, taxation, employment, and health and 
safety laws. Apart from these responsibilities, Thornton (2004) listed seven other 
general duties that directors should also comply with, namely: 
• The duty to act within his or her power as a firm director; 
• The duty to promote the success of the firm; 
• The duty to exercise independent judgment; 
• The duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence; 
• The duty to avoid conflicts of interest; 
• The duty not to accept benefits from third parties; and 
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• The duty to declare interest in proposed transactions or arrangements with the 
firm. 
These general duties are merely guidelines that assist directors to ensure proper 
management of a firm. To identify the duties of a director, the different categories of 
directors need to be identified. There are two main categories of directors, namely 
executive and non-executive directors. There are no legal distinctions between these 
directors. The only difference is that non-executive directors are not involved with the 
day-to-day operational running of the firm (Thornton, 2004). 
Executive directors perform strategic and operational business functions such as 
managing the assets, human resource management, and ensuring firm performance 
in the daily operations of the firm. Non-executive directors are acquired for their 
experience and knowledge and are seen as independent advisers to the firm during 
strategising and decision-making. Generally, non-executive directors work part-time by 
attending board meetings and working on specific projects (Recruiting directors, 2012). 
There is, however, a third category of directors called independent directors. The 
purpose of appointing an independent director is to make sure that the board includes 
directors who can effectively exercise their best judgment for the exclusive benefit of 
the firm; judgment that is not influenced or clouded by conflicts of interest (Recruiting 
directors, 2012). 
Directors are remunerated for what they are required to do, and receive incentives 
when they achieve goals set for them or the firm. This study focuses on directors in 
general, and continues by distinguishing between executive and non-executives with 
regard to a possible relationship between the remuneration these directors receive and 
the firms’ financial performance (PwC, 2012:9). 
1.2.3 Directors’ remuneration 
Currently, directors’ remuneration is in the spotlight more than ever before, especially 
after the recent global financial crisis. The trust between shareholders and 
remuneration committees have plummeted to the lowest level ever due to 
misperceptions regarding the role that remuneration has played in the financial 
meltdown (Closer scrutiny of executive remuneration, 2009:18). Remuneration is 
defined in Section 71 of the Companies Act (2008) as encompassing fees, salaries, 
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bonuses, pensions, compensation for loss of office, details of service contracts and 
securities issued. It also includes financial assistance for the subscription of shares 
and any interest deferred, waived or forgiven in respect of a loan or other financial 
assistance provided by the firm to a director. The overarching principle is that a firm 
will acquire and retain a top executive director when the remuneration package is 
higher than the benchmark set in the industry (Mac Naulty, 2005:15). 
According to Van der Walt (2003:23), directors’ remuneration can be divided into two 
parts, namely a non-incentive and an incentive part. Non-incentive remuneration is the 
base or the fixed remuneration that is intended to maintain the director’s standard of 
living, to commensurate the status and position held by the director as well as the size, 
scope of work, accountability and responsibility towards the firm and other 
benchmarks. The non-incentive remuneration also includes the duties that the director 
agrees to in the service agreement and what is expected of him or her. Due to the 
shortage of highly skilled directors in South Africa, it makes it possible for directors to 
demand higher fixed incentives than what firms can generally afford to offer. 
More recently, firms have tended to shift more towards the incentive earnings part to 
provide the director the opportunity to earn more and to ensure that the firm has sound 
financial performance in line with the remuneration (PwC, 2012:6). Incentive-based 
remuneration is the variable part of remuneration. This part of the total remuneration 
package is earned by achieving or exceeding goals set for the individual or the firm. 
Incentive earnings are usually more measurable and are most likely based on profit 
and growth. Every firm has a unique relationship with its directors’ remuneration 
packages and firms will usually differ from each other in this regard. Terms are normally 
discussed and negotiated prior to the appointment of a director to the firm. 
The total increase in remuneration paid to directors of South African firms is generally 
smaller than in most Western countries (SAPA, 2010). During the global financial crisis 
period, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (2011) pointed out that the lower increase was 
still not helping to narrow the pay gap between large and small firms’ director 
remuneration as well as the gap between an average employee’s remuneration 
compared to the remuneration of an average director. The high remuneration for 
directors was nonetheless regarded as highly controversial in the global financial crisis 
period. South African directors are fortunate not to have experienced pay freezes and 
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cutbacks like some directors in other countries, especially in the United Kingdom. Tight 
financial constraints forced firms to stop high remuneration increases. Directors in the 
Financial Sector were targeted the hardest with remuneration restraints during the 
global financial crisis period. Research conducted at PwC (2011), however, showed 
that there was still an increase in the directors’ annual remuneration (including basic 
salary, performance bonus and other benefits) of seven per cent for the Financial 
Sector in 2010 in South Africa. Although the percentage is much smaller than the 
twenty-three per cent increase before 2008, the remuneration was still escalating in 
South Africa. This tendency is seen as a source of concern by shareholders since many 
firms are still struggling after the global financial crisis. 
Similar other important issues regarding directors’ remuneration that need attention 
include the following (PwC, 2011): 
• The executive directors’ pay gap between firms and sectors; 
• The non-executive directors’ pay gap between firms and sectors; 
• Factors that need to be considered when designing and establishing the 
remuneration structure (guaranteed and variable remuneration) for directors; 
and 
• Corporate governance principles and regulations that should change executive 
remuneration structures in the best possible way. 
According to Van der Walt (2003:1), the King II report stated that directors should 
primarily be rewarded on an incentive-based basis. This makes it easier to align the 
interests of the directors with those of the shareholders. This method of remuneration 
will ensure a sustainable business model. However, one of the concerns with an 
incentive-based package is that the directors might only see the firm from a specific 
shareholder’s point of view, and that it could therefore be harmful for the firm and other 
shareholders over the long-term. This approach may cost firms dearly in future. 
The King II report (2002) did not stipulate the precise composition of remuneration. 
The most common performance remuneration methods, however, are suggested to be 
share options and bonus schemes in return for sustainable financial performance. Gill 
Marcus, the prior chairperson of the Financial Services Board and president of the 
South African Reserve Bank, warned firms to reconsider and investigate their 
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remuneration packages to prevent directors from only producing gigantic 
unsustainable short-term profits to ensure big bonuses for themselves (Magnan, St-
Onge & Gélinas, 2009:28). 
This study’s selected timeframe from 2002 until 2010 is based on the King II report. 
The reason for the selected timeframe is that some firms started to implement the King 
III report principles from 2010 onwards, and that financial statements may 
consequently differ in this respect. Therefore, comparable results in terms of the 
directors’ remuneration and firms’ financial performance could be obtained in this study 
by selecting the specific timeframe. According to the King II report, directors are held 
accountable for steering and controlling the firm directly for its shareholders and 
indirectly for its stakeholders, therefore it is vital to identify and discuss directors’ 
remuneration. The King II report helps to improve the governance and accountability 
of firms, especially for top management (directors). The following director remuneration 
recommendations are highlighted by the King II report (Institute of Directors, 2009): 
• Remuneration should be sufficient to attract and retain directors of suitable 
stature; 
• Performance-related elements should be a large part of the total remuneration 
package; 
• A remuneration committee should recommend directors’ incentive packages on 
merit; 
• A remuneration committee should consist mainly of independent directors and 
should make recommendations and advise the board regarding remuneration 
issues; and 
• An annual report, disclosing all the members of the remuneration committee, is 
needed. 
According to Thornton (2004), Section 75 of the King II report stated the declaration of 
individual directors’ remuneration, share options and benefits, along with the 
remuneration philosophy statement explaining the general remuneration approach of 
the firm that needs to be supplied in the firm’s financial statements. 
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Now that the background relevant to directors’ remuneration has been explained, the 
focus can shift towards exploring the structure of remuneration, considering the total 
remuneration package, as well as identifying and discussing each component relevant 
to the total remuneration package directors receive. This will help to ascertain whether 
certain components may have stronger influences on the performance of a firm than 
others. The information will be used to identify direct and indirect relationships between 
remuneration for directors and the financial performance of the firm. 
(a)  Structure of remuneration 
According to a PwC report (2011:8), the total guaranteed remuneration package (TGP) 
for executive directors refers to all the components, including a basic salary and 
monthly basic benefits (pension, medical, car allowance and others) that are 
guaranteed. Beside the TGP, there are short-term incentives (STI) that are paid to 
executives based on individual or firm performance when achieving goals and targets 
within 12 months. Long-term incentives (LTI) are referred to as equity-based rewards 
that are accrued based on director or firm performance for a period exceeding 12 
months. 
Important to note is that the variable pay component – an increasingly significant factor 
when it comes to executive directors’ remuneration – consists of all the long-and short-
term incentives combined. When referring to the total incentives a director receives, 
the phrase the total earnings is used and not the total remuneration, the latter including 
only TGP and STI. The total earnings consist of TGP, STI, LTI, ad hoc payments and 
retention incentives. 
PwC (2011:7) released a report that focused on the vast majority of JSE-listed firms’ 
remuneration structures. These remuneration structures comprised a mixture of TGP, 
STI and LTI incentives. The report’s results have suggested that shareholders focused 
more on remunerating directors with variable pay than fixed pay, to ensure better 
financial performance. A comprehensive example of how remuneration packages are 
constructed is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
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FIGURE 1.1: The components of remuneration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adjusted from PwC (2011:8) 
Figure 1.1 illustrates five different components of remuneration for directors. TGP, STI 
and LTI are the more commonly known components and have already been discussed 
in the previous paragraphs. Ad hoc components are also seen as remuneration. 
Examples include when an incentive payment is made to a person when joining or 
leaving a firm. Lastly, retention remuneration is very popular in South Africa due to the 
shortage of skilled directors. This form of remuneration is paid to retain the best 
directors for the firm (PWC, 2011:9). When these five types of remuneration are 
combined, the total remuneration package can be calculated for a director in a specific 
year. It is crucial to understand that every director’s remuneration structure will vary 
depending on the role and agreement between the director and the firm. 
PwC (2011:19) advised South African firms to consider the following three steps when 
structuring the remuneration package: 
• Corporate management – Better relationships are needed between executives, 
remuneration committees and the shareholders; 
• Incorporating risk in financial aims – Variable remuneration should be allocated 
according to the risk taken to generate profit for the firm; and 
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• Determining the remuneration package – All the relevant factors and functions 
should be taken into consideration when determining the total remuneration 
package. Long- and short-term, fixed and variable remuneration and “everything 
in between” should be stated to confirm the final package. 
Today, more emphasis is being placed on variable remuneration to promote 
performance-driven directors in firms (PwC, 2011:9). This emphasis ensures that the 
remuneration bears some resemblance to the fortunes of a particular firm and its 
shareholders. Variable remuneration is divided into two main components, namely 
cash and shares. 
By dividing the total remuneration into the two components, TGP and variable pay, it is 
easy to identify which part is fixed and which part of the remuneration is variable. Figure 
1.2 is an example that illustrates how the composition of the total remuneration can 
differ for the different categories of directors in the firm. 
FIGURE 1.2: An example of total guaranteed pay versus variable pay 
 
Source: Crafford (personal collection) 
The percentage differences between the fixed and variable remuneration are 
influenced by the role that a director plays in the firm. Consider the difference between 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) as an example 
in Figure 1.2. The CEO is there to ensure that the firm grows and performs to be 
competitive and profitable. For this reason, the CEO will be remunerated based on the 
firm’s financial and non-financial performance. The CFO has a larger fixed percentage 
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income due to the fact that no unnecessary risk should be taken financially by the CFO 
to increase his or her own income. 
Factors as mentioned above influence the compilation of directors’ remuneration. 
Short- and long-term incentives can have a significant influence on the financial 
performance of the firm. The following analysis is therefore of great importance when 
considering the sustainability and financial performance of the firm in relation to the 
remuneration of directors. The researcher will be able to divide the total remuneration 
into sub-components to illustrate which individual sub-components of a director’s 
remuneration might have a significant relationship to the financial performance of a 
firm, and if so, the scope and strength of these relationships. These sub-components 
are demonstrated in Figure 1.3. 
FIGURE 1.3: Sub-components in directors’ remuneration package for various 
directors 
 
Source: Crafford (personal collection) 
Figure 1.3 provides an example of how the composition of remuneration for the three 
different categories of directors could be compiled. The STI, LTI and TGP remuneration 
package all form part of the total package directors receive. The reason for these 
differences between remuneration structures is that firms want to ensure sustainability 
over both the short and long term. As can be seen in the example in Figure 1.3, the 
CEO’s remuneration composition is different from the CFO and that of other executive 
directors: by allocating a bigger portion of the incentives for the CEO to variable pay, 
and structuring half of that component to variable incentives over the long term, 
shareholders can make sure that the CEO create short-term performance to obtain a 
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higher income over the short-term, but can also ensure long-term sustainability and 
value for the firm and its shareholders. 
Identifying all the different components of remuneration and understanding how the 
remuneration compositions for different directors are determined, assist to clarify the 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of a firm. 
Remuneration is thus not a simplistic matter that the shareholders and board of 
directors of a firm can easily decide on. For this study, the total remuneration package 
will be divided into four sub-categories and additional motivations for selecting these 
sub-components are discussed in the methodology chapter, Chapter 4. In order to 
identify or develop the best suited remuneration package, the firm needs to acquire a 
competent remuneration committee. 
(b) Remuneration committee 
A remuneration committee is responsible for determining the remuneration, incentive 
arrangements, benefits and any other remuneration payments of the directors. The 
committee also determines the remuneration of the chairperson of the board. The 
committee monitors and approves the level and structure of the remuneration for top 
management (executive directors) who reports directly to the CEO, and the firm 
secretary. In addition, the committee reviews, monitors and approves or recommends 
share-incentive arrangements for directors (Swart, 2010:1). 
According to Van der Walt (2003:53), the remuneration committee’s responsibilities 
are divided into two parts. The first part is that the committee should identify the best 
remuneration strategy, plan and guidelines for the firm and its directors. Secondly, the 
remuneration committee needs to assess the performance of all the directors, to report 
back to the board regarding the motivation for the directors’ remuneration. This is 
required to compare the remuneration to the goals and achievements set for them. 
Thus, the remuneration committee plays a vital role in determining the appropriate 
remuneration package and level of fixed remuneration in return for performance from 
the directors. 
According to Hahlo (1991:275), top executives determine their own remuneration, 
since they agree upon the set performance objectives for what they are remunerated 
for. 
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Thornton (2004) referred to the King II report for guidelines regarding the remuneration 
committee. The King II report suggested that the remuneration committee should 
preferably consist of only non-executive directors, in order to ensure that there will be 
no conflict of interest when determining the remuneration packages for executive 
directors. CEOs are also only allowed to join the committee when invited and not when 
the committee is busy discussing the CEO’s remuneration package. 
Swart (2010:3) listed the following aspects when the purpose of the remuneration 
committee is defined in determining the firm’s broad policy with respect to incentive 
arrangements, remuneration, bonuses, share options, compensation payments and 
pension rights. The remuneration committee should: 
• Ensure effectiveness and satisfactory incentive schemes as well as reviewing 
and approving principles needed in this regard; 
• Report on environmental, social and corporate governance issues; 
• Consider the impact of performance objectives when making remuneration 
decisions; 
• Assist the board in matters referred to the committee; 
• Abide by and apply all the laws and codes when determining directors’ 
remuneration; and 
• Monitor and review the responsibilities of management in comparison to the 
remuneration paid from time to time. 
According to the TTI Group (2012), the main role and function of the remuneration 
committee is to assist the board in developing and administering a fair and transparent 
procedure for determining the remuneration policy of the firm. When determining the 
remuneration packages for management the following are taken into consideration: the 
basis of their merit, qualifications and competence compared to the firm’s operating 
results, individual performance and comparable market statistics. 
The remuneration committee is always liable to state the reasons and motivate any 
remuneration decisions made by the committee. In general the remuneration 
committee is identified as a key factor to consider when a relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and firms’ financial performance is investigated. 
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One important aspect that the remuneration committee is responsible for, is to ensure 
that proper disclosure and transparency are adhered to. 
(c) Disclosure and transparency of directors’ remuneration 
The disclosure of directors’ remuneration is becoming increasingly important. 
According to Pile (2010:1), all the remuneration and benefits of directors that are 
audited, should be disclosed in the firm’s financial statements in line with South Africa’s 
Companies Act of 2008. For this study’s timeframe the Companies Act of 1973 was 
still applied. Only the total remuneration (direct and indirect) had to be disclosed in the 
annual financial statements according to the Companies Act 1973. 
A survey conducted by PwC (2010:10) indicated that an average JSE-listed firm’s 
executive director earned 250 to 300 times more than the lowest paid executive 
directors. For this reason PwC believes that there is a legitimate requirement for firms 
to justify their decisions on directors’ remuneration. Greater transparency should 
mitigate challenges regarding excessive payments to directors.  
South Africa is known for the pay gap between firm directors. For example, if the pay 
gap is quoted at 300, it indicates that one person’s remuneration is 300 times more 
than that of another. This large gap identified, makes disclosure regarding directors’ 
remuneration even more important, due to the problems that arise from improper 
disclosure or insufficient transparency. However, there are advantages and 
disadvantages regarding these contentious problems mentioned in this section. 
According to Retief (2011:2), Section 30(4) of the Companies Act (2008) outlines the 
following factors that must be included in the annual financial statements of a firm with 
regard to directors’ remuneration: 
• The remuneration and benefits received by each director as defined in Section 
30(6); 
• The amount of pension paid by the firm to the director or pension scheme; 
• Payments made due to loss of office; 
• Number of shares issued to a director by the firm; and 
• Details of service contracts with regard to directors’ agreements. 
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By ensuring proper disclosure regarding remuneration for directors, the firm could 
attempt to experience fewer agency problems and should be seen in a more positive 
light by the public and media. From the above discussion, it can be concluded that 
proper disclosure of directors’ remuneration is an important aspect, especially when 
trading on the JSE and when the firm’s reputation is at stake. 
(d) Remuneration paid to directors and firm size 
The size of a firm does not only influence the total amount of remuneration received 
by its directors, but also the ratio of sub-components allocated in the total remuneration 
package, for example the amount of fixed and variable incentives. A firm’s size and 
type are also important factors when attempting to compare remuneration levels 
between firms in different sectors and when considering the market and the JSE as a 
whole. 
Research conducted by PwC (2011:4) after the global financial crisis in 2008 already 
indicated a vast increase in remuneration for executives in the twelve months for 2010 
compared to the same period in 2009. The results obtained from the study done by 
PwC (2011) suggested that directors received basic salaries comparable with firms of 
a similar size (benchmarking) and remuneration could even be compared with the 
international environment. 
In this research study, the focus was on firms from the Industrial Sector. All firms that 
were listed on the Industrial Sector of the JSE during the period 2002 to 2010 were 
considered. Those that delisted were also included. Furthermore, firms had to comply 
with the additional requirements set in this study to be included in the final sample. By 
considering all firms in the sector, irrespective of their size, a potential size bias was 
reduced. 
1.2.4 Remuneration and performance 
Directors should be managing a firm in such a way as to maximise shareholders’ value 
by managing the day-to-day operations as well as ensuring sustainable future growth. 
Therefore, when satisfactory financial performance is achieved by a firm, its directors 
should be compensated accordingly in terms of their remuneration (De Wet, 2004:13). 
Performance criteria will be instrumental to ensure that directors’ remuneration is fair 
and appropriate for the job and in line with the results they achieved. Performance 
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criteria for directors are divided into three broad types of measures: market-based 
measures, accounting-based measures and individual-based measures (Greene, 
2010). Forms of these three types of measures used to measure directors’ 
performance include: 
Market-based measures which focus on: 
• Shareholder return; 
• Share price (and other market-based measures); and 
• Profit-based measures. 
Accounting-based measures which address: 
• Return on capital employed; and 
• Earnings per share. 
Individual-based measures which focus on: 
• Individual director performance (in contrast to corporate performance 
measures). 
The measures are used to evaluate financial performance (Mallin, 2009:254). When 
trying to find a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of a firm, the financial statements of firms can be very useful to obtain the 
necessary information. The total remuneration package for directors is usually easily 
accessible from financial statements when needed for research purposes. In this 
research study’s case the total remuneration for each director was sub-divided, in order 
to assess the different sub-components and their relationship with the financial 
performance of the firm. The reason for sub-dividing the total amount of remuneration 
is that not all parts of the package may hold a relationship with the financial 
performance of a firm, and if so, the relationship type may vary between these sub-
components. For instance, a specific incentive may be provided to achieve a specific 
performance objective of a firm. This may influence a specific sub-component in the 
total remuneration package. 
Strong pay-for-performance sensitivity is seen as a key metric in aligning the differing 
objectives of directors and shareholders. Scepticism in this regard is often observed 
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due to the fact that compensation performance contracts are sometimes identified as 
greed instruments rather than an innocent incentive mechanism (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2004:8). 
When considering the immediate relationship between director remuneration and 
trying to identify results regarding profit maximisation and firm performance, it becomes 
almost impossible to draw definite conclusions. However, it is possible to pinpoint 
patterns in director remuneration to assist in determining whether profits are consistent 
when compared. Baumol (1967:46) hypothesised that executive directors’ salaries are 
far more correlated to the scale of business operations than profitability. 
According to Jensen and Murphy (1990:225), remuneration for directors shows small 
sensitivity to the overall performance of firms. This finding is in contrast to the agency 
theory. In the agency theory, an attempt to resolve the agency problem between 
shareholders and directors is exercised in the form of incentives. Designing an optimal 
remuneration package for directors to ensure and align mutual interest for both parties 
suggests that a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of firms should exist. 
Other studies have also failed to show that the relationship between payment and 
performance is strong, such as Jensen and Murphy (2004:98) and Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia (1998). A PwC report (2010) confirmed that there is no direct correlation 
between market capitalisation (calculated by the number of shares issued and 
prevailing share prices) and the remuneration of directors. Thus, not all the studies 
investigating the relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm performance 
yielded the same findings and results. 
A study conducted by Dommisse (2011:5) examined the total remuneration package 
of directors and compared it to the financial performance of a selected sample of firms 
listed on the JSE. This was done to ascertain whether there is a relationship between 
the total remuneration package and a number of selected financial performance 
variables included in the study. Turnover, income, and income before interest and tax 
(EBIT) were the performance factors used to compare financial performance with the 
total remuneration package. The study found significant relationships between the total 
remuneration for directors and the selected variables regarding the financial 
performance for the firms. A strong correlation of more than 80% was also observed 
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between total directors’ remuneration and the variables selected for financial 
performance of the firms. Directors’ remuneration only increased when there was a 
concomitant increase in turnover, income and profit. Only five of the 120 firms selected 
for the study showed a negative correlation, confirming a strong relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of the firms. These research 
studies suggest that possible relationships between directors’ remuneration and the 
firms’ performance might exist, but the type of relationship, if any, is in most cases 
unknown. 
Given the background provided in the previous section of this study, including previous 
research studies done globally in this field, the importance of this study is clear. The 
remainder of this chapter focuses on the research problem, research objectives, 
research design, hypotheses, orientation of the study and concludes with the necessity 
for research in the specific field. 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
From a shareholder’s point of view, any disproportion between directors’ remuneration 
and the financial performance of a firm raised serious questions about the method 
according to which directors were rewarded. The relationship between total directors’ 
remuneration and the financial performance of a firm will be investigated. Sub-
components of directors’ remuneration and types of relationships towards financial 
performance variables will also be analysed and tested. In addition to the various 
relationship tests, four debatable areas needed specific attention. These included: 
• The overall level of total director remuneration and share options/share gains; 
• The suitability of financial performance measures, based on their ability to 
motivate directors to act in a way to create shareholders’ value; 
• The role and independence of the remuneration committee in determining 
director remuneration; and 
• Shareholder influence on the remuneration of the directors. 
In this study, the sub-components of directors’ remuneration are identified and 
compared to the financial performance variables selected for this study. Investigations 
like these may assist firms to set their remuneration for directors in a more strategic 
way and to ensure shareholders’ value maximisation as well as the sustainable 
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financial performance of the firm. Findings from this study should assist and inform 
firms of the latest remuneration trends, in order to easily benchmark themselves to the 
industry and competitors. Furthermore, proper disclosure and enhancing transparency 
by means of implementing the required principles should be helpful in addressing the 
research problem. 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In order to address the research problem, the following primary and secondary 
objectives are formulated: 
Primary objective: 
• To investigate the expected relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
the financial performance of a firm. 
Secondary objectives: 
• Identifying the different sub-components of the total directors’ remuneration and 
their importance towards the firms’ financial performance measures identified; 
• Investigating the contribution of the various sub-components towards total 
remuneration; 
• Investigating the relationship between the various sub-components of directors’ 
remuneration and firms’ financial performance variables selected; 
• Comparing the total and the sub-component remuneration of executive directors 
with the financial performance variables of the firms; and 
• Comparing total non-executive directors’ remuneration with the financial 
performance of the firms. 
This study focuses on the directors’ full remuneration package as well as the 
remuneration per sub-component. All executive and non-executive directors of sample 
firms selected from the Industrial Sector are considered. Listed and firms that delisted 
during the timeframe 2002 until 2010 are included, provided that the necessary 
information is available. The directors’ total remuneration package is divided into its 
sub-components, consisting of basic salary, bonuses, share options or grants 
exercised as well as other remuneration/allowances in order to identify the possible 
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relationship of each sub-component in the total remuneration package with the 
financial performance of a firm. 
Four measures of financial performance were selected to investigate different aspects 
of a firm’s sustainability and performance over the short and long term. To achieve the 
objective of this study, all relevant measures of financial performance were obtained 
from the firms’ financial statements, and used to quantify financial performance. Short-
term measures identified were turnover and earnings per share (EPS). The long-term 
measures considered were total share return (TSR) and market value added (MVA). 
These measures were selected due to the vast scope of financial coverage they 
provide, thus including accounting-, market- and individual-based measures. 
By identifying a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of the firm, the shareholders and stakeholders can judge whether the 
supervision of the remuneration committee and the firm’s current strategy, are sound 
and of a satisfactory standard. If there is no relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and the financial performance of the firm, it could suggest excessive 
incentives for directors, thus not enhancing the overall performance of the firm. 
Excessive remuneration would only be plausible when sound financial performance by 
a firm can be used as a motivation for the decision. Since directors’ remuneration is 
currently a very sensitive and contentious issue, not only in South Africa but worldwide, 
this study also investigated the financial performance of firms paying very large 
amounts to their executives. If the firm’s financial performance was in line with the 
remuneration that the directors received during the given timeframe, the positive 
relationship could be seen as justification for the high remuneration levels. 
Based on past research, sub-dividing remuneration packages and identifying trends in 
fixed and variable incentives also provides an indication of the way that firms are 
structuring total remuneration for directors (Bognanno, 2010:2). As in a study 
conducted by Murphy (1999), remuneration was split into four categories, consisting of 
base salary, bonus, share gains and other incentives. 
Based on the research problem and the objectives of the study formulated in the 
previous two sections, the hypotheses were developed. 
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1.4.1 Hypotheses 
A hypothesis is an unproven proposition that tentatively explains a certain assumption. 
The null hypothesis (H0) then, is a statement of the status quo, communicating the 
notion that any change from what has been thought to be true or observed in the past 
will be due entirely to random error (Zikmund, 2003:499). By means of statistical 
techniques, the researcher determines whether the empirical evidence confirms the 
theoretical hypothesis. The main objective of the study was to assess whether there is 
a relationship between the remuneration of directors and the financial performance of 
firms. The study did not only help to shed more light on the issue of overcompensation 
for executives, but also to solve the problem surrounding disclosure by investigating 
whether firms applied the principles of the King II report. Finally, it should ensure that 
remuneration committees use the appropriate strategy to set remuneration packages 
for directors. 
Therefore, the following null and alternative hypotheses were formulated: 
Ho: There is no relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of firms. 
 
H1: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of firms. 
If the alternative hypothesis (H1) is rejected, it could indicate that the shareholders, 
stakeholders and the general public may have the right to disagree on the excessive 
packages directors receive and that they may protest against these incentives. If a 
positive relationship is found and (H1) is not rejected, the firms may justify and state 
that the remuneration for directors is acceptable, thus rejecting the null hypothesis (Ho). 
Having formulated the hypotheses, the research method is discussed below in Section 
1.5. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHOD 
This study is based on data that were collected from listed and delisted Industrial 
Sector firms on the JSE during the period 2002 to 2010. The research is based on 
quantitative time-series cross-sectional data (panel data) by investigating all the 
individual firms’ financial statements throughout the nine-year timeframe, focusing on 
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both the financial performance and the compilation of directors’ (executive and non-
executive) remuneration for each firm. 
All the data required for the study were secondary data which were obtained from 
external databases. McGregor BFA (2012) and TimBukOne (2012) are research 
databases that specialise in the financial reports of firms listed on the JSE. McGregor 
BFA (2012) was used as the main source to obtain the data required for the measures 
and figures to evaluate the firms’ financial performance. TimBukOne (2012) was the 
other main source used for collecting data about the directors’ remuneration, as 
disclosed in the financial statements. The data were then converted into Microsoft 
Excel (2012) to be standardised for the study. All the data collected assisted with the 
descriptive and inferential statistics that were executed in SPSS (2012). 
This study’s research process commenced by formulating the relevant hypotheses, as 
mentioned in the previous section, followed by developing the research design and 
methodology in Chapter 4. The research process for this study consisted of ten steps. 
All the required information regarding the type of data used as well as identifying the 
dependent and independent variables are mentioned in this chapter and more 
comprehensively in Chapter 4. In this study’s case the dependent variables are the 
directors’ remuneration and its sub-components. The independent variables are the 
selected financial performance measures selected. 
The data processing and analysis of the dependent and independent variables were 
considered separately at first. Both the variable types were analysed applying 
descriptive and inferential statistical tests. In the inferential statistic section, regression 
models are applied, thus trying to find the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. In instances where outliers were identified in the data set, 
trimming was applied in order to refine the results. If time delays between financial 
performance and directors’ remuneration occur, lag testing would be helpful. Additional 
testing for lags between the dependent and independent variables are therefore also 
performed to determine possible relationships.  
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1.5.1 Research design 
When considering the research design, it is important for the researcher to anticipate 
the appropriate research method to maximise the validity of the eventual results 
(Mouton, 1996:107). This study mostly employed secondary research methods. 
(a) Secondary research and secondary data 
Grinyer (2009) defined secondary research as the use of existing data collected for the 
purposes of a prior study, to peruse a distinct research interest from the original work. 
Secondary data are most commonly associated with quantitative data. According to 
Boyce (2002:94), one of the major rewards of secondary research is that it can offer 
the necessary background information to improve the researcher’s perspective of the 
situation surrounding the current issues. 
Secondary data can be obtained from internal and external sources. Internal, or in-
house data, are secondary information acquired from within the organisation where the 
research is being carried out. External secondary data sources include books, journals, 
newspapers, internet websites as well as external databases (Boyce, 2000:96). For 
the purpose of this study, external secondary data were predominantly used. 
To obtain the secondary data, the researcher first conducted a thorough literature 
review regarding firm performance, and narrowed it down to the financial performance 
of firms. Continuing with the literature review, remuneration in general and directors’ 
remuneration including its sub-components in particular were discussed. Previous 
studies of a similar nature were also included to emphasise the significance of the 
study. Books, academic journals and other publications were used to identify the 
expected relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance 
of firms. Furthermore, prior studies and reading material with regard to remuneration 
and the factors that normally influence it, were analysed. Information relevant to this 
study was used and modified to apply it as part of the literature review and the research 
design of this study. All this information provided a solid theoretical background for the 
study. 
External databases were used to obtain the data needed for the empirical analysis. 
The data required to measure financial performance were obtained from the McGregor 
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BFA (2012) database. The reason for using McGregor BFA as the main data source is 
because of its complete set of standardised financial reports for all the Industrial Sector 
JSE-listed firms. McGregor BFA (2012) is also a popular data source for researchers. 
Lastly, data regarding the remuneration of directors were obtained from TimBukOne 
(2012). The directors’ total remuneration and sub-components were collected under 
the directors’ shareholding and remuneration sources as stated on the financial reports 
for each firm. 
As mentioned previously, the primary objective of this study was to determine whether 
the remuneration of directors had any relationship with the financial performance of 
firms. By applying regression analysis on these variables, the stigma regarding 
overcompensated directors could be addressed. Listed firms (those firms that 
remained listed during the study period) and delisted firms (firms that delisted during 
the study’s time period, but existed for at least three consecutive years) on the 
Industrial Sector of the JSE were included. The time period for the study was 2002 until 
2010. A large sample was selected in this study since the data for most firms were 
readily available. The Industrial Sector was selected due to its large size and the 
general nature of firms listed in this sector. 
To be included in the study, a firm had to be listed on the Industrial Sector within the 
timeframe period for at least three consecutive years with the necessary information 
disclosed regarding its financial statements, remuneration paid to directors, the layout 
of the remuneration package given to the directors, and share price reports. To 
investigate this relationship, the following variables are discussed. 
(b) Independent and dependent variables 
The dependent variable for this study is the directors’ total remuneration. This variable 
was divided into sub-components of directors’ remuneration collected from the financial 
statements of the firms. The dependent variable’s four sub-components are basic 
salary, bonuses, share options/grants exercised and other incentives. 
An independent variable is a variable whose value is not determined by the value of 
other variable(s), but rather determines the value of those other variables (Financial 
Dictionary, 2012). The independent variables for this study are the various financial 
performance measures. In this study, these variables were quantified in different ways 
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to reflect different aspects of financial performance, and included in the statistical 
analysis to investigate their relationship with the dependent variable. The independent 
variables used in this study were turnover, earnings per share (EPS), total share return 
(TSR) and market value added (MVA). 
1.5.2 Data processing and analysis 
Data processing consists of at least two kinds of operations. The first operation entails 
the general method, during which the data are extracted to obtain the relevant required 
information, and then summarised in an appropriate form like a diagram, report or 
table. The second operation is by manipulating the input data with an application 
programme to obtain the relevant output as graphs, numbers or texts (Business 
Dictionary, 2013b). 
As mentioned in the research design, McGregor BFA (2012) and TimBukOne (2012) 
were used as the primary sources for all the secondary data needed for the study. The 
data were analysed and converted to a useable format using Microsoft Excel (2012). 
Data analysis comprises various steps and is used to examine each component of the 
data provided analytically and logically. Various sources of data are usually gathered, 
reviewed and analysed to form findings or reach a conclusion for specific research 
(Business Dictionary, 2013b). Generally, data processing starts by first analysing the 
data set in order to compile descriptive statistics, which is followed by inferential 
statistics. 
(a) Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study. 
They offer simple summaries about the sample and the measures included in the 
study. Together with a simple graphical analysis, they form the basis of virtually every 
quantitative breakdown of data (Williams, 2006). In this study, the following descriptive 
statistics were included: 
(i)  Mean: The mean is a measure of central tendency and it reflects all the values in a 
data set. All the values in a data set are added and divided by the number of values 
(Coldwell & Herbst, 2004:102) to determine the mean. 
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(ii)  Median: According to Coldwell and Herbst (2004:103), the median is the middle 
observation of a data set. Values are ranked according to increasing sizes, and the 
middle value represents the median value. 
(iii)  Standard deviation: DeFusco, McLeavey, Pinto and Runkle (2008:287) stated that 
the standard deviation measures the spreading of the mean. The mean and standard 
deviation are usually presented together when summarising data. The standard 
deviation explains the measure of dispersion within data. 
(iv)  Skewness: Skewness is described as an asymmetry from the normal distribution 
in a set of statistical data. Skewness can come in the form of "negative skewness" or 
"positive skewness", depending on whether data points are skewed to the left (negative 
skew) or to the right (positive skew) of the data mean (Cooper & Schindler, 1998:468). 
(v)  Kurtosis: Kurtosis is any measure of the "peakedness" of the probability distribution 
of a random variable. In a similar way to the concept of skewness, kurtosis is a 
descriptor of the shape of a probability distribution and, just as for skewness, there are 
different ways of quantifying it for a theoretical distribution and corresponding ways of 
estimating it for a sample from a population (Dodge, 2003). 
All these descriptive statistic measures and their results assisted the researcher to 
select proper regression analyses and to identify other tests for the study, as discussed 
in the next section on inferential statistics. 
(b) Inferential statistics 
According to McDaniel and Gates (2001:413), the basic principle of statistical inference 
is that numbers can be different mathematically, but at the same time not significantly 
different statistically. In this study, a probability hurdle of .05 was used to determine 
whether a relationship between variables was significant or not. Less than .05 indicated 
a significant relationship and a probability larger than .05 indicated insignificance. A 
more thorough discussion on this topic is included in the research method chapter. In 
this study, regression analyses were most suited and performed to test the 
relationships between variables. 
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(i)  Regression: Regression is a statistical technique that attempts to determine the 
strength of the relationship between one dependent variable (components of directors’ 
remuneration in this study) and a series of other changing variables (financial 
performance measures in this study). Regression analysis considers a group of 
random variables, thought to be predicting the dependent variable, and attempts to 
find a mathematical relationship between them (Kruskal & Tanur, 1978). 
For the purpose of this study, multiple regressions were conducted. Multiple 
regressions are applied when more than two independent variables are included. Since 
the study identified four independent variables, multiple regressions were required. 
The data set for this study can be classified as panel data. Thus, the regression 
analysis techniques applied are more complex than for normal regressions. Panel data 
sets contain observations on various observed units over a time period for different 
firms (Keller, 2005:650). In this study’s case the time period is from 2002 until 2010 
and for each year a number of different variables were obtained for every firm that was 
listed in that year. In order to determine the most appropriate regression model to apply 
to the data set, the F-test for fixed effects and Hausman test for random effects had to 
be conducted to select either a fixed effects, random effects or pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model. Additional tests, like the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity, assisted to obtain more accurate results when data were not 
normally distributed. The regression tests, measures and models used and applied on 
the selected data set for this study are also discussed and motivated comprehensively 
in Chapter 4. 
1.6 ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY 
The outline of the study is as follows: 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Chapter 1 provides a thorough background and outline of the study, setting and 
formulating the research problem, objectives, research methodology and discussing 
briefly the research methods that were employed in the study. A brief literature review 
on the key issues investigated in the study is also included. The chapter concludes by 
explaining the importance and contribution of this study in a South African context. 
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CHAPTER 2:  FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
This chapter starts with an overview of corporate performance in general, and then 
continues to discuss important aspects related to the financial performance of firms in 
particular. The concept of firms’ performance in relation to shareholders’ wealth is 
discussed in-depth, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages when creating 
shareholders’ value. Other factors related to financial performance, such as the 
stakeholders’ theory and the agency theory are also examined. 
The last two sections in Chapter 2 focus on different evaluation measures employed 
by firms in order to estimate performance. The first section, where non-financial 
measures are discussed, is followed by the second section, which investigates 
financial evaluation measures. As this study focused primarily on the financial 
performance of firms, Chapter 2 concludes with an in-depth discussion of accounting- 
and market-based measures when evaluating a firm’s financial performance. 
CHAPTER 3:  DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION  
Chapter 3 covers all the key factors related to remuneration. Starting with a 
background, definition and an overall view of the concept of remuneration, the focus 
shifts to an in-depth analysis and discussion of directors’ remuneration, including the 
following: the external and internal factors influencing directors’ remuneration; the 
remuneration strategy and remuneration requirements; the structuring of directors’ 
remuneration packages; the role and importance of a remuneration committee; the 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration; and the psychological impact of remuneration on 
directors. 
Chapter 3 also includes a separate section focusing on non-executive directors’ 
remuneration. Since the roles and responsibilities of non-executive directors are 
different from executive directors, their remuneration structure also differs. 
The final section in Chapter 3 concludes with an extensive literature review of previous 
studies done worldwide on the relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
financial performance of firms in order to highlight the importance of this research as 
well as to develop expectations about relationships between the variables included in 
the study. 
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CHAPTER 4:  METHODOLOGY 
This chapter focuses on the research methodology for the study. It starts with a 
definition of business research, a comparison of different business research methods 
and why a scientific research method was chosen. It also emphasises the importance 
of business research in terms of a firm’s financial performance and maximising 
shareholders’ wealth. 
The remainder of Chapter 4 is based on the complete research process, as outlined 
by Lamb, Hair, McDaniel, Boshoff, Terblanche, Elliott and Klopper (2010:15). Each of 
the ten steps identified in this research process is explained and discussed in-depth, 
including the following: defining the research problem; identifying the research 
objectives; creating and developing a research design; conducting primary research; 
planning the research framework and design; collecting, analysing and interpreting the 
secondary data; compiling the research findings report; and follow-up and monitoring. 
Very important decision-making regarding the entire research process took place in 
Chapter 4. These selections influenced the entire research process. First the data 
collection method was identified (secondary data) followed by selecting a sample. 
Other important choices included selecting and motivating the variables for the study 
and furthermore determining which variables represent the dependent and 
independent variables respectively. 
The chapter concludes by explaining why it was necessary to use two types of 
statistical measures, namely descriptive and inferential statistics. The importance of 
motivating the validity and reliability of these measures, as well as that of the data used 
in the study, is also emphasised. 
CHAPTER 5:  RESEARCH RESULTS 
In this chapter, data relating to the directors’ remuneration and financial performance 
are analysed. This chapter provides the results as determined from the empirical 
analysis of the data. Tables and graphs are provided to explain the overall results for 
the descriptive statistics as well as the regressions analyses conducted as part of the 
inferential statistics section. 
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In Chapter 5 both the descriptive and inferential statistics sections display the results 
according to a specific pattern. Each section starts by first focusing on the dependent 
variables (total directors’ remuneration results) and then the independent variables 
(firms’ financial performance measures). 
In terms of the dependent variables, the total remuneration for all directors is 
considered at first. Thereafter a distinction is made between executive and non-
executive directors in order to more specifically focus on these two types of directors’ 
remuneration results. Subsequent to the above, the directors’ total remuneration is 
then categorised into the four sub-components selected in this study. Each one of 
these sub-components is then investigated to identify trends and possible relationships 
with financial performance. 
Additional tests were completed when conducting the inferential analyses and 
reporting the results in Chapter 5 to increase the accuracy and usefulness of the 
information. Finally lag testing was conducted to test the possibility for time delays 
between firms performing financially and directors being remunerated afterwards. 
CHAPTER 6:  SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION  
The final chapter concludes the study by summarising the overall findings and 
extensively discussing how the findings can assist firms, shareholders, stakeholders 
and the general public. More specifically, it points out how the study’s findings, 
combined with earlier research, can help with future decision-making in respect of 
directors’ remuneration. 
Chapter 6 concludes by acknowledging possible limitations of the study and suggested 
future research in the study’s field. 
1.7 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The skewed income distribution in South Africa has been a major source of concern. 
According to Dommisse (2011:4) the country Gini-coefficient of 0.57 indicates that 
South Africa has one of the most skewed income distributions in the world. A value of 
0 indicates that the income difference level is at the lowest possible level and a value 
of 1 indicates the most skewed distribution. This problem is one that not only appeared 
after the global financial crisis in 2008, but was mentioned long before 2008. This 
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skewed income distribution affects the entire country, and is also observed when 
considering directors’ remuneration. The substantial difference between a normal 
employee’s salary and those of directors in South Africa is often considered as a 
source of concern. The government, public and shareholders want to ensure that the 
remuneration paid to a director is appropriate, rather than excessive salaries being 
paid without proper motivation. Even trade unions are starting to investigate directors’ 
remuneration, because they believe that their normal hardworking members are being 
exploited (Dommisse, 2011:12). 
The study will further assist firms to understand how trends are changing with regard 
to directors’ remuneration packages. The focus is not only on the total remuneration 
packages of directors, but also on the different components such as the guaranteed 
and variable parts of the remuneration package. In this study, directors’ remuneration 
sub-components were identified as basic salary, bonus, share options/grants 
exercised and other remuneration/incentives. Finding the appropriate relationship 
between the directors’ remuneration sub-components, the total directors’ remuneration 
package and the financial performance of the firm, should help to identify potential 
problem areas, contribute towards the development of efficient remuneration strategies 
and ensure the sustainability and competitiveness of the firm. 
Using statistical measures, tables and graphs, the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and the financial performance of firms is clarified, reducing the problem 
of misconceptions the general public and media might have of overcompensated 
directors. Lastly, the research may assist firms to plan their short- and long-term 
sustainability initiatives around directors’ remuneration and the firm’s financial 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 2: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The term ‘financial performance’ is defined as a particular measure of how a firm 
utilises its assets for the primary mode of business to generate returns (Business 
Dictionary, 2013a). Financial performance is generally regarded as a measure of a 
firm’s total financial health over a given time period, and is used to compare similar 
firms in the same industry, or to compare industries or sectors with each other. The 
financial performance of a firm directly influences its shareholders by means of share 
value creation and capital growth in the firm. Therefore, this chapter commences by 
focusing on shareholders’ value, shareholders’ principles as well as advantages and 
disadvantages of maximising shareholders’ wealth. 
After a discussion of a firm’s relationship with its shareholders, the literature review is 
also used to identify various other stakeholders, using the stakeholder theory as 
starting point. From here the focus shifts to the agency theory, providing support for a 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and a firm’s financial performance. By 
defining the agency theory, the study first focuses on the management of the agency 
problem, followed by a discussion of the conflict between the parties involved in the 
agency theory. Non-financial factors affecting a firm’s performance are also 
considered. 
The last section of this chapter focuses more specifically on literature pertaining to the 
financial performance of a firm. Various market and accounting measures that are 
commonly used to quantify the financial performance of firms in previous research 
studies are discussed. To conclude, this chapter identifies a set of financial 
performance measures that are relevant for this study. Each one of these measures 
are discussed individually to determine its importance, before concluding the 
discussion of the chapter. 
2.2 SHAREHOLDERS’ VALUE 
The term ‘shareholders’ value maximisation’, sometimes phrased as the ‘shareholders’ 
value model’, is defined as the ultimate measure of a firm’s financial performance in 
terms of shareholders’ wealth. This measure is used to identify the primary financial 
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goal for a firm and to reward the shareholders with incentives such as dividends or 
increasing share prices (Welch, 2009). 
Fernandez (2013:1) defined shareholders’ value as the sum of all strategic decisions 
that affect the firm's ability to increase its free cash flow over time. This value is 
delivered to shareholders as a result of the ability of managers to grow earnings. 
Making wise investment decisions and ensuring healthy returns on invested capital are 
two core drivers in creating value for shareholders – the only important consideration 
is to be responsible when working with shareholders’ capital. The opposite can also 
occur when mismanagement occurs by taking unnecessary risks or making poor 
decisions. 
Shareholders’ value is reflected by firms as the ultimate measure for determining the 
firm’s success in the extent of enriching its shareholders. Shareholder value is the 
value enjoyed by a shareholder possessing shares in a firm. Typically when only one 
type of share is issued by a firm, the shareholders’ value would be the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the current share price. Since firms belong to 
shareholders, it is only obvious that firms need to create value for them and that 
management may only spend funds if it is authorised or is in the best interest of 
shareholders. Firms first and foremost have a responsibility towards their 
shareholders. Shareholders’ value maximisation is a controversial issue. In the ideal 
setting firms compensate their directors to pursue the firms’ goals and to ensure 
performance from the directors for optimal value creation. Unfortunately this ideal 
setting is not always the case. Friedman (1970) made the statement that the “business 
of business is business” and that a firm’s responsibility is to increase its profits. 
Maximising shareholders’ value also helps to discipline managers to rather perform to 
increase the shareholders’ value than to focus on their own interests. 
According to Jensen (2001:297), the main goal of a firm needs to be the maximisation 
of its shareholders’ value. If a firm does not pay attention to its shareholders and 
increase shareholders’ value, the firm itself will not be able to maximise its own growth 
either. It is important to link the growth of a firm with shareholders’ value maximisation 
to create synergy for all parties involved. 
Maximising shareholders’ value forms the foundation of value based management and 
is a key management principle that should first and foremost ensure that the best 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
38 
 
interest of the shareholders is considered. Shareholders should be taken into 
consideration and be notified when business decisions are made that may influence 
their value in the firm. There is, however, no legal obligation for directors to maximise 
shareholders’ value (Kennerly, 2010). 
Martin et al. (2009:118) emphasised the importance of VBM. Their study supported the 
consistency between maximising shareholders’ wealth and rewarding management for 
doing so. Their study suggested that the VBM relationship is critical to ensure that firms 
maintain a positive reputation. To promote the shareholders’ interest and VBM in a 
firm, firms are requested to comply with a few value principles that will benefit the firm 
and at the same time maximise shareholders’ value. 
2.3 SHAREHOLDERS’ VALUE PRINCIPLES 
The general understanding is that shareholders’ value maximisation should be the 
single, guiding principle of corporate governance. Enhanced investor control and 
oversight should be stimulated in this regard. There are, however, a few assumptions 
and beliefs regarding proper governance in firms. According to Blair (2003:53), the 
following set of fundamental beliefs are incorporated or implied by the shareholders’ 
value principles of corporate governance: 
• Maximising the value for shareholders of a firm is equivalent to maximising the 
overall wealth being created by a firm; 
• Share price is a good performance measure, although financial markets also 
play a role; 
• Managers are disciplined by being held accountable for maximising 
shareholders’ value, and this ensures that they are forward-looking. Other 
metrics may confuse management and may lead to the misuse of their positions 
for their own interests rather than the interests of shareholders; 
• Proper incentives, in the form of remuneration packages, will ensure that 
competent managers and directors are retained in the firm. This will encourage 
the latter to do a better job of maximising share value tied to share-price 
performance, such as share options; 
• Directors and management should not be able to entrench themselves when 
outside investors want to take control of companies in hostile buyouts, by putting 
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up an impenetrable barrier. Proper governance ensure sustainability in the 
financial market; and 
• Shareholder primacy regimes should be adopted to prevent management to 
deterring takeovers. 
All these principles play an important role to ensure that shareholders’ value is created 
in an efficient and effective manner, but both the advantages and disadvantages of 
shareholders’ value maximisation need to be acknowledged.  
2.3.1 Advantages of shareholders’ value maximisation 
When shareholders’ value maximisation is mentioned, the average individual most 
probably immediately thinks of profits, higher returns and optimistic annual corporate 
reports. These are, however, not the only advantages when shareholders’ value is 
maximised. Johnson (2013) listed a few other advantages when wealth for 
shareholders is created. These advantages include: 
• When shareholders’ value increase, a chain reaction occurs, benefitting more 
people and creating further wealth. Earnings, growth of the firm and share prices 
also increase; 
• VBM is applied when managers strive for shareholders’ value maximisation; 
• Shareholders’ value maximisation helps to discipline management and is an 
effective measure to evaluate managers; 
• Shareholders’ value is tightly linked to continued business expansion (capital 
and operations) and profits (sustainability); 
• When shareholders are satisfied, they become loyal and the firm will have 
committed board members; 
• The public reputation of the firm when obtaining media attention thanks to 
performance and satisfied shareholders can strengthen the firm’s value even 
more; and 
• Better long-term sustainability is possible when firms work towards maximising 
the value of shareholders. 
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Madden (2010:134) agreed with Johnson (2013) that maximising shareholders’ value 
is not only beneficial for the obvious purpose, but also for the larger social community. 
When firms continually grow, invest or expand, long-term wealth is created for 
everyone. Unfortunately, not everything is perfect when firms only focus on 
shareholders’ value; therefore the disadvantages regarding shareholders’ value 
maximisation also need to be investigated. 
2.3.2 Disadvantages of shareholders’ value maximisation 
Criticism against an exclusive focus on shareholders’ value maximisation has greatly 
increased following the global financial crisis in 2008. This is partly because of a lack 
of social responsibility in terms of employment, environmental issues and ethical 
business practices. In general, management’s sole intention is to increase 
shareholders’ value, but this approach may negatively influence third parties in the 
process. Other critics claim that CEOs and other individuals in management positions 
enrich themselves at the cost of shareholders (Aglietta & Reberioux, 2005:4). 
Martin et al. (2009) also suggested that firms need to shift their focus more towards 
corporate social responsibility in order to create a win-win situation for all stakeholders. 
Their study does not object to shareholders’ value creation, but points out that 
shareholders’ value creation should not be the only objective managers strive towards. 
A few disadvantages regarding shareholders’ value are listed below (Martin et al., 
2009): 
(a) A lack of transparency 
Shareholders’ value depends on how much profit a firm generates, since these 
financial results are usually reflected in the firm’s share price. To achieve higher share 
values, some firms use methods to fraudulently increase the profits reported in their 
financial statements. To prevent these fraudulent activities proper disclosure and 
transparency are needed. With better transparency, it will be possible to distinguish 
between actual profits and fraudulent profits. 
(b) Increased risk 
In an attempt to increase short-term shareholders’ value, some firms may take larger 
risks than usual. The stability and sustainability of the firm should be considered when 
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more debt and higher risk investments are realised. Taking large risks may attract 
investors and increase the share price, but could, at the same time, easily place the 
firm at risk of bankruptcy. 
(c) Short-term strategy 
Managers are sometimes so obsessed with shareholders’ value that they do not focus 
on the long-term success of the firm. Short-term strategies to increase the value of 
share options might be beneficial for share option holders over the short term, but not 
for the firm’s sustainability in the long term (Rappaport, 1998:13). 
When comparing the advantages with the disadvantages associated with 
shareholders’ value maximisation, it becomes apparent that most people do not agree 
with the theory of shareholders’ value maximisation. Many academics argue for or 
against a consensus view that managers should strive to maximise shareholders’ 
value, and by doing so, impact on the broader social welfare of others. For this reason, 
it is important to take the stakeholder theory into consideration to understand this 
integrated relationship in the firm. 
2.3.3 Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder theory is defined as the theoretical framework of business ethics and 
organisational management which focuses on the moral and ethical values of the 
management of a firm (Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004:364). The stakeholder theory 
argues that managers in a firm should make decisions so as to take account of the 
interests of all stakeholders in a firm (Jensen, 2001).  
In the last three decades, awareness of shareholders’ protection and rights became 
more evident as shareholders are the owners of a firm (Gugler, 2008:3). Therefore, a 
firm had a duty to put shareholders’ needs first, that is, to increase their value. 
However, the stakeholder theory argues that there are also other parties involved such 
as trade unions, communities, creditors, debtors, employees and customers. 
Value creation is an inevitable part of doing business when considering the stakeholder 
theory. A shared sense of value is created in a firm and managers must use value 
creation as the core aspect when bringing the stakeholders together. When managers 
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know how they want to do business and what the firm’s needs are, a proper relationship 
can be formed between stakeholders and the firm (Freeman et al., 2004:364). 
Martin et al. (2009:118) suggested that a firm’s cultural mind-set needs to be 
transformed towards corporate social responsibility and needs to consider the impact 
of a firm’s operations on all stakeholders. Their study’s evidence emphasised the 
critical importance of stakeholders for a firm’s long-term sustainability as well as for 
sustainable value creation. 
Criticism also exists against the stakeholder theory. Blattberg (2004:172) criticised the 
stakeholder theory, arguing that the interests of different stakeholders can be offset or 
compromised against one another. Blattberg (2004:173) commented that conflict can 
easily occur when applying the stakeholder theory, because not all stakeholders will 
ever benefit equally. 
Although researchers have different views as to whether the stakeholder theory should 
be applied or not, it is difficult to ignore the relationship between the shareholders, 
managers and other stakeholders of a firm. 
As seen from the section above, focusing exclusively on shareholders’ value 
maximisation may negatively impact on a firm’s other stakeholders. In addition, the 
managers and shareholders of a firm may have different objectives, which are not 
always aligned with each other and which may negatively influence the relationship 
between these two groups. This complex relationship between shareholders, 
stakeholders and managers is considered as part of the agency theory. 
2.4 THE AGENCY THEORY 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The agency problem is the result of differences in the objectives of management and 
shareholders. Adam Smith already identified the agency problem a few centuries ago 
in his book “The wealth of nations” (1776:607): 
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of 
their own, it cannot be well expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own. Like stewards of a rich man, 
they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give 
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themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, 
more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.” 
Since Roman times, firms and their management started to protect the interests of 
shareholders (referred to as principals and capital providers) (Lipman, 2010). During 
the late 19th century, managers were referred to as directors of the firms (acting as 
agents). Mismanagement and directors’ abuse of power for their own benefit lead to 
the agency problem. To prevent agency problems from occurring, a number of 
corporate governance measures were implemented (Carlos & Nicolas, 1996:916). The 
agency theory suggests that the optimal remuneration package for directors is one that 
links directors’ remuneration to some measures of the shareholders’ value and thus 
mitigates agency costs (Devers, Cannella, Reilly & Yoder, 2007:1016; Murphy, 1999). 
According to Appelbaum et al. (2011), the agency theory refers to the contract between 
persons, principals and agents. The agent performs a service for the principal and 
receives authority to make decisions for the principal on his/her behalf. The agent is 
compensated in return by looking after the interest of the principal. Although this 
sounds like the ideal solution for the agency problem, there is a good chance that the 
agent will not always act in the best interest of the principal, but may want to promote 
self-interest instead. This might be due to a lack of incentives or other personal 
reasons. Dalton and Daily (2001) recognised the agency theory as the most 
recognised theoretical perspective applied in corporate governance. Their study 
describes the fundamental agency problem within firms, where separation of 
ownership and control exists. 
2.4.2 Agency problem management 
To solve the agency problem, proper monitoring of management’s activities is needed. 
Initiatives in this respect can become very costly not only in financial terms, but also 
with regard to other factors like relationship and trust issues. 
Firms can manage the agency problem by focusing on how performance is promoted 
and rewarded. According to Ibrahim and Samad (2009), agency costs occur from the 
misalignment between shareholders and the firm’s managers. One of the core reasons 
for this conflict is due to excess cash and cash equivalents. Singh and Davidson 
(2003:793) and Florackis (2008:37) also revealed that small-sized firms have a 
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significant positive influence on asset utilisation efficiency, reporting that higher asset 
utilisation efficiency leads to lower agency costs. 
The board size of a firm can also negatively influence the relationship to asset turnover, 
indicating that more board members are less efficient (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid & 
Zimmermann, 2006:249). 
To assist in solving the agency problem, non-executive directors are included in the 
board of directors. When firms apply this governance mechanism, questions arise 
whether non-executive directors align themselves with shareholders to promote their 
interest, or with top management that influences the board. In most cases, it was found 
that the non-executive directors will align themselves with management rather than 
with shareholders (Long, Dulewicz & Gay, 2005:671). 
According to Hambrick and Jackson (2000:108), directors in general are suitably 
motivated when performing their required duties to ensure they adhere to act in the 
best interest of shareholders. Unfortunately, directors and shareholders do not always 
have the same view on certain issues as far as managing the firm and management 
practices are concerned. 
A common example where agency conflict occurs between managers and 
shareholders is time horizon differences. Managers in general have a shorter horizon 
than that of the firm and its shareholders. Another example of agency conflict is the 
difference in risk averseness that may exist between managers and shareholders 
(Ryan & Wiggins, 2001). The lack of incentives for managers are thus a key problem 
associated with monitoring management in an effective manner, especially when 
addressing agency problems. 
When remunerating directors with equity, Feltham and Fu (2001:7) recommended that 
shareholders distinguish between share option plans and full-value share unit plans. 
The reason is that when remuneration committees implement incentive-efficiency 
models, firms should rather remunerate their agents (directors) with full-value shares. 
The reason is that the directors manage the firm’s daily operating running and risk 
factors, thus motivating directors to work harder for share growth. Full-value shares 
are also preferred by directors as remuneration, as this option offers directors a longer 
horizon than the usual share options that expire at a certain time. This type of 
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remuneration could be used by a firm to ensure sustainability over the long-term 
(Magnan et al., 2009:28). 
Recently in the United States, a few public firms’ directors failed in their task in the 
aftermath of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (also known as the 'Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act'). Directors’ tasks and responsibilities that consist 
of financial reporting, risk oversight, internal governance, strategic decision-making 
and planning for sustainability were not met. Shareholders should ensure that directors 
perform their tasks effectively. One way to ensure performance is by implementing a 
proper remuneration strategy that will in return ensure benefits for the shareholders 
(Magnan et al., 2009:28). 
According to Warren Buffet, quoted in the Berkshire-Hathaway Annual Report (2009), 
directors have long benefited from the “oversized financial carrots” (rewards). He 
proclaimed that “meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture” 
(consequences). Crutchley and Minnick (2011:907) stated that monitoring by 
shareholders is designed to reduce the agency conflict that results from the separate 
control and ownership of a firm. Barriers such as conflicts of interest obstruct effective 
monitoring of agency problems and negatively influence a firm’s performance over the 
long term. 
A study by Barber, Ghiselli and Deale (2006:65) found that directors had personal 
objectives in conflict with those of shareholders. This led to the perception that there 
may be a weak relationship between a firm’s financial performance and its directors’ 
remuneration. They concluded that the agency problem can be resolved by aligning 
the remuneration of directors with the interests of shareholders, thus creating value for 
the shareholders through the pay-for-performance relationship. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between pay-and-performance is not necessarily a simple matter. 
2.4.3 Conflict of interest between directors and shareholders 
A director’s main role in the firm is to make the critical decisions and steer the firm in 
the right direction. The directors’ responsibilities include mergers and acquisitions, 
capital expenditures, monitoring and assessing manager effectiveness, deciding on 
compensation, and setting strategies to ensure sustainability for firms. These are only 
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a few of the important responsibilities and roles directors are accountable for and which 
could influence the firm’s performance positively or negatively. 
According to the Companies Act (2008), directors are defined as members of the board 
of a firm or an alternate director of a firm and include any person occupying the position 
of director or alternate director, by whatever name designated. Directors must exercise 
his or her power and perform his or her functions as follows: 
• In noble devotion and for a good purpose; 
• In the best interest of the firm; and 
• With a degree of diligence, care and expertise that may be expected of a person 
carrying out the equivalent functions and having the general understanding, 
ability and experience of that director. 
The Companies Act (2008) prevents a director from using the position of executive, or 
obtain any information while acting in the capacity of a director, to gain an advantage 
for himself or herself, or for any other person (other than the firm or a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the firm), or to knowingly cause impairment to the firm or a subsidiary of 
the firm. 
Directors must also avoid any conflict of interest with the firm where possible. South 
African law states that the director should always place the interest of the firm before 
the individual’s personal interest. Section 75 of the Companies Act (2008) specifically 
makes provision for dealing with directors that use information of the firm to gain 
personal wealth. This section clearly states that a director will be prohibited from having 
any say or influence in respect of using the firm’s information to gain personal wealth. 
Section 75 of the Companies Act (2008) seems to impose a strict duty not to allow 
personal financial interest to impact, in any way, on the dealings with the firm. In 
addition, where a director or member of a board committee has a conflicting personal 
interest in respect of a matter on the board’s agenda, he or she has to state that 
personal interest and immediately leave the meeting. Such a person is also prohibited 
from any action that may influence or attempt to influence the discussion or vote by the 
board, and is banned from executing any document on behalf of the firm in relation to 
the matter, unless explicitly requested to do so by the board. 
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It is important that all directors and prescribed officers comply with the conflict of 
interest declaration provisions, as non-compliance may render certain transactions and 
agreements void. 
The conflict of interest provisions apply equally to persons related to the director, 
prescribed officer or member of a board committee. Thus, where a director, prescribed 
officer or member of a board committee knows that a related person has a personal 
financial interest in a matter to be considered at a board meeting, or knows that a 
related person has acquired a personal financial interest in a matter, after the board 
has approved that agreement or matter, he or she should disclose that fact to the board 
(Section 75 of the Companies Act, 2008). 
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2003), there are two contrasting views on the 
relationship between remuneration and the agency problem. The more accepted view 
is the ideal contracting approach, which sees remuneration as a “cure” for the agency 
problem. The other view is the decision-making power approach, which views 
remuneration as “part” of the agency problem. In order to discourage conflict and to 
ensure that a good relationship exists between shareholders and directors, the “carrot 
and stick" method are often be used as a strategic tool in firms. 
The so-called “carrot and stick” method is very popular to encourage directors to 
enhance and strive towards performance of the firm. According to the Cambridge 
dictionary (2012) the “carrot and stick approach” refers to a strategy of offering a 
combination of rewards and punishments to encourage behaviour. It is named with 
reference to a cart driver hanging a carrot in front of a mule while holding a stick behind 
the mule. The mule would move towards the carrot because it wants the reward of 
food, while also moving away from the stick behind it, since it does not want the 
punishment of pain, thus pulling the cart. This is exactly what is being done when 
remunerating management for good performance, namely setting goals (performance 
targets) and having consequences if they do not perform. A system like this motivates 
directors and should contribute towards maximising shareholders’ value. 
Martin et al. (2009:118) highlighted the relationship between management and 
shareholders, and suggested that VBM might be the solution. Similar to the carrot and 
stick method, VBM also reward management for performing well or punish 
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management for not performing as expected. Activities performed by management that 
contribute towards shareholders’ wealth creation, need to be rewarded. 
In order to resolve the agency problem and to apply VBM in a firm, performance 
measures need to be identified to compare the performance of a firm to the 
remuneration paid to directors. There are two main types of performance indicators 
used in a firm. These two types of performance indicators can be used when evaluating 
directors’ performance, namely non-financial and financial indicators. 
2.5 NON-FINANCIAL FACTORS WHEN EVALUATING DIRECTORS’ 
PERFORMANCE 
‘Financial Performance’ is defined as the accomplishment of a given task measured 
against presently known standards of accuracy, completeness, cost and speed 
(Business Dictionary, 2013a). In a contract, performance is deemed to be the fulfilment 
of an obligation over and above that what was demanded in the contract (Hansen & 
Wernerfelt, 1989:399). To measure whether obligations are met, relevant performance 
indicators need to be identified. 
According to Corsi, Dale, Daum and Schoppen (2010) a board of directors needs to 
acknowledge five non-financial factors when evaluating a firm’s performance. These 
five factors are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
2.5.1 Effective board leadership 
To ensure effective leadership the combination of knowledge and experience among 
the directors, the value of information they receive and their ability to operate as a unit 
are important factors to consider. The CEO who manages the firm dynamics should 
maintain regular contact with directors between meetings. Highly operational boards 
often rotate meetings between different firm locations to educate directors about 
different facets of the firm and ensure communication access to other executives. 
Directors must be invited to attend all operational and strategically orientated meetings 
and should be encouraged to ask questions in order to promote overall performance 
management. The board of directors should not only assess the performance of the 
CEO, but also evaluate their own work to improve and develop their fields of expertise 
and knowledge. Transparency is an important principle for sustainable effective board 
management. 
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One problem that arises when striving for performance is the top-heavy facts and 
figures that are usually backward-looking, and that are not sufficiently focused on 
strategic issues and planning for the future. A method to ensure effective management 
is to assist directors by means of well-planned induction programmes, offering them 
continual opportunities to increase their business skills and understanding what will 
keep directors up-to-date with changes in legislation compliance or governance codes. 
Finally, effective management accentuates good communication, whether with board 
directors, key executives or shareholders when discussing feedback of meetings or 
remuneration packages. 
2.5.2 Strategy 
Strategy gives a competitive advantage to a firm and plays a vital role to ensure 
continuous progress in performance. Properly addressing and handling of strategies 
from the developmental to implementation and monitoring stages is vital. It is the 
responsibility of the non-executive and executive directors to develop the correct 
strategy whereafter the board of directors will fine-tune and oversee the execution of 
the strategy by management. Measuring the directors’ performance against a set of 
agreed-upon key performance objectives will assist performance evaluators when the 
directors’ progress is evaluated for a specific timeframe. The most common process 
method for the yearly review is where the CEO and the board of directors revisit the 
firm’s annual strategy by analysing the set of strategic options, identifying and 
evaluating their competitors’ strategy and then making recommendations and 
adjustments to their existing strategy. Strategic decision-making will influence the 
firm’s success and should satisfy shareholders. Every director must be fully engaged 
and competent to ensure maximum performance in strategy. Absolute clarity is needed 
when the requirements and expectations of a strategy are proposed and implemented 
(Corsi et al., 2010). 
Non-performance can only improve when the board of directors and the rest of 
management work collectively and create a strategy that benefits all stakeholders. 
Better understanding and valuable suggestions are contributed when sharing thoughts. 
Debating is also healthy among directors and management who want to make positive, 
valuable contributions to strategy development that will enhance the directors’ 
performance in the firm. 
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2.5.3 Risk versus initiative 
Following the start of the 2008 global financial crisis, boards of directors have adjusted 
their approach to risk oversight and assessment. In general, risk responsibility still 
tends to lie with the audit committee, where the majority of time is spent on financial 
risk. Risk is not only applicable to financial matters. Issues such as health and safety, 
the environment, IT security, internal processes, industrial relations and corporate 
reputation can also have an impact on the overall performance of the firm. Setting the 
optimal structure and procedures for risk management between directors and 
management will help to clarify responsibility and accountability issues for effective risk 
management. 
Firms’ and directors’ risk appetite or averseness needs regular reviewing. Directors’ 
personal attitudes and interests influence their decision-making when risks are 
identified, evaluated and controlled. Thus, directors should always act in the interest 
of shareholders and not react based on personal interests and emotions. The agency 
problem therefore does not only apply to financial performance factors, but also to non-
financial performance factors (Corsi et al., 2010). 
Recently, the focus has shifted more towards downside risk than upside risk due to 
increased risk aversion. The board of directors will acknowledge that risks are 
internally inherent in any firm and often create long-term value to its shareholders. The 
board of directors must, however, always be optimistic when evaluating new 
opportunities. 
2.5.4 Succession 
Most firms would agree that future succession planning is of significant importance. 
Most directors acknowledge the importance of succession planning and admit that 
more needs to be done by a firm’s board to establish an accurate process to ensure 
the continuation of competent leadership. The lack of readiness by boards when 
unpredicted changes occur in management, such as the resignation or change of a 
CEO, can influence the performance of a firm and usually alarms the market, 
diminishing the share price. All similar occurrences and changes in emergencies 
should be handled discreetly and effectively. Success is directly connected to the 
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overall performance of the firm and can only flourish when good governance and 
leadership are visible. 
2.5.5 Sustainability 
Directors have an obligation to increase and protect long-term shareholders’ value and 
to ensure that short-term decision-making does not negatively influence the 
sustainability of the firm. In South Africa, the notion of sustainability is linked to the 
Constitution and affects every listed firm on the JSE (King II report, 2002). All forms of 
resources, whether it is financial, human, natural or social resources, are essential to 
value creation. The only way to ensure performance throughout in terms of value 
creation is if it can be accomplished in a sustainable manner. 
The non-financial factors discussed in the sections above, in conjunction with financial 
performance, have an impact on the financial prosperity and sustainability of a firm. 
High turnover, good financial ratios and improving figures on financial statements, will 
only be feasible when non-financial factors such as proper leadership, risk 
management and sustainability plans are implemented. Various researchers regard 
firm performance from other angles and thus have different viewpoints measuring 
performance. In general, non-financial performance factors are difficult to calculate and 
compare. 
Non-performance information is scarcely available and difficult to obtain. Comparing 
firms and sectors with each other will almost be impossible due to limited standardised 
non-financial measures that are available for comparison, as well as information that 
might not be accurate. In most instances this will not be the case with financial 
performance measures. In this study the focus was therefore solely on the financial 
performance of firms. 
2.6 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Financial performance can be defined as measuring the results of a firm's policies and 
operations in monetary terms. These results are reflected in the firm's turnover, return 
on investment (ROI), return on assets (ROA), earnings per share and various other 
financial measures (IBM, 2013). In short, financial performance is a measuring tool to 
determine how a firm utilises its assets when doing business to generate revenue. In 
general, a firm’s overall financial health is measured over a given period of time, and 
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can be compared to similar firms in the industry or to industries in aggregation. In 
previous studies researchers utilised various financial measures and approaches in 
order to evaluate a firm’s performance. 
According to Carton and Hofer (2006), financial performance is a core element in 
empirical research. These researchers identified 88 different indicators to measure 
financial performance. These indicators were divided into three main sections, namely 
growth, profitability and market-based indicators. They stated that financial 
performance should be analysed by using more than one of these factors. 
Ashley and Yang (2004:380) stated that management can gather useful information by 
examining the income stream of a firm, to determine the remuneration directors can 
receive. This information will also indicate performance measures that can be 
implemented to ensure growth and the sustainability of the firm. 
A study conducted by Kato, Kim and Lee (2007:37) proved that accounting and sales 
measures did not have a significant impact on the setting of remuneration for directors 
in Korea. In Korea, the directors’ remuneration was linked to stock market performance 
(shareholders’ return) to ensure that directors act in the best interest of the 
shareholders. Using accounting and sales measures to determine financial 
performance is however a popular model which is used globally. 
According to Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome and Weintrop (2004:70), growth opportunities 
and firm size need to be taken into consideration when assessing financial 
performance. The remuneration directors receive is then determined by their duties at 
the firm depending on the firm’s size and growth opportunities. 
Ruth (2005) concluded that a firm’s share price is the most important factor for a 
shareholder. This important element will ensure that the remuneration directors receive 
is in alignment with the performance expectations set by the shareholders. However, 
it is vital to remember that the share price should not be seen as the only measure 
when determining the remuneration of directors, due to the fact that the share price 
can create long- and short-term performance opportunities that determine the 
sustainability and remuneration for directors. 
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Other measures like returns on assets (ROA) and earnings per share are also relevant 
when determining the performance of a firm. These measures were used in many 
similar studies due to the fact that they are simple to calculate and concise. 
It is apparent that diverse opinions exist on how to evaluate and manage corporate 
performance, and no measure can be considered superior to the others. However, 
some measures are definitely more preferred and accurate for performance evaluation. 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1987:109) stated that financial performance should be 
measured by only focusing on two factors: growth and profitability. Profitability 
measures include ROA, return on equity (ROE), and ROI, while growth can be 
measured by the growth of sales (turnover). In a related study conducted by Van der 
Linden (2007:21), the Du Pont analysis was used for financial performance 
measurement. The Du Pont analysis method, also known as the "Du Pont identity”, 
was developed by the Du Pont Corporation in the 1920s. The Du Pont analysis 
estimates a firm’s profitability by decomposing its ROE into a number of factors, and 
considering their contribution to the overall ROE. These factors are illustrated in the 
following equation: 
ROE = Net Profit Margin × Total Asset Turnover × Equity Multiplier 
Net Profit Margin = Net Profit/Sales 
Total Asset Turnover = Sales/Total Assets 
Equity Multiplier = Total Assets/Equity 
The Du Pont analysis indicates that ROE is affected by three factors: 
• Operating efficiency, which is measured by the profit margin; 
• Asset use efficiency, which is measured by the total asset turnover; and 
• Financial leverage, which is measured by the equity multiplier. 
In the first part of the Du Pont model, the total asset turnover is multiplied by the net 
profit margin (this is also known as the firm’s ROA). The total asset turnover reflects 
how effective the assets are being utilised in order to generate more revenue, while 
the net profit margin measures its operating efficiency. The last part of the Du Pont 
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equation looks at the degree of financial leverage, determining how the assets were 
utilised given the equity provided in the firm. Comparing a firm’s ROE (and the 
components that contribute to its overall value) from one year to another or with other 
firms that operate in the same industry can be used to explain differences in the values 
of the ratio. 
The Du Pont analysis provides a comprehensive measurement of financial 
performance, since important ratios are incorporated in its equation. This analysis is 
very helpful when a firm’s ROE is unsatisfactory, since the Du Pont analysis can easily 
assist in locating the part of the firm that is underperforming. 
The Du Pont model is considered as a reliable measurement tool to identify whether 
the performance of a firm and the remuneration of its directors are aligned, as well as 
the impact this measurement tool has when determining remuneration packages for 
directors. However, it is important that the correct balance of measures is used when 
evaluating a firm’s performance. Accounting and market measures may possibly 
ensure that most factors influencing a firm’s financial performance, directly and 
indirectly, are taken into consideration when evaluating its financial performance. 
Eriksson and Lausten (2000) agreed that a firm’s performance should be measured 
using market indicators (e.g. share returns) and/or accounting earnings measures (e.g. 
turnover). 
2.6.1 Accounting and market measures of financial performance 
A firm’s financial performance is of vital importance to all stakeholders, as performance 
also measures the firm’s daily operations. Generally, a firm's performance is defined 
as operational effectiveness, and achieving economic goals and organisational 
survival tactics (Yuki, 1994). 
To assess the financial aspects of a firm’s performance, researchers usually apply 
accounting-based measures. These measures include profitability measures such as 
ROA, ROS and ROE. The relationship and differences between accounting-based and 
market-based measures can be defined as follows: accounting-based measures are a 
reflection of the past and short-term financial performance of the firm, while market-
based measures focus more on the long-term and future performance of the firm 
(Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994:1027). 
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Both accounting-based and market-based measures have certain advantages and 
disadvantages. Accounting measures are an effective way to compare consecutive 
yearly performances, identify trends and highlight problems. Information is readily 
available for accounting measures. Due to the uniformity of data presented in the 
financial statements along with a strict set of rules, and the application of generally-
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), it is relatively easy to measure financial 
performance by means of accounting measures. Unfortunately, accounting measures 
only focus on a single limited aspect of a firm’s financial performance. These measures 
might also be subject to managerial manipulation. For these reasons it is more effective 
to include market measures that cannot be as easily manipulated (Gentry & Shen, 
2010:514). 
Market-based performance measures also have positive and negative aspects 
associated with them. While market-based measures incorporate all relevant 
information when measuring the performance of a firm, it also limits the exposure to 
differential accounting procedures and manipulation. Market-based measures 
represent investors' evaluations of a firm's ability to generate earnings in future, rather 
than considering the past performance of the firm. Disadvantages regarding the use of 
market-based measures include the assumption that investors' valuation of a firm’s 
financial performance is a proper performance measure in general. Some researchers 
remark that investors' evaluations may not be sufficient, especially when evaluating 
the entire firm. According to Farris and McDermott (2006), financial performance 
measures must: 
• Align with shareholders’ interest; 
• Be clearly definable; 
• Be easily measurable; 
• Be controllable; and 
• Be easily communicated and understood. 
These criteria also assisted in assessing and selecting potential performance 
measures appropriate for this study. Joskow and Rose (1994) used both accounting- 
and market-based measures in their pay-for-performance relationship study. 
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Measures used in their study included total share returns (market-based) and sales 
(accounting-based). 
Both accounting- and market-based variables are included in this study. Various types 
of accounting- and market-based measures are identified below to gain an 
understanding regarding the overall financial performance of a firm. 
a)  Accounting measures          
Three accounting measures are addressed in the next sections. 
(i)  Return on equity (ROE) 
Van der Linden (2007:21) used the Du Pont analysis in order to calculate the ROE for 
a firm. According to this approach, a firm’s ROE is calculated by multiplying the ROA 
ratio with the leverage factor (total assets in relationship to equity). The Du Pont 
equation calculates the profitability and degree of financial leverage for the firm in a 
specific timeframe. This has an influence on the ROA ratio and influences the financial 
performance of the firm. This accounting measure could be helpful when determining 
a relationship between financial performance and directors’ remuneration, since 
changes in ROA or ROE can be compared with the change in directors’ remuneration 
for the same period. 
(ii)  Turnover growth 
To ensure growth in turnover, a firm requires additional funding. More inventory and 
increased credit sales are usually the two factors that result from sales growth. 
Furthermore, to ensure turnover growth, firms must be willing to increase their 
overhead costs, which do not directly generate turnover, such as advertising, 
awareness campaigns and sponsorships (Joskow & Rose, 1994). It is important to 
acknowledge the availability of funding when determining the possible growth and 
performance of a firm. In a perfect world, increased turnover lead to larger profits, and 
ultimately increased remuneration of directors based on the improved financial 
performance of the firm. For this research study, the turnover of a firm was selected as 
one of the financial performance measures. 
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(iii)  Price earnings ratio 
The price earnings ratio is an equity valuation multiple and can be calculated by taking 
the current market price per share divided by the earnings per share (McClure, 2013). 
By analysing the market’s valuation of a firm’s shares relative to the earnings it 
generated, a firm with higher earnings growth usually has a higher price earnings ratio 
than a firm with low or no growth. When the price earnings ratio increases or 
decreases, it can be utilised to establish directors’ remuneration. 
These accounting measures are often focused on internal financial performance 
criteria, which can be partially influenced by management within a firm. When external 
and market factors have a significant impact on a firm, market-based measures may 
be more appropriate to use as financial performance measures. 
(b) Market-based measures    
Two market-based measures are addressed in the following sections. 
(i)  Market value added (MVA) 
Stewart (1991:153) contended that market value added (MVA) is an appropriate 
market-based metric for ranking firms based on how much value they have added to 
(or subtracted from) their shareholders’ investment. MVA measures the difference 
between a firm’s fair market value (of its total debt and equity capitalisation) and the 
economic book value of capital employed in net assets (Venanzi, 2011:17). Increasing 
the MVA of a firm should be an important objective for any firm since it increases 
shareholders’ wealth; however, most firms do not utilise the measure. According to 
Bistrova and Lace (2012), MVA is one of the ratios that directly influence shareholders’ 
value, making the ratio relevant when determining the relationship between financial 
performance and the remuneration paid to directors. 
(ii)  Total share return (TSR) 
There has been an increased emphasis on market value measures as the most 
appropriate metrics for value creation. The Boston Consulting Group (2008) provided 
the following advantages of using TSR as a market-based measure: 
• It incorporates the value of dividends and other cash pay-outs; 
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• It integrates all the dimensions of the value creation system; and 
• The minimum appropriate TSR goal is easy to establish: it will be set by either 
the firm’s cost of equity or the expected average TSR of its peer group. 
The Boston Consulting Group (2008) designed an exhibit (Figure 2.1) that explains 
why TSR as a measure is so important when evaluating a firm’s financial performance. 
FIGURE 2.1: Financial components influencing the total share return (TSR)
 
Source: The Boston Consulting Group (2008) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates all the financial components that are included when using TSR as 
a measuring tool of the financial performance of a firm. These components focus on 
the creation of shareholders’ wealth and the growth of a firm. 
Identifying and applying appropriate and effective financial performance measures 
may look like a daunting task, but are essential for accurate results. Therefore it is 
important that financial performance measures and incentives are selected that will 
support and be fair to both shareholders and directors. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of management is to create shareholders’ wealth in a firm, thus 
Chapter 2 commenced with a discussion regarding shareholders’ value. The second 
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section of the chapter then identified all a firm’s role-players (shareholders, 
stakeholders and management). These role-players all have different objectives and 
relationships, thus directing the study towards the stakeholder theory and the agency 
theory. This chapter continued to unravel the possible agency problem between 
management and shareholders by looking at the “carrot and stick” method. 
Chapter 2 also investigated VBM, and discussed how this management approach 
could be applied to ensure sustainable value creation for the firm and all its 
stakeholders. It became evident that firms are shifting their focus towards the ideal of 
total value creation and sustainability rather than focusing solely on shareholders’ 
value creation. 
In order to measure whether there is a relationship, if any, between management’s 
remuneration and shareholders’ value, a set of appropriate performance measures had 
to be identified. Previous studies done in this field of financial management assisted in 
determining relevant financial performance measures. Two broad types of 
performance measures were identified, namely non-financial and financial 
performance measures. Financial performance measures are used in most research 
studies due to their availability, accuracy and comparison ability. 
In this research study financial performance measures were used, and the relevant 
measures were identified and investigated. The selected financial performance 
measures were picked based on the criteria that both accounting and market measures 
for financial performance had to be included. The financial performance measures 
selected for this study were a firm’s turnover, earnings per share (EPS), MVA and TSR. 
Since only the relevant financial performance measures were investigated and 
identified in this chapter, the measurement of remuneration had to be addressed in the 
next chapter in order to achieve the primary objective set for this study, namely to 
determine the relationship between a firm’s financial performance and directors’ 
remuneration. Remuneration, more specifically directors’ remuneration, is therefore 
the focus of Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3: DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Directors’ remuneration has been in the limelight for the past two decades, especially 
following the global financial crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2009. However, 
the issue regarding directors’ remuneration increased during the crisis when 
shareholders and other stakeholders noted the excessive remuneration directors 
received contrasted against the decrease in firms’ financial performance. In South 
Africa, a few firms have been under scrutiny during the past decade. Examples include 
the power giant Eskom, and Sasol, a leading manufacturer of petroleum. Both cases 
resulted in an upsurge in media attention regarding the high incentive packages of their 
executive directors. 
Fortunately, there are continuous improvement regarding regulations and legislation 
on remuneration for directors, and shareholders are becoming more aware and 
informed regarding their rights in this regard than previously (Morrissey, 2009:22). In 
South Africa, firms are regulated by the principle guidelines contained in the King 
reports. These principles assist firms in terms of corporate governance, disclosure and 
transparency. The Companies Act (2008) also assists in ensuring that firms are 
responsible and abide by the law in South Africa. 
Chapter 3 commences by defining remuneration in general followed by a more narrow 
approach focusing on directors’ remuneration. In order to define the remuneration for 
directors, remuneration strategies, structures, remuneration committees, financial 
disclosure as well as the psychological impacts around remuneration are addressed. 
This chapter concludes by discussing the relationship between financial performance 
and directors’ remuneration.  
3.2 REMUNERATION 
The term ‘remuneration’ can be defined as the reward for employment in the form of 
salary, payment or wages, and includes benefits and allowances such as medical, 
vehicle and pension, bonuses, cash incentives and non-cash incentives (Collins 
English Dictionary, 2009). 
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Remuneration schemes are the methods of payment available to firms and 
organisations by which they remunerate their employees. Remuneration schemes vary 
from fixed monthly or weekly wages, regardless of output, to payment for additional 
duties completed in a period. Different remuneration schemes are also used whereby 
a person is remunerated individually, compensation as a group (departments) or even 
the entire firm achieving targets as a whole. Levels of remuneration should be sufficient 
to attract, retain and motivate directors to run a successful firm. When focusing on 
directors, a significant portion of remuneration is usually structured towards individual 
or corporate performance (AECI, 2013). 
The design of the remuneration scheme might directly influence the performance by 
the employees in the firm. Remuneration is therefore seen as a psychological motivator 
for employees to perform and ensure that firms are also sustainable (Rynes, Barry & 
Minette, 2004:381). The main concern regarding remuneration is that current 
incentives and reward strategies might be inadequate in the future when employees 
are continually raising their sights and higher remuneration levels are achieved 
(Ibbetson & Whitmore, 1977:12). 
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the concept of remuneration and its different 
categories. 
FIGURE 3.1: The concept of remuneration 
 
Source: Krauter and de Sousa (2009:165). 
Figure 3.1 represents the components of remuneration. Considering remuneration and 
focusing mainly on the financial aspects, Figure 3.1 clearly indicates the sub-
categories of which the total remuneration package might consist. 
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Dutra (2002:181) stated that financial remuneration (the compensation for a person’s 
work) can be divided into two segments: direct and indirect remuneration. Direct 
remuneration focuses on the cash incentive received by an employee for work done. 
Fixed and variable remuneration fall in this category. All other benefits such as 
allowances are included under indirect remuneration. 
Employee remuneration and benefits can be divided into four basic categories (Dutra, 
2002:181), viz.: 
• Fixed pay – cash reward paid to an employee by an employer based on an 
agreement between them. The most common form of guaranteed remuneration 
is the basic salary; 
• Variable pay – cash reward paid to an employee by an employer that is 
dependent on performance, discretion, and results achieved. The most well-
known form is a cash bonus; 
• Benefits – programmes that the employer uses to improve employees’ 
remuneration, such as paid leave, medical insurance, car allowance; and 
• Equity-based compensation – a plan where the employer would use shares as 
incentives for employees. The most common example is share options. 
In recent years, firms have also been incorporating non-financial rewards into the 
remuneration package for employees (Hanzlick, 2013:51). Career and professional 
development are two of the most crucial non-financial factors that are taken into 
account when setting the total remuneration package for employees. 
All the remuneration types, as already mentioned above, can mainly be influenced by 
two types of factors, namely internal and external factors. Internal remuneration is 
influenced by business objectives, internal equity, labour unions, organisational 
structures and culture. Looking from the outside, external remuneration is influenced 
by the economy, inflation, unemployment rate, labour market, laws, taxes and industry 
trends (benchmark) and habits (Dutra, 2002:183). 
Now that remuneration has been defined and the main categories thereof identified, 
the focus will shift more specifically towards directors’ remuneration. 
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3.3 DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
The remuneration of directors has been discussed widely in the past twenty years. The 
Business Dictionary (2012) defines directors’ remuneration as follows: 
“Executives and non-executives may be compensated by salary, fee, usage of a firm’s 
property and other benefits. Amounts for remuneration are usually limited not to exceed 
those specified in the articles of association, and shareholders may sue directors if they 
do not abide by the rules. Shareholders usually have a big influence (approval) on the 
remuneration paid to directors in the firm.” 
According to Section 66 of the Companies Act (2008) No 71, directors’ remuneration 
is defined as: 
• Fees paid to directors for services rendered by them to or on behalf of the firm, 
including any amount paid in respect of directorship;  
• Salary, bonuses and performance-related payments; 
• Expense allowances, to the extent that the director is not required to account 
for the allowance; 
• Contributions paid under any pension scheme; 
• The value of any option or right given directly or indirectly to a director, past 
director or future director, or person related to any of them; 
• Financial assistance to a director, past director or future director, or person 
related to any of them, for the subscription of shares; and 
• A loan or other financial assistance by the firm to a director, past director or 
future director, or a person related to any of them, or any loan made by a third 
party to any such person. 
The term directors’ remuneration is also used when executive and non-executive 
directors are remunerated by fee, basic salary or the use of a firm’s property as agreed 
(Business Dictionary, 2012). The remuneration amount may not exceed the amount 
specified in the contracts and shareholders may oppose any amount that exceeds the 
agreed amount. Shareholders must always approve any remuneration paid to directors 
when loss of office occurs.  
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From an organisational perspective, it may be extremely difficult to remunerate a 
director solely based on the firm’s financial performance. There are various external 
factors that may also influence directors’ remuneration. Examples include 
benchmarking, market volatility and governance-related factors. Frequently in firms, 
directors will be remunerated with specific types of remuneration depending on the 
type of factors influencing the firm’s performance as in the study of Stobaugh (2000) 
below. 
Stobaugh (2000) identified eight major benefits that add value to the remuneration 
package, namely share grants or share options, which are seen as the most expensive 
benefit; retirement programmes; matching directors’ gifts to universities and colleges; 
cash remuneration until retirement; grants to charity; medical insurance; payment of 
spouse’s travel expenses and benefits paid in case of death or illness. Although this is 
already a large number of benefits, directors may receive additional benefits over and 
above those mentioned here. 
Stobaugh (2000) wanted to emphasise that the total value of a director’s remuneration 
package must be declared to the shareholders and that both directors’ and 
shareholders’ financial interests should be aligned to accomplish the firm’s financial 
goals. Unfortunately directors’ remuneration has been identified as a problem since 
the early 1990s. Shareholder groups suggested that there is no relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and the firm’s financial performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). 
Since a firm’s financial performance is not the only factor influencing the remuneration 
a director receives, it is important to identify and evaluate all other measures that might 
also play a part in remuneration decision-making. 
3.3.1 Factors influencing directors’ remuneration 
Bender and Porter (2003) identified the following factors influencing directors’ 
remuneration: 
• Share gains and share options awarded to directors; 
• Size of the board of directors in a firm; 
• Role and importance of corporate governance in the firm; 
• Executives’ risk awareness or appetite; 
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• Future growth and opportunities for the firm; 
• Benchmarks from the industry and market; 
• Sensitivity to the current market and economic conditions; 
• Remuneration committees’ methods and consistency in selecting a 
remuneration strategy;  
• Ownership in firms (directors’ shareholding); and 
• Influence of shareholders on the firm. 
These factors may have a big influence when decisions about remuneration are made. 
The data gathered from these factors will ultimately provide the required results firms 
need to set the adequate remuneration package for directors. Although these 
measures are not the only factors that influence the remuneration of directors, they do 
provide sufficient evidence on how the remuneration model is composed for directors. 
Factors influencing remuneration are divided into internal and external types as listed 
below (Aswathappa, 2005:278): 
(a) Internal factors influencing directors’ remuneration  
The internal factors are addressed in the following sections. 
(i)  The influence of the size of the board of directors on remuneration 
A study conducted in the United Kingdom and Japan indicated that a smaller-sized 
board of directors, in conjunction with using more non-executive directors, resulted in 
lower remuneration for executive directors. This study also revealed that where boards 
of directors owned more shares, the remuneration was seemingly higher. This also 
holds true when considering firms where family influences are high (Kubo, 2000:51). 
(ii)  Corporate governance and future opportunities 
An academic paper presented by Ozkan (2005:15) confirmed that corporate 
governance does have an influence on directors’ remuneration. Larger firms with more 
growth opportunities remunerate their directors more than average firms. The study 
also revealed that firms with more non-executive directors are willing to remunerate 
with cash salaries rather than equity. 
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(iii)  Committees influence tailoring risk-adjusted incentive remuneration packages 
According to Lipman (2010:55), there are two categories of risk-need assessments 
when setting performance remuneration for directors, namely accounting risk and 
structural risk. Before discussing these two risks, firms need to acknowledge whether 
they are rewarding directors for risky behaviour or not. To determine this, the risk 
managers of the firms should be consulted before deciding on any remuneration 
packages. 
When considering accounting risk, firms should be careful when implementing 
performance contracts that are based on bonus pay-outs. In prior instances where 
accounting fraud occurred, the problems were only noticed years later. In general it is 
difficult for firms to retrieve their money from directors, even if “claw-back” policies are 
included in the contracts. To prevent occurrences like these, better planning is needed 
to ensure the sustainability of firms. Setting risk periods and withholding bonuses for a 
time period, or creating deferred bonus plans, can assist in this matter before directors 
are remunerated. 
The second risk is structural risk where all non-accounting risks are used to adjust 
directors’ remuneration towards firms’ financial performance (Lipman, 2010:55). 
Turnover and services rendered often contain hidden risk factors. An example is credit 
sale transactions that influence the turnover and are used to evaluate the firm’s 
performance and may influence directors’ remuneration. In later years, the financial 
statements may be adjusted for income not received. This means that at the time of 
acknowledging the sales, the directors received remuneration for future cash inflow 
that did not realise, meaning directors’ remuneration did not contain the risk factor of 
this risk realising. 
As mentioned earlier in the discussion on accounting risk, the bonus paid to a director 
must be delayed until the risk period is over, or the risk factor should be incorporated 
when the performance bonus is structured. Lipman (2010:56) stated that a five-year 
risk period will be a sufficient time period to take the risk into consideration before 
rewarding directors for their performance. This will mean that directors will be 
remunerated in year six for year one’s performance, and year seven for year two, and 
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so forth. Lipman (2010:56) also suggested three action plans. Firstly, that remuneration 
models should include the risk and long-term stability of the firm; secondly, that boards 
of directors should assess remuneration policies regularly; and finally, that the timing 
of firms’ financial performances should be aligned with the incentives paid to directors. 
Research conducted in Japan indicated that directors’ remuneration is designed and 
structured to create value for shareholders. It was also noted that no share options 
were used in this regard to remunerate directors for the increase in the firms’ financial 
performance (Kato, Lemmon, Luo & Schallheim, 2005:460). There are, however, 
external factors also affecting directors’ remuneration. 
(b) External factors that influence directors’ remuneration 
To eliminate unnecessary problems regarding unfair judgment of directors’ 
remuneration, a few external factors should be taken into consideration (Lipman, 
2010:57). Firstly, proper market data should be compiled to evaluate directors’ long-
term risk-taking standards in similar firms; secondly, remuneration benchmarks are 
needed in the industry; and thirdly, the directors’ employment contracts need to be 
evaluated. Benchmarking against other firms has become a popular method to ensure 
proper management and performance, but it is not always the case that the benchmark 
is set correctly in the industry. To provide a better understanding of the concepts, 
benchmarking and remuneration contracts are explained as follows: 
(i)  Benchmarking 
Benchmarking is probably the most popular method globally when setting directors’ 
remuneration. According to Garvey and Milbourn (2006:224), benchmarking is 
extremely popular in specific industries like the Industrial and Financial Sector, where 
benchmarks are set rather high. Consistency is crucial when selecting external 
benchmarks, but in order to ensure that the firm’s financial performance and directors’ 
remuneration are still aligned, is also critical. In examples where the correlation 
between the firms’ financial performance and directors’ remuneration decreases 
instead of increases or the relationship between firms’ financial performance and 
directors’ remuneration is negative, problems might occur due to focusing on 
benchmarks and not on the firms’ performance. 
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When firms decide not to use the benchmarking method due to the expensiveness or 
impracticality of the method, firms should always try to be consistent with remuneration 
decisions even though markets may fluctuate up or down (Garvey & Milbourn, 
2006:224). Consistency often ensures that directors have more to gain in markets that 
are tumbling than in markets that are rising under certain circumstances. 
(ii)  Remuneration contracts 
According to economic literature much has been written on the topic of designing an 
optimal directors’ remuneration contract (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Conyon, 2006). The 
importance of a contract derives from shareholders that monitor directors by means of 
remuneration for work or services rendered relating to financial performance. Contracts 
in general ensure that directors act in the best interest of the shareholders (Rosen, 
1992:181). Jensen and Murphy (1990:225) argued that firms should create a contract 
that link directors’ remuneration to share market performance (shareholders rate of 
return). Adequate remuneration contracts in general should encourage directors to act 
in the best interest of shareholders. 
Although each sector and every firm within that sector have their own view, the model 
and structure regarding the calculations for directors’ remuneration, general standard 
benchmarks and similar firms’ contracts are good indicators of proper remuneration 
paid to directors. Generally, internal and external factors influence firms’ 
considerations when the overall structuring of directors’ remuneration packages takes 
place. These internal and external factors that are used to determine the remuneration 
for directors can also negatively influence the perception around directors’ 
remuneration. 
3.3.2 External and internal factors responsible for directors’ remuneration 
status 
As mentioned earlier, it is impossible to ignore the controversy regarding directors’ 
remuneration compared to firms’ financial performance as well as to read a financial 
magazine or a paper without noticing what large remuneration packages directors are 
earning. 
Stakeholders allege that directors are over-compensated, thus suggesting directors’ 
remuneration is not in line with the firms’ financial performance. Furthermore the gap 
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between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of the firms appears to 
be continuously widening (International Labour Organization, 2008:20). According to 
Graham, Roth & Dugan (2008:6), there are ten factors that contribute to directors’ over-
compensation. These factors are discussed in the following sections. 
(a) Directors in the media 
Cashing lavish pay cheques and multi-million Rand share options that the media just 
cannot wait to report on, are a major cause of the perception that directors are over-
compensated, especially now that firms are becoming more transparent and financial 
statements are so easily attainable to anyone. Often, the media only focuses on the 
directors’ remuneration and rarely takes factors such as firm size, turnover and firm 
growth in relation to the remuneration into consideration. 
(b) The economy 
Firms that implemented the pay-for-performance strategy did not specifically stipulate 
that the financial performance should be linked to the directors’ performance, and not 
the overall performance of the economy. Frequently, firms do extremely well but not 
due to improved management strategies and tactics, but rather due to the economy or 
a certain industry that performed well. Nevertheless, the directors still claimed their 
performance pay and bonuses. These types of occurrences have an immense 
influence on over-compensation that occurs in some firms (Morgenson, 2013). 
During the global financial crisis of 2008, the interest in executive remuneration 
intensified due to the decrease in shareholders’ wealth and poor performance of the 
firm. Demands were made by shareholders to adjust directors’ remuneration to be 
aligned with the firm’s financial performance during periods of economic difficulty, but 
firms differed in this regard and some even continued to increase the remuneration as 
usual. 
Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala and Senbet (2010) had concerns regarding the 
structure of directors’ remuneration packages especially after the dot-com crisis and 
the 2008 global financial crisis period and proposed a revision with regard to the size 
and structure of executive pay plans. 
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(c) Economists 
Economists started to analyse directors’ remuneration by developing models to 
understand the compensation directors receive. In these models a few factors such as 
talent and skills of the directors, firm size, and earnings on market capitalisation were 
taken into account. These models then started to justify the remuneration in an unfair 
manner and added to the over-compensation problem (Faulkender et al., 2010). 
(d) Government and selected government agencies 
The government never identified share options as an expense, but as capital to protect 
the stakeholders with the necessary laws and regulations to prevent unrealistic taxable 
earnings out of these options. The general accounting system and the lack of 
disclosure of share options and share gains in the past have been identified as some 
of the biggest contributors to over-compensation, adding to the outrage against 
excessive directors’ remuneration. 
(e) Board of directors 
The board of directors has the power and responsibility to decide and manage all the 
remuneration and management actions of a firm. Boards thus play an important role 
and need to be pro-active at all times. If not, they can be seen as the source of over-
compensation. 
(f) Stakeholders 
Stakeholders need to stand up and protest for what they believe in. When investors 
and buyers are not happy with how things are executed or handled in a firm, the 
stakeholders need to stop supporting these firms. 
(g) Institutional investors 
Institutional investors, like big pension and mutual fund managers, often do not play 
an active role to prevent the over-compensation of directors in the firms that they 
invested in. They need to first and foremost look at the interest of their shareholders. 
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(h) Lawyers 
In most prominent cases where directors were allegedly over-compensated, a lawyer 
was involved to assist his/her client to secure the best deal, no matter what the effect 
would be on other shareholders and stakeholders. Although lawyers’ involvement is 
not blamed directly, the lawyers themselves benefit from this dilemma. 
(i) Human resource departments 
Human resource management needs to be transparent in everything they do and carry 
the responsibility not to hide information from the board of directors and stakeholders’ 
committees. Too many incidents occur where a lack of transparent information was 
provided to committees regarding remuneration packages for directors. 
(j) Consultants 
The biggest problem with external consultants is that they are “blind” to see what is 
happening in firms. It appears that a conflict of interest for consultants can play a big 
role in the decision-making regarding directors’ remuneration. 
To conclude, it can be assumed that there is enough blame to place on many role 
players. In some instances, directors’ remuneration is allegedly aligned or linked to 
firms’ performance, but when investigating the financial performance of the firm, the 
results do not always correspond with how the directors are remunerated. 
All the role players and factors mentioned in the preceding discussion influence 
directors’ remuneration directly or indirectly. A proper remuneration strategy is needed 
in every firm to justify and balance the total remuneration package paid to each 
director. 
3.4 REMUNERATION STRATEGY 
The need for a strategy and systems for remuneration has never been greater than 
now. Remuneration never stands alone, but is included in other management 
processes, such as the performance management process, the overall policies and 
the integrated plan of a firm. In order to develop a comprehensive remuneration 
strategy, various factors and requirements need to be identified. 
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3.4.1 Total rewards strategy 
According to Graham et al. (2008:67), there is no simple one-size-fits-all strategy in 
terms of total remuneration rewards. This makes strategising very challenging due to 
the uniqueness of each firm. To ensure that a firm’s reward strategy works well, much 
tailoring and alterations are needed. Therefore it is important to understand the specific 
business remuneration components, as well as how the firm’s performance 
management operates, in order to develop the optimal strategy. 
A reward strategy generally consists of three core factors namely vision, mission and 
values (Owen, Mundy, Guild & Guild, 2001:10). These factors will assist in clarifying 
misconceptions regarding the remuneration and the firm’s financial performance. 
(a) Vision 
A vision statement enables a firm to plan for the future and set realistic goals to 
achieve. Even with a good vision statement obstacles and challenges occur that the 
directors should be able to deal with, therefore the vision must inspire directors to take 
proper action even if it affects them personally. 
(b) Mission 
Purpose and values are the core aspects when identifying the mission of a firm and 
should always remain permanent, even though strategies might be adjusted to meet 
requirements. The mission statement guides the firm to be sustainable and take 
responsibility in everything it does. Therefore, a mission must be simple and state a 
positive, clear view. Motivation plays a vital role to apply what the mission statement 
requires on a daily basis, and highlights the importance of remunerating directors for 
following the mission set for the firm. 
(c) Values  
Beliefs and values are at the heart of the firm. Although there is no fixed set of rights 
and wrongs, it enables the firm to set boundaries and develop core values for 
themselves. Values ensure that directors focus on the core vision and business 
decision-making. Firms known for having good values often force their management 
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to maintain the firm’s good reputation, thereby decreasing the possibility of directors 
making decisions to potentially benefit themselves. 
The problem with all three of these factors is that it is somewhat difficult to always link 
the vision, mission and value principles to directors’ remuneration, since the vision, 
mission and values in some firms’ statements are generally poor and misleading 
(Graham et al., 2008:72). Therefore it is suggested that specific remuneration 
requirements are determined for setting remuneration packages in firms. 
3.4.2 Remuneration requirements 
High remuneration rewards have been given to directors since the early 1990s. The 
question still being asked after more than two decades, however, is whether or not the 
directors’ remuneration is justified by the firms’ financial performance. There is much 
speculation on this subject, due to the fact that the entire remuneration process is not 
as transparent as shareholders would like it to be. Deciding what the remuneration 
should be is a more complicated issue than what the media, for instance, makes of it. 
Magnan et al. (2009:28) recommended the following requirements in terms of directors’ 
remuneration to ensure sound performance and top-quality directors: 
• Director remuneration must be satisfactory to attract high calibre directors to the 
firm. The remuneration must also be in line with the responsibilities and 
accountability required for the position; 
• When setting the remuneration package for the directors, the decision-making 
must be transparent with the correct objectives in mind. Having clear 
benchmarks to use as an indicator may be of good use for the firm; 
• A large portion of the remuneration package should be kept as long-term 
remuneration for directors to ensure the sustainability of the firm; and 
• Remunerating directors must be based on the long-term goals of the firm, and 
not only on short-term success; this helps reducing the risk factor when striving 
to increase the firm’s performance. 
After identifying requirements for directors’ remuneration, the process for structuring 
and compiling the optimal remuneration package can commence, since the 
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requirements set are seen as a foundation on which the remuneration structures are 
constructed. 
3.5 STRUCTURING DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
When compiling the directors’ remuneration, all the sub-components of the entire 
package must be identified individually and those affecting the compilation of the 
package should be addressed. Furthermore, the different types of directorship also 
play a vital role when structuring an adequate remuneration package. This highlights 
the importance of compiling the most appropriate remuneration package for each 
director (Design of directors’ remuneration packages, 2010). 
3.5.1 Establishing the remuneration package 
Throughout the decades, firms have revised their strategies to optimally remunerate 
directors as well as to ensure firms’ financial performance (PwC, 2011). Additions to 
improve this relationship included setting remuneration committees, adding non-
executive and independent directors, adapting the governance process, share 
ownership guidelines and fees for attending meetings. The question, however, still 
remains how firms should determine directors’ remuneration and whether a 
relationship, if any, exists between firms’ financial performance and directors’ 
remuneration. 
How much and how do firms remunerate directors? According to DeFond and Hung 
(2004:269), directors’ remuneration must be determined by considering the directors’ 
roles in the firm. They identified three roles, namely monitoring, strategic resource and 
fiduciary. 
(a) Monitoring 
Monitoring is one of the core responsibilities of the board of directors (PwC, 2011). All 
decision-making by management that may have an impact on the firm or shareholders 
must be monitored by the board of directors and remuneration committee. It is 
important to ensure that directors are adequately remunerated when performing well – 
either by basic salary, share options or other incentives to promote effectiveness and 
growth for the firm. Share options are generally used for long-term growth and are 
critical for investors to ensure long-term sustainability. Firms should always be cautious 
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when setting performance-based remuneration. Directors might start taking 
unnecessary risks by engaging in speculative and manipulative behaviour. Situations 
as mentioned above may lead to conflict of interest as discussed in Section 2.2 of 
Chapter 2. 
(b) Strategic resources 
In modern times, firms acknowledge directors as valuable resources for a firm. 
Directors have business and political connections, experience, unique expertise as 
well as good reputations that increase the credibility of firms and, in effect, increase 
value for shareholders. Firms can therefore not only remunerate directors by analysing 
and monitoring the firm’s financial performance, but need to evaluate the directors as 
valuable resources and assets of the firm (Coombes, 2008:70). 
(c) Fiduciary role 
Preventing fraud and promoting proper risk management are only the tip of the iceberg 
when considering directors’ legal duties and obligations. Currently, directors’ 
responsibilities are rapidly expanding, and they are held more accountable for the 
financial resources of shareholders than ever before (PwC, 2011). In this respect, the 
directors’ remuneration should also be evaluated by measuring the fiduciary duties and 
responsibility they have in a firm. 
A recent study conducted by PwC (2012) states that most firms only focus on the 
monitoring aspect when setting the remuneration package for directors. Although there 
is no denying that directors should always act in the best interest of the shareholders 
by spending time and effort to ensure good governance together with monitoring 
management, other factors as mentioned above in Chapter 3 also play a vital role in 
setting accurate and adequate remuneration packages for directors (Le Blanc, 2004:1). 
Furthermore, it is important to identify all the remuneration sub-components when 
conducting remuneration package structuring for directors, since this enhances 
transparency in the firm. 
3.5.2 Directors’ remuneration sub-components structure 
Many firms approach directors’ remuneration packages on the basis of a ‘total 
remuneration’ package, instead of focusing on each sub-component individually 
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(Ebert, Torres & Papadakis, 2008:11). While cash incentives are important, it is not the 
only sub-component when remunerating directors. Various other sub-components also 
contribute towards the total remuneration package. 
Within the financial remuneration structure for directors, the direct financial 
remuneration is split into two types, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, namely fixed and 
variable remuneration components. The composition ratio between these two types of 
direct directors’ remuneration differs from individual to individual. Generally the 
variable portion is more short-term-based when designing the remuneration package. 
Figure 3.2 clearly illustrates what a director’s full package may consist of. When 
compiling the remuneration package, every category forming part of the overall 
remuneration package, is identified. Figure 3.2 is a good starting point for this study, 
since all the important remuneration sub-components are mentioned. 
FIGURE 3.2: Directors’ full remuneration package possibilities 
  
Source: Adapted from Manas (2000:220). 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the various possibilities of selecting sub-components to create a 
remuneration package best suited for individual directors. It must be noted that for this 
research study the main focus was on total remuneration. Non-incentive rewards were 
thus excluded and the focus was not placed on the total rewards package, but the total 
remuneration package received (extrinsic values). 
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Since various sub-components are added together in order to create the total 
remuneration package, the most important remuneration sub-components need to be 
identified and discussed. The four sub-components considered in this study, namely 
basic salary, bonuses, share gains and other incentives are discussed in greater detail 
in the following sections. 
(a) Basic salary 
According to Graham et al. (2008:250), the basic salary component is most probably 
the one sub-component that is regarded as the biggest problem by stakeholders and 
forced many firms to rethink and adjust their remuneration strategy to a more 
performance-based one. In general, shareholders feel that directors are being over-
compensated in terms of their basic salary. The size of a firm usually influences the 
basic salary directors receive. A firm’s growth and turnover also influence directors’ 
remuneration. New proposals however suggested that remuneration should be 
determined by the market value of a firm instead of its turnover. 
According to Linger (2013) firms devote little attention in calculating the base salary 
sub-component of the remuneration package. Many firms only use the current 
benchmark in the sector when it comes to base salaries because it is the easiest way 
to set a market-base salary.  
(b) Short-term incentives 
Short-term incentives are generally implemented for a period no longer than a year 
and are performance-driven to motivate directors. This type of incentive plays a vital 
role when base salaries are not important. Performance-based incentives can be for 
the individual director or for the entire board of directors to ensure that the firm moves 
forward, growing and performing at its best. Van den Linde (2009:15) contended that 
although remuneration is not always linked to market fluctuations, the directors should 
at least be remunerated by means of a (short-term incentive) performance bonus, 
when the firm’s performance and growth increase. 
Firms use short-term incentives to achieve short-term objectives and to focus on 
important areas. By implementing an effective short-term remuneration reward 
strategy, the directors are motivated to advance much faster to achieve goals which 
are set for the short term.  
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According to Graham et al. (2008:266), short-term incentives can be divided into the 
following three sub-components: 
• Discretionary: Directors are rewarded for past behaviour and the incentives are 
not fully linked to a motivation reward; 
• Pool: Directors are remunerated with a percentage of performance in a project. 
This type of incentive is very popular and self-explanatory. The better the 
director performs, the bigger the bonus will be; and 
• Target: Directors have been given set measures regarding performance that 
need to be achieved. This type of incentive can be combined with discretionary 
and pool incentives. 
These three forms of short-term incentives are implemented to ensure that directors 
increase the firm’s financial performance and in return receive remuneration for 
achieving the stated objectives.  
(c) Medium-term and special incentives 
These types of incentives are implemented relative to a three- to five-year timeframe, 
usually in those cases where directors are remunerated for achieving goals set for a 
comparable period. Although most firms classify these incentives as long-term, it is 
actually incorrect, because a period of five years is generally a relatively short period 
of time compared to the entire lifetime of a firm. The medium-term timeframe is usually 
used to execute business plans and increase effectiveness and efficiency in the firm 
itself. Directors usually do not focus much on this timeframe as it falls between the 
short- and long-term views. It may however still be important to use medium-term 
incentives in order to ensure that directors pay attention to this time period in the firm’s 
lifespan (Graham et al., 2008:252). 
(d) Long-term incentives 
The duration of long-term incentives falls within the five- to ten-year bracket of the 
firm’s lifetime. These long-term remuneration incentives are classified as the most 
important incentives paid to directors, since it promotes continuous sustainability and 
secures the longevity of a firm (Graham et al., 2008:252). At present, share options, 
an important example of a long-term incentive, are regularly associated in the media 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
79 
 
with being corrupt. When directors receive share options, they could be tempted to 
immediately start to capitalise the capital of the firm back into the share price and 
immediately increase their own benefits. Shareholders would then lose value by 
receiving fewer dividends, thus less return on their shares. Above all, directors usually 
prefer this timeframe due to the fact that they have sufficient time to implement and 
witness the results from strategies and business models developed in the firm (Graham 
et al., 2008:253). 
It is crucial that firms link the correct objectives and their timeframes with the most 
suitable remuneration sub-component in order to achieve the firm’s long-term financial 
objectives. The following factors need to be investigated when structuring the long-
term incentives for directors to ensure that the firm’s long-term objectives are 
sustainable: 
• Directors’ interest is aligned with those of the stakeholders, linking remuneration 
with performance; 
• Directors are attracted and retained to ensure sustainability of the firm; 
• Long-term thinking is endorsed with long-term plans; 
• Long-term success of the firm is shared with the directors; and  
• Wealth accumulation programmes are created as long-term incentives. 
Firms’ financial objectives can be achieved when using long-term incentives. One of 
the most popular long-term incentives for directors is share options or share gains. In 
various countries qualified incentive share options and non-qualified share options are 
used by many firms as an equity remuneration type for directors to motivate them to 
perform in the shareholders’ best interests (Design of share incentive plans, 2010). 
The qualified share options provide tax benefits, but also contain complicated tax 
consequences. In South Africa the non-qualified share options have the disadvantage 
that taxable income is stated at the time non-qualified options are exercised whether 
the shares are sold or not. Moreover, the income from these share options may be 
taxed as ordinary income and not as long-term capital gains (Sigler, 2011:2). 
Equity-based remuneration is most often used to ensure long-term firm performance. 
Share options are the most popular sub-component used by firms as a remuneration 
tool. According to a study by Magnan et al. (2009:28), equity-based remuneration 
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translates into value creation and the overall performance of a firm. This is mainly 
achieved by increasing the directors’ focus on the monitoring aspect in the firm. 
Clementi, Cooley and Wang (2006:2213) also identified share options or any share 
gains as a commitment device. This raised the issue about the risk appetite of the 
director when selecting projects and comparing risk to the remuneration received for 
the financial performance results. 
Other studies have shown that executive share options reduce excessive risk aversion 
by giving the directors an incentive to increase the firm’s risk by accepting risky 
profitable projects instead of avoiding them (Sigler, 2009; Grasselli & Henderson, 
2009). Risk is one way to increase the value of share options, thus increasing the 
volatility of a firm’s profits and performance. 
Within the different time periods, namely short-, medium- and long-term, there are 
different types of incentives used to remunerate directors. There are however other 
incentives that are not fixed to a time period, or just added perks a director might 
receive. These other forms of incentives are discussed below. 
(e) Other incentives 
In this study, directors’ remuneration was divided into four sub-component categories, 
namely base salary, bonuses, gains on share options or share gains and other 
remuneration. As part of other remuneration, items like medical aid, pension 
contributions, travel and cell phone allowances and car allowances are included. 
These are only a few general examples of items that will be classified as part of the 
other incentives a director could receive. Some firms try to combine some of these 
incentives with the performance of the firm. One such example, where firms try to apply 
this method by linking an incentive for the individual towards the financial performance 
of the firm, is the retirement fund contribution. In the example below, the individual 
refers to an executive director. 
(i)  Retirement fund incentives 
In general, retirement plans are not connected to the financial performance of a firm, 
but constitute a large part of the remuneration directors receive. Graham et al. 
(2008:233) developed a performance-based wealth accumulation programme. This 
model measures sustained performance over the long term when contributing to a 
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director’s retirement fund. Models like these usually have termination penalties to 
prevent a director from leaving before the contract expires. Firms want directors to tie 
their own long-term success to that of the firm. 
(ii)  Additional forms of incentives for directors 
Director remuneration does not only come in the form of money or equity. Being a 
director of a specific firm may also enhance the reputation of the director. Directors 
build networks and create opportunities; they have more social interaction with each 
other; they gain knowledge about specific markets and sectors to create value and 
have the use of the firm’s workforce and other resources at their disposal. All off these 
are examples of non-financial incentives and in most instances may exceed the normal 
remuneration indicated on the financial statements of the firm (Magnan et al., 2009:30). 
All the sub-components of directors’ remuneration combined create the total structured 
remuneration package of directors. It is important that the remuneration package as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 is balanced and properly structured to promote the best 
financial performance for the firm. This will mean that directors are properly 
remunerated for achieving the firm’s objectives, thus attempting to ensure that a 
positive relationship exists between directors’ remuneration and firms’ financial 
performance. As discussed later in this chapter, the remuneration committee of a firm 
will play a big role in ensuring that directors’ remuneration and financial performance 
are linked. It must be noted that this study will solely focus on the remuneration 
package and not the total reward package for directors. The difference was clearly 
explained at Figure 3.2 earlier. 
Structures and models used by firms may vary from time to time, especially depending 
on the economic climate. Financial crisis, hyper growth periods and other external 
factors may influence remuneration package structuring directly or indirectly. It remains 
important to see what impact some of these external factors may have when structuring 
and setting directors’ remuneration packages. External factors may easily influence a 
firm’s financial performance. Unfortunately directors can do little to influence these 
external changes in the markets, especially in economic downturn periods. 
Three issues regarding the composition and structuring of directors’ remuneration, 
which in most instances lead to agency problems, are discussed below. The first issue 
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is remuneration during a period of global financial crisis. A previous study conducted 
in United Kingdom by Gregg, Machin and Szymanski (1993:255), indicated that even 
during global financial crisis periods, directors received high remuneration irrespective 
whether their firms performed or not. This was a big concern for shareholders and other 
stakeholders. The general view is that firms will not lower the remuneration of directors 
in global financial crisis periods, but can easily increase these remuneration packages 
during boom periods in the economy. 
The second issue arises from remuneration sub-components. All incentives are not 
always appropriate for directors and a firm’s financial performance. All the sub-
components mentioned in the previous sections (cash, bonus incentive plans, share 
options and share gains) may lead directors to engage in activities that create 
enormous problems and risks for the firm. Undesired behaviour may be encouraged 
when rewarding directors with cash bonuses. Examples include accounting 
manipulation to maximise pay-outs to directors, as well as only focusing on short-term 
goals, which is detrimental to the long-term sustainability focus of the firm (Gregg et 
al., 1993:256). 
The third issue is that remuneration by means of share options or share gains for 
directors may not necessarily increase the efforts of directors to improve the financial 
performance of the firm. Share gains and share options may increase or decrease due 
to market fluctuations, but the directors are rewarded by the changes in the share price. 
This could suggest that directors are not working as hard, owing to the fact that the 
market forces may work for them (Gregg et al., 1993:256). 
The bundling of the different sub-components of remuneration into a complex 
remuneration package for directors allows the shortcoming of one element to be offset 
by the strength of another. It is thus important that a proper evaluation of the firm’s 
financial performance and directors’ performance is conducted accordingly to ensure 
that the appropriate remuneration structures are set (Sigler, 2011:4). 
The previous sections primarily focused on executive directors, who are directly 
involved in managing the firm and its daily business. The following section will shift the 
focus to non-executive directors, investigating their roles, responsibilities and how their 
remuneration structure works. 
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3.6 NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
Non-executive directors are seen by investors and the media as people who protect 
shareholders’ interests in the firm. Furthermore non-executive directors need to be 
devoted to sufficiently fulfil their responsibilities. Non-executive directors are 
remunerated for services rendered, responsibilities held and the role non-executive 
directors generally play accordingly. Thus non-executive directors in general do not 
receive basic salaries, bonuses or share options and grants as in the case of executive 
directors (Davies, 2000:11). 
The level of remuneration is generally determined by the non-executive director’s role, 
time commitments and responsibilities in the firm. The various forms of remuneration 
paid to non-executive directors can be divided into the following categories (PwC, 
2009): 
• A basic fee; 
• Fees for responsibilities such as chairing a committee; 
• Committee membership (e.g. remuneration, nomination or audit committee); 
and 
• Attendance fees (meetings). 
Non-executive directors’ fees may also be benchmarked against similar firms, where 
time commitments, roles and responsibilities are comparable (Out-Law, 2013). 
Normally, the directors’ knowledge, experience and skills are used to effectively help 
the firm to grow and perform. 
At this point, both executive and non-executive directors’ remuneration has been 
discussed. The focus now needs to shift towards the remuneration committee, since 
the appropriate remuneration paid to all directors is determined by this committee. 
Therefore, in the next section the importance and responsibility of a firm’s 
remuneration committee follows. 
3.7 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
The importance of a remuneration committee has grown significantly over the past few 
years. This is because the corporate governance requirements regarding directors’ 
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remuneration became instrumental in setting and managing remuneration. According 
to PwC (2009), the remuneration committee plays a far bigger strategic role than 
imagined. In the past the committee only dealt only with legal matters, especially with 
the disclosure of remuneration. Currently, the committee is also very much part of 
determining the structure of remuneration. 
According to PwC (2009), a remuneration committee’s responsibilities include: 
• Regulating and approving the firm’s remuneration policy; 
• Setting and preparing the annual remuneration report; 
• Reviewing the performance and approving annual total remuneration packages 
(guaranteed pay; short- and long-term incentives); 
• Determining and setting performance measures for incentive plans; and 
• Communicating with shareholders on directors’ remuneration. 
The above-mentioned responsibilities are not the only duties of a remuneration 
committee, but they are identified as the core key performance areas for the 
committee. According to Sigler (2011:5), a remuneration committee’s responsibilities 
are defined by governance rules, and consist of the following: 
• Assess and approve corporate goals and objectives relevant to directors’ 
remuneration; 
• Evaluate the performance of the directors with regard to the above goals and 
objectives; 
• Determine and approve, either as a committee or with other independent 
directors, the remuneration levels on the basis of this assessment; 
• Make recommendations to the board of directors with respect to non-executive 
directors’ remuneration, incentive plans and equity-based plans; and 
• Produce the report on executive remuneration required to be included in the 
proxy statement. 
According to the governance rules prescribed by the King Committee on Corporate 
Governance (2002), a remuneration committee must have the sole authority to 
preserve, dismiss and reward a consulting firm to assist in evaluating a director, CEO 
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or any other senior executive’s remuneration. Another important factor the 
remuneration committee must see to is the disclosure of directors’ remuneration, which 
is cohesive with the King II report principles and good corporate governance guidelines 
as prescribed in the King Committee on Corporate Governance (2002). 
3.8 DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
According to Section 30 of the Companies Act (2008), information regarding the 
remuneration paid to directors should be disclosed in the annual financial statements 
of a firm. The Companies Act (2008) differs from the previous Companies Act (1973) 
in mainly three areas with regard to directors’ remuneration. Firstly, the Companies Act 
(2008) requires disclosure on an entity basis (not collectively); secondly, disclosure of 
previous directors’ remuneration is required; and lastly, the remuneration of all 
prescribed executives must be disclosed. The King reports and good governance 
principles are thus important tools to ensure proper disclosure in a firm. 
The agency problem led to a growing distrust and scepticism towards firms’ executive 
directors, which resulted in the development of corporate governance principles 
(McConvill, 2001:4). The King Committee on corporate governance was established in 
1993 to promote good corporate governance. An improvement in corporate 
governance requirements can improve the link between executive directors’ 
remuneration and a firm’s financial performance (King Committee on Corporate 
Governance, 2002). The King II report (2002) stated that performance-related 
elements of remuneration should constitute a substantial portion within the total 
remuneration packages executive directors receive. The King II report also stated that 
a formal and transparent procedure for developing a policy on all directors’ 
remuneration should apply. This should be supported by a remuneration viewpoint in 
the annual report. 
In addition to the requirement that the normal remuneration of prescribed directors be 
disclosed in the financial statements, the Companies Act (2008) also obliges the 
disclosure of other remuneration received by executive directors. Furthermore, the 
Companies Act (2008) requires approval by special motions when the firm plans to 
issue shares to executive directors as well as when the firm renders financial 
assistance to executive directors. The Companies Act (2008) also calls for disclosure 
in the annual financial statements on an individual basis of remuneration paid to 
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directors. Executive and non-executive directors need to be informed of the fact that 
their remuneration will be disclosed. 
According to Bussin, Blair and France (1998), failure to disclose over the past few 
years has resulted in increased pressure on firms to get their corporate governance in 
order. The King II report required firms to disclose the necessary information as 
prescribed in the King II report (2002) ensuring proper transparency regarding 
directors’ remuneration. The problem emerged that if a firm disclosed all its 
remuneration information, the firm may in effect lose its competitive advantage by 
revealing it to the general domain. In this argument, the question about where the 
balance lies between transparency and a competitive advantage becomes important. 
Bussin et al. (1998) identified the following requirements when a disclosure strategy is 
planned to ensure that a firm’s competitive advantage regarding the remuneration 
strategy remains intact: 
• The remuneration report should include the firm’s policy regarding directors’ 
remuneration; 
• A detailed performance summary with share options and long-term incentives 
for each director must be included; 
• The selection of specific performance conditions must be justified; 
• Methods to determine whether performance targets are met and motivations 
why these methods are selected, should be identified; and 
• External factors that may influence the performance conditions of firms in an 
industry should be identified. 
These requirements could hold negative consequences for a firm. If a firm discloses 
its entire remuneration policy it will lose its competitive edge and it may not be able to 
attract and retain directors. The firm’s business strategy is also exposed when 
performance remuneration is disclosed, thus placing the shareholder in a difficult 
dilemma when deciding between extensive disclosure of directors’ remuneration as 
part of the financials and having a competitive edge. 
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Scholtz and Smit (2011:22) developed a figure to demonstrate the similarities and 
differences between directors’ remuneration requirements, according to the 
Companies Act of 2008 and the JSE listing requirements, as seen in Figure 3.3. 
FIGURE 3.3: Directors’ remuneration requirements 
Companies Act 2008 JSE listing requirements 
 The following must be disclosed separately  
• Remuneration,* 
• Benefits,* 
• Pension, 
• Payments to pension funds on behalf thereof, 
• Compensation for loss of office, 
• Securities issued, and  
• Service contracts 
 
 Remuneration includes: 
• Directors’ fees for services to or on behalf of 
the company , 
• Salary, bonuses and performance related 
payment, 
• Expense allowances for which the director 
need not account, 
• Contributions to any pension scheme not 
otherwise needing separate disclosure. 
• Options or rights given directly or indirectly, 
• Financial assistance for the subscription of 
options or securities or the purchase of 
securities, and  
• Any loans and any other financial assistance  
 
 Remuneration and benefits must be shown for:  
• Services as director of the reporting company, 
and  
• All other devices while being a director of the 
reporting company. 
 Disclosure should be made of each 
individual director’s emoluments, 
including directors who have 
resigned. 
 An analysis in aggregate and by 
director of emoluments paid for the 
current financial year as well as the 
preceding financial year, 
distinguished between executive 
and non-executive directors: 
• Fees for the services as director, 
• Management, consulting, 
technical or other fees, 
• Basic salary, 
• Bonuses and performance-related 
payments, 
• Sums paid by way of expense 
allowance. 
• Any other material benefits 
received. 
• Contributions to pension fund, 
and 
• Commission, gain or profit 
sharing arrangements.  
Source: Adapted from the South African Companies Act, 2008 and JSE Listing requirements (2010) 
Firms listed on the JSE must ensure that they comply with all the directors’ 
remuneration disclosure regulations and requirements, not only with respect to the 
Companies Act (2008), but also to the requirements mentioned for listed firms on the 
JSE, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
It is, however, important to note that there is a psychological side to remuneration for 
directors as well, whether it is regarding the financial remuneration paid to the directors 
or whether directors are only motivated when being paid by the firm. These issues can 
only be analysed when the psychological impact on directors is examined more 
closely. 
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3.9 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF REMUNERATION ON DIRECTORS 
There is an on-going debate about directors’ remuneration in Western economies as 
to whether shareholders are getting what they deserve and whether directors’ 
remuneration is acceptable to stakeholders (Larkin, Lamar & Francesca, 2012:1194). 
Unfortunately, little regard has been given to perhaps the most important constituency 
– the directors themselves. 
For several years firms believed that directors are only motivated by financial 
remuneration received for performance and growth in firms. Recent studies reported 
that this might not always be the case. Psychological and sociological factors and 
motivation methods also need to be included as not all directors are motivated in the 
same way. 
A recent study conducted by PwC in Australia (2012:6) investigated the psychology of 
incentives and found the following: 
• Directors are more risk averse, meaning that they would rather take a lower 
fixed salary than performance bonuses; 
• Directors much rather prefer a clearer pay package above a complex one with 
more value; 
• Directors value deferred pay significantly below its economic or accounting 
value, since the longer the directors have to wait for bonuses, the less it is worth 
to them; 
• Directors want to be paid more than their peers, even if it is lower in absolute 
terms; 
• Directors don not just work for money; factors like an ideal job also play an 
important role; and 
• The majority of directors believe that their long-term incentives are not effective, 
thus it does not motivate them to perform. 
In recent times the question has been asked whether the ‘old’ remuneration strategy 
is still effective. Shareholders are of the opinion that firms invest too much money in 
long-term incentives for directors with little performance to show for it (PwC, 2012:29). 
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Remuneration is inherent to a firm’s strategy. Firms use various remuneration 
strategies and have the discriminatory advantage in selecting their pay-for-
performance policies (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990:669). Risk attitude and behavioural 
biases play a major role in the decision-making processes of directors when being 
remunerated in these firms depending on the role the director has in the firm as well 
as the opportunity costs involved.  
It is important for firms to be able to identify the elements that influence directors’ 
behaviour, since a firm’s performance depends on it. Remuneration strategies 
currently focus mainly on two mechanisms when it comes to a firm’s financial 
performance and directors’ remuneration. In the first instance, provision for effort and 
personnel economics are identified as in the case of Jensen and Meckling (1976:305), 
where powerful insight into the strategic role of remuneration for performance is 
identified by clearly defining the mechanisms used that affect employee efforts to 
enhance firm performance. Secondly, the economic theory of effort, skill and output 
utilised by the firms to improve operating performance. 
There are, however, more factors influencing remuneration and a firm’s performance 
such as psychological factors that are largely neglected in the economy. These factors 
include psychology of information and focusing on social and overconfidence costs. 
These factors influence not only the behaviour of the director, but also the decisions 
and actions of other employees (Larkin et al., 2012:1194). 
Focusing on the psychological factors, Branca and Imelmann (2009) stated that 
behaviour is defined as the way directors act as a result of a particular remuneration 
package. The literature in economics mainly focuses on behaviour in terms of the firm’s 
performance. In contrast to that, social and/or psychology literature focus on the 
intrinsic (doing an activity for its own sake) or extrinsic (doing an activity for an 
instrumental reason) motivations of director behaviour. 
Other factors, such as corporate culture, fame, awards and social groups also need to 
form part of factors when modern remuneration packages for directors are compiled. 
When psychological and social factors as mentioned in this section are incorporated 
in the agency theory, as was the case in the study conducted by Gagne and Forest 
(2008:225), these factors assist researchers to move closer towards explaining the 
effectiveness of the various methods influencing behaviour, motivation and retaining 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
90 
 
key talent when remunerating directors. These factors cannot always be calculated in 
monetary value towards remuneration, but are also important factors that might 
indirectly influence firms’ performance.   
Researchers could also investigate the relationship between the psychological 
remuneration of directors and a firm’s financial performance. For more detail, industrial 
and organisational psychology (also known as IO psychology or work psychology) 
could be considered. Organisational psychology is the scientific study of the employee, 
workplace environment, and the organisation (Anderson, Ones, Sinangil & 
Viswesvaran, 2002:424). Industrial and organisational psychologists contribute to the 
organisation's success by means of the performance, satisfaction, safety, health and 
well-being of its employees. It is therefore important to not only focus on cash-based 
incentives when remunerating, but to also focus on the directors’ behaviour and 
attitudes, and how these can be developed and improved by means of hiring practices, 
training programmes, feedback, and management systems (Building better 
organisations, 2013). 
Section 3.9 identified the psychology underpinning “financial” remuneration. The 
directors’ attitudes towards typical current remuneration models that only focus on 
monetary value benefits were revealed. Furthermore, the emphasis could be on 
industrial psychology when remunerating packages for directors are structured. There 
are various types of incentives and factors that motivate directors, not only financial 
incentives. The current general remuneration model may need adjustments as it may 
no longer be adequate. 
This study will however focus on the remuneration paid during a specific period 
selected, thus not being able to adjust the remuneration packages, but to evaluate the 
current compilation and the possibility of a relationship towards firms’ financial 
performance. Before stating the problem relevant to this study, a few similar studies 
conducted in the field of directors’ remuneration and firms’ financial performance 
internationally are listed and the most relevant studies are briefly discussed in the next 
section. 
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3.10 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
Many studies worldwide have analysed the determinants of directors’ remuneration, 
particularly in the United States and in the United Kingdom. These include Coughlan 
and Schmidt, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Cosh and 
Hugh, 1997; Conyon, 1998; Zhou, 2000; Grunditz and Lindqvist, 2003; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004; Gregg, Jewell and Tonks, 2005; Lee, Lev and Yeo, 2008; Crutchley and 
Minnick, 2012 as well as Larkin et al., 2012, to name but a few. These authors reviewed 
much of the literature pertaining to corporate financial performance and directors’ 
remuneration. 
Murphy (1985:11) wrote one of the most influential papers on pay for performance 
when he compared a firm’s performance and the remuneration of its directors by 
measuring shareholders’ return. Building on this study, Jensen and Murphy (1990:225) 
compared the directors’ wealth with those of the shareholders and found no significant 
relationship in this regard. Further studies followed and yielded different results. These 
studies were conducted all over the world in different sectors and using different 
performance measures to compare with the remuneration of directors. Diverse findings 
were gathered depending on internal and external factors of these firms and the 
industries considered for the studies. 
A study conducted in the United States by Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) 
investigated the pay for performance for CEOs and also found a significant relationship 
between the financial performance measures used and the remuneration of the CEOs. 
The study focused only on the basic salary component and total remuneration paid to 
the CEOs and measured it against ROA, share returns, turnover and investment 
opportunities. 
In Australia, Windsor and Cybinski (2007) aligned executive directors’ remuneration 
with firm performance. The study investigated the top 50 largest publicly-listed firms in 
Australia over a period of two years. The dependent variable used for the study was 
executive directors’ remuneration that comprised fixed pay, superannuation, bonuses 
and fringe benefits. The study concluded that different measures used had different 
relationship outcomes. 
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A Korean study done by Kato et al. (2007:37) suggested that the remuneration of a 
director might be linked to the financial performance of the stock markets. This study 
compared the sensitive relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
performance of the firms in Korea, to those of the United States and Japan. Accounting 
measures had less impact on the remuneration of directors in Korea than those in the 
United States and Japan. The study used the stock market as a measure because a 
change in share price is a reasonable indicator to measure a firm’s growth as it is used 
internationally. 
According to Krauter and De Sousa (2008:193), who investigated 28 manufacturing 
firms in Brazil, executives’ remuneration and a firm’s financial performance do have a 
positive relationship. The Mann-Whitney test was used in the study, and the results 
suggested that there is a relationship between variable salaries and financial 
measures, namely ROE and return on sale (ROS). Another positive relationship was 
found between other remuneration types and the financial measures ROE, sales 
growth, and ROS. When the study used the Pearson’s correlation test, no significant 
linear relationships among variables were pointed out. 
A study done by BDO International (2010), the 5th largest network of accounting firms 
in the world, relationship links between the remuneration of directors and performance 
of firms all over the United States were found. From most of these studies, a positive 
return for shareholders leads to an increase in remuneration, while the opposite 
reaction applied when performance decreased. 
Dommisse (2011:1) studied the top 120 JSE-listed firms in South Africa, investigating 
the relationship between the total remuneration of executive management and firms’ 
financial performance. Dommisse used income, turnover and earnings before tax and 
financing cost as financial performance measures. These measures are short-term 
figures and can be tested against firms’ financial performance. The study indicated a 
strong relationship between the total directors’ remuneration and firms’ financial 
performance. 
Another South African study done by Bradley (2012) also determined that no linear 
correlation between CEO compensation and the performance of firms existed. The 
study investigated the 40 largest listed firms on the JSE. He did however suggest that 
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econometric models show correlation between certain variables such as age and 
experience of directors to compensation.  
All the studies listed in Section 3.10 assisted in setting the context and highlighting the 
importance of this research study. These studies are only a small portion of current 
studies done globally and confirm the immense importance of this issue regarding 
overcompensation and the lack of a relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
a firm’s financial performance. By expanding the research in the field and conducting 
valid studies around this issue, all stakeholders can be rightfully informed. 
Shareholders and stakeholders would obtain a better understanding and improved 
insight on the matter and agency problems may decline or even disappear. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provided the necessary literature and background for this 
study. A conclusion for the literature chapters follows. 
3.11 LITERATURE CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in the two literature review chapters, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, directors’ 
remuneration is still a high-profile issue. Almost daily, articles and various newspapers 
and business magazines highlight the concerns about the amounts of cash and equity 
remuneration paid to the directors of firms. The biggest concern is that directors are 
remunerated independently from a firm’s financial performance. These arguments lead 
to the perception that directors become wealthy at the expense of a firm’s 
shareholders. 
In a business context, the vision is that directors’ remuneration should stay closely 
linked to shareholders’ value creation by means of comparing it with a firm’s financial 
performance. Effective performance measures and governance principles will ensure 
that directors’ remuneration programmes are linked to the remuneration directors 
receive and that shareholders are treated justly. 
The primary objective of this study was to determine whether there is a relationship 
between the remuneration paid to directors and the financial performance of the firms 
selected in this study. This study’s objective will directly influence the shareholders’ 
value maximisation issues and investigate whether or not directors are being over-
compensated. 
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In this study, the different sub-components of directors’ remuneration are identified to 
highlight the areas where directors are remunerated for their work and performance. 
These sub-components were compared to the firms’ financial performance to ascertain 
whether any relationship between sustainable performance and wealth creation for 
shareholders are observed based on the remuneration directors receive. 
The secondary objectives for this study included the following aspects: 
• Identifying the different sub-components of the total directors’ remuneration and 
their importance in relation to the firms’ financial performance measures 
identified; 
• Investigating the contribution of the various sub-components towards total 
remuneration; 
• Investigating the relationship between the various sub-components of directors’ 
remuneration and firms’ financial performance variables selected; 
• Comparing the total and the sub-component remuneration of executive directors 
with the financial performance variables of the firms; and 
• Comparing total non-executive directors’ remuneration with the performance of 
the firms. 
All these objectives are investigated when descriptive and inferential statistics are 
applied for this study, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, for this to be conducted, 
the methodology for this study is first developed in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As highlighted in the previous two chapters, financial performance varies depending 
on the type of firm as well as the sector it operates in. In the case of this study, Industrial 
Sector firms listed on the JSE during the period 2002 to 2010 were considered. The 
remuneration paid to the various directors in the industry is influenced by factors that 
were discussed in depth in Chapter 3. By investigating previous empirical studies, the 
researcher identified four financial performance measures for this study and divided 
the total remuneration of directors into four sub-components. 
All the financial information, reports and other prior studies indicated that a possible 
relationship between the financial performance of the firms and directors’ remuneration 
may exist. The primary objective of this study was therefore to investigate the 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of firms 
listed on the Industrial Sector on the JSE. Five secondary objectives were also 
formulated and listed again in Section 4.5 of this chapter. 
In Chapter 4, a broad overview of research in the business environment will be given, 
followed by a detailed explanation of the comprehensive research process that was 
employed in this study. This research process was adopted to ensure that all steps 
and aspects of the methodology for this study are addressed. The research process 
starts with defining the research problem, followed by identifying the objectives for the 
study and developing the research design. After these steps are explained, the chapter 
continues to discuss the data collection method used; the primary and/or secondary 
research conducted; the research framework chosen; how the data were collected; 
and explaining the descriptive and inferential statistics that were used to test the 
hypotheses. 
4.2 BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Business research is a systematic and organised attempt to investigate specific 
problems encountered in a firm’s setting that need solutions. Business research is also 
defined as the entire research process from the starting phase, acquiring the 
necessary data; analysing the research data; separating the relevant data; converting 
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the collected data it into useful information and using the findings for better decision-
making, guidance and planning for future problem-solving in the final phase. Overall, 
business research helps to improve performance in a firm and should contribute to 
maximise shareholders’ value (Cooper & Schindler, 2006:4). 
The following quote motivates the reason for business research: 
 “Every business issue ultimately boils down to an information problem” (Doyle & Griffin, 2010:6). 
It is always important to state the purpose of the business research before selecting 
the type of research that will be conducted. There are various business research 
methods to use, such as descriptive versus analytical, applied versus fundamental, 
quantitative versus qualitative, conceptual versus empirical. For the purpose of this 
study, the scientific method approach was used. The process of this method is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
The scientific method focuses on the system or technique used by researchers to use 
prior knowledge and evidence to achieve objectives in a firm. According to Doyle and 
Griffin (2010:6), the core of research, whether basic or applied, lies in the scientific 
method used. 
FIGURE 4.1: The scientific idea development method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Doyle and Griffin (2010:6) 
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With the scientific method, there are various ways to develop ideas. It is important that 
these ideas can be converted and stated into researchable terms. By being able to 
convert these terms, the hypothesis stage is reached. The next step involves testing 
the hypothesis against empirical evidence (which are facts from observation or 
experimentation). With hypotheses, the results may either be rejected or not rejected. 
By formulating the findings, new knowledge is generated and developed. 
4.3 THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
According to Cant, Gerber-Nel, Nel and Kotze (2003:27), a research process can be 
defined as a series of steps in the methodical collection and analysis of data. For the 
purpose of this study, the research process consisted of ten steps as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. 
FIGURE 4.2: The research process 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Lamb et al. (2010:151) 
Step 1
• Define the research problem
Step2
• Identify research objectives
Step3
• Create and develop a research design
Step4
• Collect secondary data and reconsider objectives
Step5
• Conduct primary research
Step6
• Plan the research framework and design 
Step7
• Collect the data
Step8
• Analyse and interpret the data
Step9
• Compile and present the research findings report
Step10
• Follow-up and monitoring
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A thorough discussion of each of the steps outlined in Figure 4.2 will follow in this 
chapter, in order to explain how the research process was applied for this particular 
study. 
4.4 STEP 1: DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The research process begins when the researcher is confronted with an opportunity or 
a challenge. This opportunity or challenge is usually acknowledged for the first time 
and is not clearly defined. For this reason, it is crucial that the researcher addresses 
the research matter with proper and prompt decision-making. This is an important step, 
due to the fact that the entire research process will follow according to the decision 
made. If the research problem is inadequate or weak, the findings of the research might 
also be of little value. One cannot design a research plan without a very clear idea of 
what needs to be accomplished (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004:36). Bertrand Russel, a well-
known British author specialising in mathematics and philosophy, quoted the following 
regarding the research problem: 
“The greatest challenge to any thinker is stating the problem in a way that will allow a solution” (Tao, 
2005:129). 
Before one can understand how to develop a well-defined research problem, it is 
important to know what the goal or outcome of the process will be. According to 
Strangman (2012), the goal of defining the research problem is to create research 
questions and hypotheses that are: 
• Measurable – quantifiable/testable; 
• Well-defined – no ambiguous language; 
• Useful for decision-making or finding a solution; 
• Directly connected to one another – the hypothesis is not only a plausible 
answer to the research question, but completely answers the research question 
as well; and 
• Taking the full scope of the problem into consideration – have all the important 
and relevant questions been asked? 
The most important reason why a research problem must be defined before continuing 
with the steps that follow below, is that the researcher must first define the “destination” 
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before starting the research “journey”. This helps to determine what will be done, 
whether it will withstand scientific scrutiny, how it will be done and what may be 
achieved by conducting the research (Sage, 2012). 
According to Gerber-Nel (2004:167), it is not only important to obtain an answer or 
solution as mentioned above, but to obtain these answers in an effective and efficient 
manner. Therefore, in the case of this study, it was vital to properly acknowledge the 
problem or opportunity confronting firms to do proper research in order to find sufficient 
solutions and results. 
As highlighted in the previous two chapters, directors’ remuneration has been a high- 
profile issue for the past few decades. Shareholders want to be better informed about 
whether directors’ remuneration packages are in line with the performance of the firms, 
or whether they are earning big incentive packages without any obligation towards 
shareholders or being required to ensure an acceptable level of performance in the 
firms. This issue was used to develop the research problem for this study, and 
furthermore, to determine whether there is indeed a relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and the financial performance of firms. Once the research problem has 
been identified, the research objectives can be formulated. 
4.5 STEP 2: IDENTIFYING THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
After defining the research problem, the primary and secondary research objectives 
need to be developed to continue with the research process. The main purpose of the 
research objectives is to provide relevant information, and to obtain results and 
answers for the research study. 
According to Wiid and Diggines (2013:2), this step answers what the purpose of the 
research is, as it is impossible to formulate these objectives before the research 
problem has been identified. These research objectives are guidelines to what the 
researcher would like or hope to achieve in the study. The research objectives will in 
general correspond to a large degree with the information required to solve a problem 
or utilise an opportunity. Therefore, it is important that the research objectives are 
formulated in an accurate, relevant and specific manner. 
When formulating research objectives, the researcher divides general questions into 
more focused and specific questions. These questions are then used to set the primary 
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and secondary objectives of the study. A primary objective is defined as the statement 
of the main relationship or association that the researcher seeks to identify or establish 
(Farrugia, Petrisor, Farrokhyar & Bhandari, 2010:278). The primary objective set for 
this study was to determine whether there is a relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and firms’ financial performance. 
Secondary objectives are defined as specific aspects in the research topic that the 
researcher wants to investigate in the main framework. The following secondary 
objectives were formulated for this study: 
• Identifying the different sub-components of the total directors’ remuneration and 
their importance in relation to the firms’ financial performance measures 
identified; 
• Investigating the contribution of the various sub-components towards total 
remuneration; 
• Investigating the relationship between the various sub-components of directors’ 
remuneration and firms’ financial performance variables selected; 
• Comparing the total and the sub-component remuneration of executive directors 
with the financial performance variables of the firms; and 
• Comparing total non-executive directors’ remuneration with the financial 
performance of the firms. 
These objectives were formulated to strengthen and support the primary objective of 
the study. According to Lamb et al. (2010:152) the research objectives should ensure 
that the problem statement is addressed and assist with the relevance of the measuring 
instruments that will be used to assess the empirical results from the data analysis. 
4.6 STEP 3: CREATING AND DEVELOPING A RESEARCH DESIGN 
After the research problem has been identified, and the research questions and 
research objectives have been formulated, the research design can be developed. The 
research design is the method/plan that sets out how the research will be conducted. 
Wiid and Diggines (2013:54) described the research design as a blueprint and a 
framework design for the researcher. The design is the plan and structure that will 
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enable the researcher to increase the ultimate validity of the research results and 
findings. To compile the research design, the researcher needs to establish a few key 
factors in advance, namely: 
• The type of data; 
• Where the data will be collected or obtained from; 
• What data collection method and technique will be used; 
• Who or what is targeted; and 
• How the data will be analysed. 
These factors are examples of what may be required to compile a proper research 
design. Lamb et al. (2010:152) stated that the research design is not only a plan to 
implement the research project, but also a tool to prevent any misunderstandings and 
a guide to work from. 
According to Mouton (1996:107), a research design is a set of guidelines and 
instructions that need to be followed in order to address the research problem and the 
research objectives. The design illustrates all the elements of the research. These 
include samples, methods, programmes and measures. 
The research design will vary depending on the type of research conducted. For this 
reason, the researcher must ensure that the research objectives stated in the previous 
step can be achieved by selecting the correct and relevant data sources from where 
the needed data can be collected. There are two types of data sources when collecting 
data, namely secondary and primary sources. According to Grinyer (2009:2), 
secondary data sources include data that were generally collected for previous 
research and/or already exist. Secondary data sources are most commonly associated 
with quantitative data. In contrast, primary data sources are documents or records 
containing first-hand information or original data on a specific topic. The researcher will 
first try to solve the research problem by using secondary research data, and only if it 
is not possible to solve the research problem this way, will the researcher conduct 
primary research. 
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4.7 STEP 4: COLLECTING SECONDARY DATA AND RECONSIDERING THE 
OBJECTIVES 
Secondary data refer to information that has been collected for some other purpose 
and is readily available (Gerber-Nel, 2004:11). Secondary research is described as the 
most widely used method for data collection. The secondary research process involves 
accessing data and information that have been gathered or originate from previously 
conducted primary research (Prescott, 2008). Secondary research also includes 
collecting information from third-party sources such as websites of firms, accounting 
and sales reporting, magazine articles as well as previously gathered information used 
internally or externally by an analyst. 
According to Prescott (2008), there are many advantages to using secondary research 
data rather than conducting primary research. One significant advantage when using 
secondary data is that the data can provide background information regarding the 
research study and could strengthen the final results. Other advantages of secondary 
data include (Prescott, 2008): 
• Ease of access; 
• Low cost to acquire; 
• It helps to clarify and/or answer the research questions; and 
• It may eliminate the difficulty to conduct primary research. 
Prescott (2008), however, stated the importance of also mentioning the negative 
aspects regarding secondary research data. These include: 
• The quality of research may be inadequate; 
• It may not be specific to the researcher’s needs; 
• The information gathered from previous research may be incomplete; and 
• The research may be untimely or outdated. 
Overall, there are significant advantages for researchers to conduct secondary 
research. It is the responsibility of the researcher to clarify and manage the 
disadvantages accompanied with secondary data. 
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Another important aspect to acknowledge when working with secondary data is the 
difference between internal and external secondary data. Internal data can be divided 
into four broad reporting categories and are obtained within an organisation. The four 
areas can be classified as accounting reports, sales force reports, miscellaneous 
records and internal experts (Abhijeet, 2010). External data are recorded, created, 
conducted or generated by entities other than the researcher or the organisation 
conducting the research. This type of data is usually collected from external databases 
or published data (Cant et al., 2005:71). 
For this study, secondary external data were collected. McGregor BFA (2012) and 
TimBukOne (2012) were chosen as the main external databases for the study. These 
databases provided all the information regarding the remuneration of directors as well 
as the financial performance of the selected firms for the study’s timeframe. Firms’ 
public websites were also used to obtain and ensure correct data and information. 
4.8 STEP 5: CONDUCTING PRIMARY RESEARCH 
According to Jones and Gratton (2010:8), primary research is defined as data 
observed or collected from first-hand experience. Primary data have not been 
previously published. An example will be data that derive from an original or new study. 
As mentioned earlier, primary research is usually only conducted when secondary 
research is not adequate or cannot solve the research questions. According to Wiid 
and Diggines (2013:85), primary data can be obtained from observation, experiments 
and surveys. Every method used to collect primary data will use alternative techniques, 
as no perfect single method exists to conduct primary research. It all depends on the 
experience of the researcher. The type of research selected for the study will definitely 
influence the method, objectives and other factors of the study; therefore it is important 
to also highlight the advantages and disadvantages of primary research, similar to what 
has been discussed in terms of secondary research in the previous paragraphs. 
According to Dickie and Dubey (2008:2), the advantages of primary research include 
that: 
• It is an original source of data; 
• It is possible to capture the changes occurring over the course of time; 
• It is flexible; 
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• It is to the advantage of the researcher; and 
• Extensive research studies are based on primary data. 
Dickie and Dubey (2008:2) did not only identify the advantages of primary research, 
they also acknowledge the disadvantages of primary research that include that: 
• Primary data is expensive to obtain; 
• It is time-consuming; 
• More resources are required; and 
• Inaccurate feedback may occur. 
When conducting primary research, the researcher must compile and design the 
needed research by collecting data and converting it into the required information to 
address the research question. Before starting with a primary research investigation, 
it is important to first compile the research framework as will be discussed in the next 
section. 
4.9 STEP 6: PLANNING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
During this step of planning the research framework, the researcher identifies the 
selection of subjects and the respondents (individuals) that will participate in the study. 
The terms population, sample and census are used to identify and measure the 
elements selected for the study to address the research question. 
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013), a population may be studied 
using one of two approaches: taking a census, or selecting a sample. It is important to 
note that irrespective of whether a census or a sample is used, both provide information 
that can be used to draw conclusions about the whole population. 
Easton and McColl (2010) defined a population as an entire collection of people, 
animals, plants or things from which data may be collected. In this study, the 
researcher was interested in firms listed in the Industrial Sector of the JSE and wanted 
to draw conclusions regarding the entire group selected. 
A sample is defined as a group of units selected from a larger group (population). By 
using a sample, it is expected that valid conclusions about the larger group (population) 
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can be drawn. The reason for using a sample rather than the entire population is 
generally due to the large size of the entire population. The best way to solve this 
problem is by doing random sampling on the population. This method is used to best 
represent the larger group or population. The researcher should note that even when 
only selecting a sample, it is important to thoroughly define the population as well as 
including the description of the requirements to be included. It is also important to note 
that the targeted population will always be identified prior to selecting a sample from 
where the data for the study will be gathered (Roxy, Olsen & Devore, 2008:32). 
An alternative way to conduct research is by way of a census collection. A census is 
defined as a procedure of systematically acquiring and recording information regarding 
the elements of a given population (Arthur & Sheffrin, 2003:334). The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2013) defined a census as a study of every unit, everything or 
everyone in the population identified. This is known as enumeration, which means it is 
a complete count. Data collected with this method are far more accurate than selecting 
a sample that represents the entire population. 
In this study, a sample was used to obtain the relevant information due to specific 
requirements. All firms listed on the Industrial Sector of the JSE from 2002 until 2010 
were identified to address the research problem, namely the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and the firms’ financial performance. This makes it clear that 
the target population selected for this study was the Industrial Sector firms listed on 
the JSE. The criteria and requirements identified for the research study were selected 
to include most of the population by selecting specific data required from every element 
in the population. After identifying the population, additional requirements were 
considered to determine the sample group. One of these requirements was that a firm 
had to be listed for three consecutive years. By selecting such a large sample of firms, 
findings are more accurate for the entire population. Table 4.1 illustrates the 
advantages and disadvantages of selecting the sample. 
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TABLE 4.1: Advantages and disadvantages of a sample selection 
Advantages of a SAMPLE Disadvantages of a SAMPLE 
• Costs would generally be lower than 
for a census. 
• Results may be available in less time. 
• If good sampling techniques are used, 
the results can be very representative 
of the actual population. 
• Data may not be representative of the 
total population, particularly where the 
sample size is small. 
• Often not suitable for producing 
benchmark data. 
• As data are collected from a subset of 
units and inferences made about the 
whole population, the data are subject 
to 'sampling' error. 
• Decreased number of units will reduce 
the detailed information available about 
sub-groups within a population. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) 
4.9.1 Setting the data set 
All JSE-listed and delisted Industrial Sector firms, listed during the nine-year time 
period, were identified for the study and formed part of the target population. The firms 
that complied with the criteria and requirements for this study were included by means 
of a sample selection. As mentioned in Step 4 of the research process, McGregor BFA 
(2012) and TimBukOne (2012) were used to collect the required data for all the firms. 
All the firms’ financial reports and results were available in standardised financial 
reporting format. By having standardised financial statements, the data set used in this 
research study are more reliable than using various reporting formats all together. 
All the firms listed during the given timeframe were considered for inclusion if they 
remained listed for more than three consecutive years. If not, it would not be possible 
to formulate trends or draw comparisons with the rest of the Industrial Sector’s firms. 
This requirement unfortunately did expose the study to potential survivor-bias 
selection, which means that only firms that “survived” for longer than a three-year 
period were included in the sample for the study (Elton, Gruber & Blake, 1996). 
One of the main reasons for selecting the Industrial Sector is that it consists of a large 
and diverse group of firms, with some firms only operating in South Africa while others 
are doing business in the international environment. Another reason for not considering 
other sectors, such as the Financial Sector and Basic Materials Sector, is the difference 
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in the financial statements and business operations of firms operating in the different 
sectors, limiting their comparability. 
If this study only focused on the listed firms in the Industrial Sector, it would have 
narrowed down the data set significantly and would have investigated only the 
successful firms. A large number of firms delisted during the period selected for 
numerous reasons. Firms that could not commit to their financial obligations and failed 
financially or cases where firms were restructured were observed. The following two 
reasons were identified for including those firms that delisted during the period used 
for the study and were listed for at least three consecutive years: 
• By including listed and delisted firms with a lifespan of longer than three years, 
the study would have a more fair and just representation of the industry growth, 
performance and trends. By only selecting the surviving firms, the 
outcomes/results of the study would have appeared better than in reality; and 
• The findings and results of this research study would be inconsistent and 
unreliable when considering the Industrial Sector as a whole for the timeframe 
being researched if only listed firms were used or only firms that existed for the 
entire time period. 
As mentioned above, a firm was only included in the study when three or more 
consecutive years of data were available for that specific firm. The type of data 
obtained for research purposes was panel data, which included time period dimension 
data (time-series) as well as cross-sectional dimension data. Whenever these two 
dimensions are used together, it is categorised as panel data. According to Diggle, 
Heagerty, Liang and Zeger (2002:2), the term ‘panel data’ refers to multi-dimensional 
data frequently involving measurements over time. Panel data contains observations 
on multiple phenomena observed over multiple time periods for the firms or individuals. 
By only considering firms that existed for at least a three-year period, the reliability of 
the study increases. 
To summarise, the study included all firms listed and delisted, having at least three 
consecutive years of data available in the period set for this research study. The period 
selected for the study was 2002 until 2010 (nine years). The reason for this unusual 
time selection was that the King III report was published after 2010, and that financial 
statement standardised format guidelines changed, affecting the consistency factor 
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between firms that did not all change immediately to comply with the new requirements 
of the King III report. Most importantly, the over-time factor comparability in the study 
would have been jeopardised by extending the period. First, a total of 126 firms were 
identified, consisting of listed and delisted firms on the JSE’s Industrial Sector. These 
firms were identified as the population for the study. After applying the criteria of a 
three-year existence requirement, 27 firms were eliminated and an additional six were 
excluded for not having or complying with the relevant data and information needed in 
the study. The remaining 93 firms’ financial data were available and complied with the 
prescribed requirements to be included in the study. The remaining 93 firms were 
included in the sample for this research study. 
4.10 STEP 7: COLLECTING THE DATA 
This phase is where the application of the methodology takes place. In this step, the 
data are physically collected and analysed. The method selected for the study and 
instruments that will be used to do the analysis in the study are identified in order to 
obtain the necessary results. The collection of data entails the actual collection of 
primary and secondary data from the selected target group, population, sample or 
census selected. 
The collection of data is known to be the most expensive aspect of the entire research 
process and increases the possibility of making mistakes considerably. The researcher 
must have the knowledge, skill and insight to obtain the correct data for the research. 
This step must be planned thoroughly, with clear instructions and methods for 
collecting the data. To start with the planning, the type of data collected must be 
identified first. As mentioned previously, there are two types of data: primary and 
secondary data. Within each of these two types there are two main types of data that 
can be collected for a study namely quantitative and qualitative data. The term 
‘quantitative’ refers to an information type that is based on quantifiable data (objective 
properties) or quantities, whereas the term ‘qualitative data’ refers to apparent 
subjective properties (qualities) including mass, time or productivity (Trochim, 2006). 
Secondary data were used for this study, because the data existed prior to the study. 
All the secondary data collected were not in the correct usable format for the purpose 
of the study. It had to be reclassified and converted into the necessary format, by 
compiling new data sheets on Microsoft Excel (2012). 
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Quantitative data were collected to achieve the objectives formulated for the research 
study. The reason for selecting a quantitative data approach can further be motivated 
by the fact that the remuneration of directors as well as the performance, financial 
ratios and financial amounts of the firms were displayed in a measurable format on the 
financial and annual reports and/or statements of the identified firms. All the numerical 
data were used to address the primary and secondary objectives. 
As mentioned above, the performance of these firms was quantified by means of 
investigating relevant financial ratios and measures. The financial ratios were used as 
measurements to calculate the financial performance of the firms. These financial 
performance measures were identified as the independent variables. Instances did 
occur where disclosure was not provided or not in the correct format for the 
requirements of the research study. The reason for this could be that the financial 
reports were not published, or that the reports were published, but were not complete 
with all the relevant required information needed for the study. The same data 
collection requirements mentioned for financial performance data were applied for 
collecting directors’ remuneration data. 
The financial information was obtained from the income statements, balance sheets 
and ratio reports from two external databases, McGregor BFA (2012) and TimBukOne 
(2012), which contained standardised reports and statements. All the remuneration 
reports were also obtained from these databases. 
The financial performance data and ratios used as measurement instruments included 
the following aspects: 
• Turnover; 
• Earnings per share; 
• Total share return; and 
• Market value added. 
The directors’ remuneration data were divided into the following four sub-categories: 
• Basic salary; 
• Bonuses; 
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• Share options exercised or share gains; and 
• Other remuneration (e.g. medical, pension, motor and telephone allowances). 
Table 4.2 provides the dependent and independent variables that were used in this 
study. As observed in Table 4.2, the independent variables were divided into two types, 
namely market and accounting measures. All these independent variables were linked 
to the measuring method in the table for the research study. 
Directors’ remuneration was selected as the dependent variable, and was further sub-
divided into four components, namely the basic salary of directors, the performance 
bonus paid, gains directors made in terms of share options exercised or received from 
the firm, and lastly, other remuneration that mostly consisted of pension, medical and 
vehicle allowances. 
The independent variables identified in Table 4.2 include market and accounting 
measures that were used to measure the financial performance of the firms. Four 
important measures were selected for this purpose. All these variables mentioned 
above including the composition of these amounts and ratios are discussed in depth 
in the sections that follow. 
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TABLE 4.2: Dependent and independent variables 
IDENTIFIED MEASURED 
Dependent variable  
Directors’ remuneration  
 
Remuneration data collected from reports and financial statements 
were converted into Excel sheets for this research study. In addition, 
executive and non-executive directors were identified and classified 
accordingly next to every director’s details for each year the firm was 
included in the study.  
 
 
• Basic cash salary 
• Performance bonus 
• Gain on share options 
• Other 
Independent variables  
Financial performance of firms  
Accounting measures   
Turnover  Statement of comprehensive income 
 
Earnings per share (EPS) 
 
EPS =  
Net Income after tax − Dividends on Preferred Shares
Avg Outstanding Shares
 
Market measures   
 
Total share return (TSR) 
 
TSR =  
Price(end) − Price(beginning) + Dividend
Price(beginning)
 
 
Market value added (MVA) Firm’s market value – invested capital 
 
Source: Crafford (personal collection) 
4.10.1 Dependent variables 
As illustrated in Table 4.2, the dependent variable selected for this study was the 
directors’ remuneration. All the sub-components of the dependent variable were 
investigated for both executive and non-executive directors. The study focused on 
these sub-components and compared them with the financial performance measures 
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selected for the study. The data were collected from the financial reports and 
statements published by all firms included in the sample during the study’s timeframe 
and complying with all required criteria. 
The sub-components of the dependent variable are discussed below: 
(a) Basic salary 
Basic salary is a fixed form of remuneration and is normally calculated depending on 
the skills and experience of directors. Sirkin and Cagney (2006:20) defined basic salary 
as a fixed amount of money paid to the employee in return for work performed. Basic 
salary does not include bonuses or any other benefits seen as potential compensation 
from employers. 
(b) Bonus/Performance bonus 
A performance bonus is defined as remuneration given for work performed above and 
beyond normal or expected duties. This type of remuneration is often used as incentive 
to increase the productivity of a team, department or an individual in an organisation. 
Performance bonuses are usually predetermined for executive directors at large firms 
as reward for meeting a certain target or goal. There are, however, regular occurrences 
when performance bonuses are awarded to employees for recognition of exceptional 
work even though the employer has no contractual obligation to do so (Business 
Dictionary, 2013c). The general assumption is that the bonus component of directors’ 
remuneration will be directly related to the performance of the firm. 
(c) Share option or share gains 
It is important to note that not all firms in this study differentiated between share 
purchase options and shares given to executive directors by the firm, by focusing more 
on the profit made from the shares sold or options exercised by the directors. For the 
purpose of the study, no distinction was made between the two options. Most firms 
disclosed share gains made by directors or indicated when directors sold their shares 
to calculate the amount of value gained from these transactions. The number of shares 
given or options exercised by directors in a specific year was calculated by taking the 
average share price for that year and using it as a measure to determine the 
remuneration of the directors for the period. The reason for placing a value on these 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
113 
 
options or share remuneration is because the firms were willing to compensate the 
executive director with the amount in the given year. However, it is important to note 
that all firms did not disclose the shares granted or share options given to directors, 
thus not being as transparent as others. Too many previous studies excluded this 
important method of remuneration. This type of remuneration may influence findings 
substantially if it is excluded. 
(d) Other remuneration 
The most common benefits included in this category when considering executive and 
non-executive directors’ remuneration were medical and pension contributions, 
vehicle, telephone, and travel allowances. It is important to note that remuneration paid 
for services rendered by non-executives for attending meetings and other duties will 
be allocated in the other remuneration sub-component section. Fringe and other 
benefits including superannuation payments were not fixed to any performance criteria 
and their relative amounts. These varied depending on the remuneration structure of 
a firm. However, from a shareholder’s perspective, these fixed forms of remuneration 
should not be excessive when compared to the size or performance of the firm. 
Having defined and explained the dependent variable and its components, the next 
section will focus on the independent variables. 
4.10.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables for the study included a set of selected financial 
performance figures and ratios that were collected and quantified from sample 
companies’ financial statements. Two measuring methods are identified for financial 
performance in this research study. The first method is to use each individual 
independent variable separately. According to Carr (1997:6), individual financial 
performance measures should be used independently, due to the fact that they may 
be highly correlated since most of them derive from the same financial data. In terms 
of the second method, the researcher could include all four independent variables in 
one regression test. An example is when testing inter-correlation variables on two 
selected financial performance measures; one internal ratio and an external measure 
that will not necessarily have significant correlation, thus making it possible to use 
these measures together in a multiple regression model. Using these two performance 
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measures may identify the effectiveness in the firm, comparing and aligning the 
performance of the firm to the remuneration of the directors. In this research study, 
particular variables were selected to compare to the dependent remuneration variable. 
The financial ratios and figures were identified as accounting- and market-based 
measures and included turnover, earnings per share (EPS), total share return (TSR) 
and market value added (MVA). These four independent variables will be discussed 
and explained in more detail in the sections to follow in order to refer to the composition 
of the ratios or the calculation of variables selected for this study. 
(a) Turnover 
In a South African context, the word turnover is synonymous with revenue. IFRS IAS 
18 (2009) defines revenue as gross inflow of economic benefits during the period 
arising in the course of ordinary activities of an entity. These inflows result in increases 
in equity, other than contributions from equity participants. Turnover is the amount of 
money received by a firm in a specific period reflecting the sales of goods or services. 
Turnover or revenue can be calculated by multiplying the price at which goods or 
services are sold by the number of units or amount sold. Turnover is also an important 
measure to determine the growth, financial performance and size of the firm. 
Comparing consecutive years’ turnover could be used to reflect the performance 
and/or growth of the firm (Conyon, 1998:485). 
(b) Earnings per share (EPS) 
Earnings per share are generally abbreviated as EPS. IFRS IAS 33 (2009) defines 
EPS as the ratio that defines the entity’s profitability and to value the firm’s earnings 
added from outstanding ordinary shares. EPS is calculated in the context of ordinary 
shares. EPS is calculated by dividing the profit or loss for the period between the 
attributable ordinary shareholders. The worth of the earnings attributed to each 
ordinary share for a year is measured in this ratio. EPS is the portion of a firm’s profit 
allocated to each outstanding ordinary share, and is used as an indicator of how 
profitable the firm is. EPS can be calculated as follows: 
#$% =  
&'( )*+,-'./0102'*23 ,* 45'6'55'2 3785'3
9'0:7('2 81'58:' # <=(3(8*20*: ,520*85> 3785'3
  (Equation 4.1) 
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When calculating EPS, the time-weighted average number of ordinary shares 
outstanding over the reporting period must be used, due to the change in the 
outstanding number of shares over time. Data sources can simplify the calculation by 
using the number of ordinary shares outstanding at the end of the period. McGregor 
BFA (2012) already calculated the EPS for each firm in the industry used in the study. 
According to Chapman-Blench (2012:47), EPS is considered to be the single most 
important variable in determining an ordinary share's price. It is a major component 
used to calculate the price-to-earnings valuation ratio. Therefore, Chapman-Blench 
suggests that EPS be included when evaluating the financial performance of the firm. 
 (c) Total share return (TSR) 
Total share return (TSR) (or simply known as total return) is one of many measurement 
tools used to determine the performance of firms’ shares over a time period. TSR 
combines share price appreciation and dividends paid to show the total return to the 
shareholder, calculated as an annual percentage. TSR is calculated by measuring the 
growth in share price from its purchasing price (paid for the ordinary shares in the 
beginning), assuming that dividends are always reinvested when paid. 
One important advantage of using TSR as an indicator of financial performance in a 
firm is that the measure allows the financial performance of firms’ ordinary shares to 
be compared even though some of the shares may have a high growth and low 
dividend rate, while others may have a low growth and high dividend rate.  
The formula to calculate TSR is as follows: 
?%@ =  
A('*2).A(B':0**0*:)C/0102'*2
A(B':0**0*:)
   (Equation 4.2) 
(d) Market value added (MVA) 
Gallagher and Andrew (2007:108) defined MVA as the difference between the market 
value of a firm and the capital contributed by investors, but clarify more specifically that 
the MVA is the sum of all capital claims held against the firm plus the market value of 
debt and equity. All contributions by investors (shareholders and bondholders) and 
market value of all debt and equity capital claims form part of the invested capital in 
Equation 4.3.  
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The higher the MVA, the better for the firm owing to the fact that a high MVA indicates 
that the firm has created substantial wealth for its shareholders. On the contrary, a 
negative MVA means that the value of management's actions and investments is less 
than the value of the capital contributed to the firm by the capital market. This means 
that wealth and value have been destroyed. The equation for MVA is as follows: 
DEF = GHIJ′L JMINOP QMRSO − TUQOLPOV WMXHPMR  (Equation 4.3) 
Once the dependent and independent variables have been defined and discussed, the 
research process can continue. The next step in the research process is to analyse 
and interpret the data, as discussed in the next section. 
4.11 STEP 8: ANALYSING AND INTERPRETING THE DATA 
Following the collection of primary or secondary data, the processing of the data can 
begin. The researcher’s task is to analyse and process the data to convert it into the 
information relevant for decision-making purposes. Data processing can be done by 
using raw data and converting it into relevant and meaningful information usable in a 
research study. There are a number of data analysis methods to use, ranging from 
highly complicated and refined methods to multivariate analysis techniques. The 
planning of the data analysis technique already occurs when compiling the research 
design and deciding what the requirements of the data should be. 
McGregor BFA (2012) was used to convert the raw data obtained from the financial 
statements and directors’ remuneration reports, to Microsoft Excel (2010). There are 
two types of research available when processing and analysing data, namely 
descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. These two types of analyses are 
discussed separately in the following sections. 
4.12 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics is the discipline of quantitatively describing the main features of 
a collection of data (Blank, 1968:2). Descriptive statistics are divided into three 
categories for this study, namely central location measures (mean and median), 
measures of dispersion (range, variance and standard deviation) and normality testing 
(skewness and kurtosis). 
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For the purpose of this study, it was important to identify trends in the data, focusing 
on the remuneration of directors over a given time period, compared to how the firms 
performed during the same time period, as well as gathering information to determine 
which descriptive models will be best suited for the data set. The following main 
descriptive statistics were included in the study: 
4.12.1 Mean 
The arithmetic mean, also known as the average, is the most popular and useful 
measure of central location. It is computed by simply adding up all the observations 
and dividing them by the total number of observations: 
DOMU =
Y=- ,6 ,B3'518(0,*3
&=-B'5 ,6 ,B3'518(0,*3
   (Equation 4.4) 
The mean is appropriate for describing measurement data, e.g. remuneration paid to 
all directors. It is important to note that a mean can be seriously affected by extreme 
values called “outliers”. A typical example is when large international industrial firm 
invests in South Africa and the firm’s South African directors are being compensated 
in relation to the firm’s other directors globally. The average remuneration paid to the 
top ten directors in South Africa may increase the mean beyond what it was previously, 
due to the large pay gap between local South African firms and a global firm’s 
remuneration differences.  
4.12.2 Median 
The median is calculated by placing all the observations in ascending order, and the 
observation that falls in the middle of all the other observations reflects the median. 
The median was selected rather than the mean due to the fact that firm sizes in the 
Industrial Sector differed substantially in the data set, thus providing a better overview 
of the total trend in the sector for the time period. The median is also less sensitive for 
outlier values than the mean. Another reason for selecting the median instead of the 
mean in the data set is because of the possibility that the distribution of the data set 
may be skewed and not normally distributed. 
4.12.3 Range (Minimum and maximum values) 
The range is the simplest measure of variability, calculated as: 
@MUZO = [MIZOLP \]LOIQMPH\U − %JMRROLP \]LOIQMPH\U   (Equation 4.5) 
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The major advantage of the range is the ease with which it can be computed. Its major 
shortfall is the failure to provide information on the dispersion of the observations 
between the two end points. Therefore, one needs a measure of variability that 
incorporates all the data and not only two observations (Dummit & Foote, 2004:119). 
4.12.4 Variance and standard deviation 
Variance and its related measure, standard deviation, are arguably the most important 
statistics of dispersion. These measures are not only used to measure variability, but 
they also play a crucial role in almost all statistical inference procedures. The equation 
to determine these measures is as follows: 
Sample variance is denoted by:  ^_ 
The variance of a sample is: L_= `
*.`
∑ (b0 − c)²*0d`  (Equation 4.6) 
where:  
L_= variance; 
              
xi = each value in the data set; 
c = population mean; and 
n = total number of values in the data set. 
 
The standard deviation is simply the square root of the variance. The standard 
deviation is used to compare the variability of several distributions and to determine 
the general shape of a distribution. 
4.12.5 Skewness 
Skewness is a probability theory statistic that measures to what extent a probability 
distribution of a real-valued random variable "leans" towards one side of the mean 
(Dean & Illowsky, 2012). Skewness can be positive or negative as illustrated in Figure 
4.3. 
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FIGURE 4.3: Positive and negative skewness
 
Source: Von Hippel (2005) 
Although the qualitative interpretation of the skewness is complicated, positive 
skewness indicates that the tail on the right side is longer or fatter than the left side 
and conversely, negative skewness indicates that the tail on the left side of the 
probability density function is longer or fatter than the right side. When in certain 
occurrences the one tail is long and the other tail fat, the skewness does not comply 
with either of the above-mentioned. In the case of multi-model distributions and 
discrete distributions, skewness may also be difficult to interpret. Skewness enables 
the researcher to determine whether a given value in a set of data is more or less than 
the mean, however, skewness does not determine the relationship of the mean and 
median (Von Hippel, 2005). 
Furthermore, it is essential to perform these tests in the study, because some of the 
data have historically been found to be non-normally distributed (skew), for instance, 
TSR (Gregg et al., 2005). 
4.12.6 Kurtosis 
Kurtosis is defined as a shape measure that illustrates the peakedness or flatness of 
a distribution compared to the normal distribution. The distribution can be more peaked 
than normal (leptokurtic), or a wider and lower peak around the mean (platykurtic) or 
normal (mesokurtic). Kurtosis, in combination with measures of skewness, is used to 
identify deviations from the standard normal distribution (Cleary, 2001). 
It might be possible that remuneration variables have very large values, such as 
salaries and bonuses, whereas share profits might be more evenly distributed. Figure 
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4.4 illustrates the various types of kurtosis that might exist within a data set regarding 
the distribution of values. 
FIGURE 4.4: Types of kurtosis 
 
 
Source: Cleary (2001) 
Descriptive statistics provide a general overview and indication of the nature of the 
data set, but can only be used to provide a general summary regarding the data. For 
a more thorough investigation within the data, as is the case for this research study, 
inferential statistics must be conducted to identify and assess the significance of a 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and a firm’s financial performance. 
4.13 INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
Inferential statistics, better defined as mathematical methods, use probability theory 
for assuming (inferring) the properties of a population based on a sample. Generally, 
the researcher is testing a hypothesis, therefore, drawing conclusions about a 
population, based on the researcher’s sample. Measure tests like ANOVA, t-tests, Chi-
squared tests, confidence intervals, and regressions are all statistical inferential tests. 
After compiling the descriptive statistics, identifying and summarising all the trends and 
findings on the data set, a good indication is available for selecting the proper 
measurement tools and models to utilise and apply the most accurate testing on the 
selected data set. 
In this study, the researcher tested the possible relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and firms’ financial performance, thus first formulating a hypothesis, 
followed by selecting an appropriate regression model by considering the type of 
research data used in the study, and finally conducting the regression analysis. 
Furthermore, the researcher may need to identify any outliers in the data set, and if 
necessary, to apply trimming in order to correct the data set. To perform all the required 
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statistical tests, SPSS Statistics (2013) was used. SPSS Statistics is a popular 
software package used for statistical and research analysis. 
Shareholders and directors have various interests and objectives. Shareholders are 
more focused on value maximisation, whereas directors may focus more on personal 
benefit and welfare (minimising efforts for maximum leisure). As mentioned previously 
in the study, this gives rise to the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:305). 
Using various types of remuneration for directors could help to align the interests of 
shareholders and directors. Against this background, the following hypotheses were 
formulated for the study: 
H0: There is no relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of firms 
H1: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of firms 
In order to test these hypotheses, all the data collected for this study had to be 
compiled, converted and interpreted to conclude whether the null-hypothesis could be 
rejected or not rejected. 
4.13.1 Regression analysis 
According to Sykes (1992:1), a regression analysis is a statistical tool when 
investigating the relationships between variables. The nature of a regression analysis 
is summarised as the relationship between independent and dependent variables.  
This makes it possible for the researcher to develop a mathematical relationship 
between these variables. The researcher usually tries to establish what relationship 
one variable will have with the other. When a regression analysis is explored, the 
researcher should select variables of interest and apply the regression analysis to 
determine the quantitative relation the one variable has to the other. When assessing 
the regression between variables, researchers test the statistical significance 
altogether to determine the degree of confidence when comparing the true relationship 
to the estimated relationship (Trochim, 2006). 
Regression analysis can be divided into two models, viz. simple and multiple. 
According to Hair et al. (2006:177), simple regression is used when there is only one 
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independent variable under consideration. When two or more independent variables 
are identified, multiple regressions will be applied. 
(a) Simple regression 
Simple regression (also known as bivariate regression) models only have one 
independent variable. This means that the relationship can only be determined by 
testing one dependent and one independent variable. With simple regression, only two 
variables are therefore included in the regression model, namely one independent and 
the dependent variable – designated as x and y respectively for explanation purposes 
below: 
 e = ]f + ]`b + O(    (Equation 4.7)  
Focusing for a moment only on the x-y relationship in the format: e = ]f + ]`b, e is the 
equation of a straight line where ]f is the intercept (or constant) and ]`  is the b 
coefficient, which represents the slope of the straight line the equation describes. The 
outset of this type of regression model can be formulated in a hypothesis to see the 
relationship between the variables of interest in the study. Equation 4.7 thus shows the 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable since the 
regression coefficient will identify the relationship, depending on the significance the 
independent variable has on the dependent variable. Furthermore there will always be 
something inexplicit in the regression, thus including the error term (O() factor as seen 
in Equation 4.7. The error term in the formula may be useful to the researcher when 
identifying which regression analysis model is best suited for this study (Kenney & 
Keeping, 1962:252).  
(b) Multiple regressions 
Multiple regression analysis is an expansion of the simple regression model. Multiple 
regression is used when more than one independent variable is used. Since this 
research study investigates the relationship between a dependent variable with four 
sub-components and four independent variables, a model like the one below will be 
the most fitting for the study: 
e = ]f + ]`b` + ]_b_+. . . +]hbh+ O(  (Equation 4.8) 
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where: 
y   = dependent variable 
 ]f  = intercept 
 ]`,]_ … ]h = regression coefficients 
 b`, b_ … bh  = independent variables 
 k  = number of independent variables 
 O(   = error term 
(c) Time-series cross-section regression analysis 
According to Beck (2006:1), a time-series cross-section (TSCS) data set consists of 
comparable time-series data observed on a variety of units. Time-series and cross-
sectional dimensions are very important for the purpose of this study because trends 
and changes during the period can be identified. It is, however, important to first identify 
the nature of the data set before it can be analysed. Due to the fact that TSCS data 
are at play, the researcher must acknowledge that the data sets used will display a 
wide variety of observations regarding all the firms involved over the different years of 
the study period. This type of data is called panel data. The term ‘panel data’ refers to 
multi-dimensional data that frequently involve measurements over time. Panel data 
contain observations on multiple phenomena observed over multiple time periods 
(Diggle, Heagerty, Liang & Zeger, 2002:2). Regression analyses for these types of 
data sets are generally much more complex than for one-dimensional data sets. 
It is important to identify the procedure that was followed in the research by making 
relevant observations regarding the type of data used. Panel data methodology was 
selected for the purpose of this study since the data was identified as panel data. All 
the firms’ selected variables were observed over a nine-year period. Once the type of 
data used are known, the regression models and methods could be determined. 
Regression on panel data combines time-series data and cross-sectional data. 
Changes in variables over time and differences between subjects are examined at 
once. In the case of panel data regressions, the following general model as described 
by Allen (1999), is usually considered: 
 
m0( = n + ∑ o0(h
p
hd` βh +  O0(  (Equation 4.9) 
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where: 
y = dependent variable for firm i in year t; 
x = independent variable for firm i in year t; 
α = intercept; 
β = regression coefficient; 
O = error term 
i = 1,…, N ; 
t = 1,…,T ; 
N = number of cross sections; 
T = length of the time-series for each cross-section; and 
K = number of independent variables; 
Section 4.13 enabled the researcher to identify which regression analysis method was 
most appropriate for the panel data in this study. The regression analysis process best 
suited for the regression analysis and data set is discussed below.  
4.14 REGRESSION ANALYSIS PROCESS 
The regression analysis process for this study started by collecting the data set, and 
was then followed by trimming the identified outliers. The next step was to test for the 
most appropriate regression model, before continuing to conduct the regression. 
Lastly, testing for heteroskedasticity was done and if required, to adjust the regression 
results. 
4.14.1 Defining and identifying outliers 
After investigating and identifying all the descriptive statistics for the study, especially 
the kurtosis and sample distribution, it was important to focus on the outliers in the data 
set. Researchers have debated continuously regarding extreme and influential data 
points when analysing data (Osborne & Overbay, 2004). These points are commonly 
known as outliers. Jarrel (1994:49) defined the term ‘outliers’ as data points far outside 
the norm for a population, while Hawkins (1980:1) described outliers as observations 
that arouse suspicion due to the fact that they deviate tremendously from other 
observations. For the purpose of the study, outliers are defined as observations that 
are numerically distant from the rest of the data set. Outliers usually occur when the 
distributions are heavy tailed and have a high kurtosis. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
125 
 
It must, however, be mentioned that although outliers could have a significant influence 
on the findings of a study, a small number of outliers are to be expected when working 
with large data sets. Since outliers are seen as the extreme observations, they 
frequently may be the minimum and maximum values of the data range when identified 
as significantly high or low, but minimum and maximum values of data sets are not 
always outliers. This is because they are not always far from other observations. 
Outliers stem from various reasons and include system behavioural changes, 
fraudulent behaviour, human or instrumental error and natural deviations in the data 
set (Grubbs, 1969:6). 
The outliers were identified before regression testing commenced in this study. Outliers 
can have significant influences when conducting inferential statistics and can have 
deleterious effects on a study’s statistical analysis. After examining outliers closely, 
Wainer (1976:285) developed a concept called ‘fringelier’, which refers to unusual 
events occurring regularly near the distribution centre of the data set. These 
observation points are near three deviations from the mean and have a 
disproportionate influence on parameter estimates. These data observations are 
usually not easily identifiable, due to the close proximity to the distribution centre and 
are identified as special outlier observations. The data in the current study were 
analysed and histograms were used to illustrate the breakdown by identifying the 
outlier area and median for all the dependent variables. These outliers can then be 
trimmed to obtain more robust statistics. 
A number of reasons for identifying and eliminating (deleting) outliers exist. Firstly, they 
increase error variance and reduce the statistical tests’ power. Secondly, outliers 
decrease normality in non-random distributions and easily violate assumptions of 
sphericity when doing multivariate analysis and normality testing by increasing type I 
errors. Lastly, outliers can easily influence estimates, having an impact on the research 
results (Zimmerman, 1994). General trimming and winsorising-trimming are two very 
helpful methods to address this important issue. 
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4.14.2 Types of trimming 
(a) Normal trimming 
Trimming in statistics derive from excluding some of the extreme values in the data 
set. By trimming the data, the extreme values are identified and acknowledged as 
outliers (Lix & Keselman, 1998:409). There are two popular ways in which trimming 
are done: firstly, fixed amount of symmetric trimming as research done by Lee and 
Fung (1985:186) suggested. In this method, a trimmed mean is measured and 
summarised when trimming on a data set is carried out. Prior to this, trimming is 
determined as a fixed amount and limits the error rate. This type of trimming is being 
performed regardless of the distribution of the data set. This robust estimator method 
is used by many researchers, although one needs to be careful of not eliminating data 
that are not outliers.  
The second trimming method is performed in accordance with the distribution of data. 
When the data set has a skew distribution, the amount of trimming on both sides of the 
distribution is not the same. More trimming will be done on the skew tail as illustrated 
in a study by Keselman, Wilcox, Lix, Algina and Fradette (2007:267). 
(b) Winsorising-trimming 
Another method used by various researchers is winsorising-trimming. Winsorising is a 
similar technique to normal trimming and is used to transform statistics by limiting all 
the extreme values in the data set and automatically reducing the effect of possibly 
spurious outliers. The difference between the two methods is that normal trimming is 
more simplified by excluding data, compared to winsorising where the extreme values 
are not discarded, but the extreme values are instead replaced by certain percentiles 
(Hasings, Mosteller, Tukey, Winsor, 1947:413). 
In this study, winsorising was applied where needed for the purposes stated above. 
Researchers use various methods and procedures to protect their data from being 
distorted by outliers, but not throwing observations and data away (Barnette & Lewis, 
1994:2). The mean and pooled OLS model estimations are very vulnerable to outliers. 
For this reason, researchers use more robust statistical methods for estimators on the 
data. Trimming is commonly used in this regard. Identifying outliers and performing 
winsorising in this study were important in order to clean the data set. 
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Furthermore, the researcher of this study did not focus on virtually identifying specific 
outliers, but rather applied winsorising. In this method, all values further than three 
standard deviations from the mean value were replaced with the value of three 
standard deviations from the mean. This method ensured that no observations were 
thrown out, but only drawing the values closer to the rest of the data. This means that 
the statistical testing could still be performed on a large set of observations. 
4.14.3 Type of regression model 
There are several approaches when considering what type of regression analysis 
model should be used for the data set. The objective is to acquire the best suited and 
most flexible regression model for the selected data used (e.g. regression test pack) 
that focuses on the selected regression test and to address the objectives set for this 
research study. 
In this study, the focus was on the following two regression models used to analyse 
panel data: 
• A random effects model; and 
• A fixed effects model. 
In a random effects model, unlike the fixed effects model, the variation across entities 
is assumed to be random and uncorrelated including the independent variables in the 
model. The main distinction between fixed and random effects models is whether the 
undetected differences effect symbolises elements that are correlated with the limits in 
the model, and not whether these effects are stochastic or not (Greene, 2002:162). 
When the researcher had any doubt or reason to believe that differences across 
entities had some influence on the dependent variables in the study, a random effects 
model was used. 
An advantage of using a random effects model is that the time-invariant variables are 
included (Bartels, 2008:8). When omitted variables are constant over time but vary 
between cases, and others are fixed between cases but vary over time, then one can 
include both types by using a random effects model. 
A fixed effects model is used when a researcher is primarily interested in analysing the 
impact of variables that vary over time. The technique investigates the relationship 
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between predictors and outcome variables within a firm. Each firm has its own distinct 
characteristics that may or may not influence the variables. When using a fixed effect 
model, the researcher assumes that something may impact or bias the predictor or 
outcome variables and control is needed in this regard. 
The fixed effects regression model eliminates the effect of time-invariant 
characteristics from the variables so that the effect can be tested. This model also 
assumes that time-invariant characteristics are unique to the individual firm and are 
thus not correlated with other individual characteristics. Every firm varies; therefore the 
firm’s error term should not be allied with other firms. One negative feature of a fixed 
effects model is that it cannot be used to investigate time-invariant causes of the 
dependent variables. If error terms are correlated, the fixed effects model is not 
appropriate since inferences may not be correct, and thus the random effects model 
should rather be used. 
To distinguish which one of the two models would be used in this study, the F-test for 
fixed effects and the Hausman test for random effects were performed to determine 
which of the two models (fixed or random effects) was best suited for the regression 
analysis. 
(a) F-test for fixed effects 
The F-test for fixed effects was developed to test and compare the fit of models. The 
F-test compares the regression models when fitted to the same data set. It also allows 
the researcher to test hypotheses involving multiple parameters simultaneously. 
Reasons for selecting the F-test include the following: firstly, the F-test’s function is to 
determine whether two samples have different variances; secondly, it is sensitive to 
non-normality, and thirdly, the F-values are all non-negative (deriving from chi-square 
properties carried over to the F-test) and distribution is non-symmetric (Gardiner, Luo 
& Roman, 2009). 
(b) The Hausman test 
Given a model and data in which fixed effects estimation would be appropriate, the 
Hausman test investigates whether a random effects estimation is just as good. When 
applying the Hausman test on a random effects example, the null hypothesis (qf) 
states that while random effects would be consistent and efficient, the alternative 
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hypothesis states that random effects would be inconsistent (fixed effects would almost 
certainly be consistent). When the Hausman test statistic is large, the fixed effects 
model is used. If the statistic is small, the random effects model is used. 
The Hausman test originates from the Hausman (1978:1251) specification test, which 
compares an estimator ]` that is known to be consistent with an estimator ]_ that is 
efficient under the hypothesis being tested. The null hypothesis states that the 
estimator ]_ is an efficient and consistent estimator of the true parameters. If so, there 
is no systematic change between the two estimators. When a systematic difference 
exists, there is reason to doubt the assumptions that the efficient estimator is based 
on. 
Furthermore, the Hausman test is used to help determine whether the fixed or random 
effects model is most suited for the research data. When first doing an F-test and the 
outcome states that the fixed effects model is not the correct option, it does not 
necessarily mean that the random effects model is the correct model instead. There 
may be other effects models such as pooled OLS. It is important to first determine the 
variance and variability of the data set. 
At this stage, the presence of homoskedasticity or heteroskedasticity in the data was 
tested. 
(c) Homoskedasticity versus heteroskedasticity 
In this section, evaluating the data to determine the presence of homoskedasticity or 
heteroskedasticity as a characteristic of the data, is discussed. Homoskedasticity is 
usually based on the assumption that analysis will be done in an equal variance 
method where random variables are within a vector or sequence. In regression 
analysis, homoskedasticity means that the dependent variables’ variances are the 
same for the whole data set. Researchers should be careful not to make assumptions 
identifying homoskedasticity instead of heteroskedasticity (McCulloch, 1985:483). 
When there are sub-populations in a data set which have different variability from 
others, the collection of random variables is called heteroskedasticity. When 
heteroskedasticity is identified, the variability could be quantified by the variance of 
statistical spreading. Furthermore, it concludes that heteroskedasticity is relevant when 
homoskedasticity is absent. Heteroskedasticity can invalidate statistical tests of 
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significance in a study. This leads to the assumption that the modelling errors are 
uncorrelated and normally distributed, which was not necessarily the situation in the 
study. 
An example of testing heteroskedasticity would be to look at error terms associated 
with very large firms that might have larger variances than error terms associated with 
smaller firms. Sales of larger firms may be more volatile than sales of smaller firms 
(McCulloch, 1985:483). 
After the normal regression test was done for the data set, heteroskedasticity testing 
was performed, due to the fact that various firms in the study differed in terms of their 
size, growth and methods of remuneration for their directors. Heteroskedasticity often 
occurs when large differences among the size of firms selected occur, as was indeed 
the case with this study. Heteroskedasticity can therefore cause the results to appear 
better than it is in reality. Therefore, it was necessary to adjust regression results to 
reflect the heteroskedasticity in the data. 
The Breusch-Pagan test is used in statistics to test for heteroskedasticity in linear 
regression models. Developed in the late 1970s, the test was named after Trevor 
Breusch and Adrian Pagan. Heteroskedasticity tests whether the estimated variance 
of the residuals from a regression is dependent on the values of the independent 
variables. 
When testing for heteroskedasticity, statistical techniques like the pooled OLS test may 
be eliminated due to the fact that a number of assumptions are generally made when 
using this technique. Pooled OLS is a method to estimate unknown parameters in a 
linear regression model and errors are homoskedastic. One important assumption is 
that the error term in the pooled OLS technique has a constant variance and is normally 
distributed, which was not necessarily the case in this study. Generally, pooled OLS is 
not recommended when cross-sectional or time-series (panel data) measurements are 
performed (White, 1980:817). 
The inferential statistics segment for the study was applied by taking the data set, 
applying trimming to address outliers, then applying the F-test and Hausman test on 
the data set and identifying the preferred regression model (fixed or random effects), 
depending on which one was best suited for the specific analysis. Furthermore, the 
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data were then tested for heteroskedasticity. The inferential statistics were applied in 
the following segments: firstly, investigating the whole group, followed by dividing the 
set in executive and non-executive directors. In all three areas, the components of the 
directors’ remuneration were measured. 
The inferential statistics segment concluded by evaluating the quality of data, 
measures, tests and models in this study by means of focusing on the reliability and 
validity of the entire study. 
4.15 EVALUATING THE QUALITY OF MEASURES 
It is important that the findings of a study are accurate and usable. In similar vein, the 
measurement instruments should be able to identify that the indicators are reliable and 
valid. The following section discusses the importance of validity and reliability 
characteristics when evaluating measurement instruments. 
4.15.1 Reliability 
According to Kimberlin and Winterstein (2008:2276), there are various methods to 
ensure that measurements are reliable and do not include error. Reliability estimates 
are used to firstly evaluate the stability of measures or using the same standard (test-
retest reliability). Secondly, the equivalence of sets of items from the same test (internal 
consistency) or of different observers scoring a behaviour or event using the same 
instrument (inter-rater reliability) is used. 
The data set for the study was collected from two databases that are extensively used 
by researchers and individuals, namely the McGregor BFA (2012) and TimBukOne 
(2012) databases. These sources provided standardised financial statements, ratios 
and measures for this study. 
4.15.2 Validity 
The term ‘validity’ is defined as the extent to which an instrument measures what it 
purports to measure (accuracy), whereas the term ‘statistical validity’ is described as 
the extent to which a concept, conclusion or measurement is justifiable and tallies 
accurately to the real world (Brains, Willnat, Manheim & Rich, 2011:75). 
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Although validity requires that an instrument must be reliable, it is important to note 
that an instrument can be reliable without being valid. Validity is the extent to which the 
analyses of the results of a test are justified, which depends on the test’s intended use. 
The selection of measurement instruments (financial ratios and statement figures) 
selected for this study was based on previous empirical studies with similar research 
subjects using the same measurement instruments. This should make the study more 
valid. Validity is divided into two categories in financial and statistical studies, namely 
internal validity and external validity (Cant et al., 2005:235). 
(a) Internal validity 
Internal validity focuses on how effective an experiment is executed. It also looks 
especially whether confounding is avoided (when more than one independent variable 
[cause] acts at the same time). The smaller the chance for confounding in a study, the 
higher its internal validity will be. 
Therefore, internal validity displays how a part of the research allows the researcher 
to choose among alternative explanations of data. High internal validity makes it 
possible for the researcher to choose one explanation above another with enough self-
assurance due to the fact that many of the perplexed variables in the study are avoided. 
According to Kimberlin and Winterstein (2008:2276), internal validity consists of three 
forms: 
(i)  Construct validity: 
This form of validity focuses on the judgment based on accumulation of evidence from 
various studies using specific measuring instruments. Construct validity requires 
examining the relationship of the measure being evaluated with variables known, or 
hypothetically related to the construct measured by the test. Construct validity will test 
whether the theory in practice works when applied practically in this study. Analysing 
prior studies relationship findings and measures used in the same field of research 
assists in determining the best measures and instruments used for this research study. 
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(ii)  Content validity: 
This type of validity reports how effective measurement instruments are developed to 
provide adequate and representative sample coverage for the topic that is measured 
and constructed in the study. Due to no statistical test to determine whether a measure 
adequately and appropriately covers or represents the content area, content validity 
usually depends on the judgment of knowledgeable experts in the field. Content validity 
assists in ensuring that all necessary areas are covered with the measures used in this 
study. Using previous research, content validity could assist in using the most effective 
measures for this study. 
(iii)  Criterion-related validity: 
This validity measure provides evidence on how new measures correlate with other 
measures from similar constructs or the same underlying concepts that theoretically 
should be related. This validity focuses on the success of the measures used for 
estimations. Examining the relationship between the measures and the criterion 
assisted in setting the criterion validity. With criterion validity the tests are compared 
with other similar measures already valid and tested in the field.  
(b) External validity 
External validity is the extent to which the results of a study can be generalised to other 
situations and to other people. This form of validity also indicates the quality of the 
research findings. Implications regarding the cause-effect relationships due to specific 
and unique scientific studies are said to hold external validity if they can be generalised 
and used in other populations and conditions. Fundamental interpretations are set to 
retain high degrees of external validity and can reasonably be expected to apply to a 
target population as well as to other populations (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004:41). 
This research study focused specifically on the relationship between the remuneration 
of directors and the financial performance of firms in the Industrial Sector of the JSE. 
It is currently an important topic internationally in all business sectors. Although the 
study only focused on the Industrial Sector, it relates to thousands of shareholders and 
stakeholders, and the study’s results may be an indicator to other countries’ Industrial 
Sectors. In some cases, results could also point towards the trend on how South 
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African firms remunerate their directors when firms are performing. These type of 
generalisations must, however, be made with great caution. 
Figure 4.5 summarises external and internal validity and the relationship between the 
two types of validity. The green ellipse represents internal validity, and the blue 
rounded rectangle around it represents external validity. 
FIGURE 4.5: Internal and external environment validity 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Micheal (1999) 
4.16 STEP 9: COMPILING AND PRESENTING THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
REPORT 
Step 9 is the second last step of the research process and is vital for the study. This is 
the stage where the findings and results are interpreted and the significance is 
explained for decision-making purposes. The success of findings and results are 
measured by the interpretation of results and conclusions that are drawn. These results 
are given in the form of a research report. According to Wiid and Diggines (2013:312), 
the research report must be relevant, structured, clear, comprehensible, complete and 
timely. There is no use in merely stating the findings; it is important that these findings 
and results are interpreted and explained. 
Chapter 5 and 6 will present and discuss all the findings for the data set. Chapter 5 will 
specifically explain all the descriptive statistic for the dependent and independent 
variables by means of tables and graphs, followed by the inferential statistics focusing 
on the regression tests, which are illustrated in a series of tables. Chapter 6 will provide 
a conclusion, presenting the overall findings and summary for this study. 
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 4.17 STEP 10: FOLLOW-UP AND MONITORING 
It is important to note that the nine steps of the research process cannot be approached 
in isolation, but that they should be used in an integrated and interdependent way. The 
method is reciprocal due to the fact that the one step influences the following one 
directly. Thus, when changing one step, the entire process needs to be revised, 
adjusted and followed-up on. In order to ensure that the entire research process is 
generating the optimum results for the researcher, proper monitoring is required. 
4.18 CONCLUSION 
This chapter focused on the methodology for the research study. Chapter 4 
commenced with a definition and explanation of business research to promote effective 
management, followed by a discussion of the research process that comprised ten 
steps. The research process is vital for any kind of research study, as it guides the 
researcher throughout the process, from identifying the objectives to how they will be 
achieved. Both secondary and primary data were needed in order to achieve the set 
outcomes for this study. However, a sample method was used to retrieve the 
necessary data instead of taking a census of the population, ensuring that all the 
requirements set for the study’s data were met. All Industrial Sector firms, listed and 
delisted on the JSE during the time period 2002 until 2010, were considered, as these 
firms had standardised financial reports available. Financial performance results and 
financial ratios were selected and used as the measurement variables. The financial 
information needed was obtained from McGregor BFA (2012) and TimBukOne (2012) 
in a standardised format. The data were analysed by using the software package SPSS 
Statistics (2013). 
For the purpose of the study, descriptive and inferential statistics were used to address 
the primary and secondary objectives of the study. The descriptive statistics focused 
on the type of data that were measured, using the following measures: median, mean, 
range, variance, standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness. The inferential statistics 
identified in this study included selecting the most appropriate regression model, 
namely a random- or a fixed-effects model, by conducting an F-test or Hausman test 
for the regression testing, before also testing for heteroskedasticity. The regression 
analyses focused and supplied statistical evidence regarding the nature and type of 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
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This chapter concluded by explaining why it was necessary to use two types of 
statistical measures, namely descriptive and inferential statistics. The importance of 
motivating the validity and reliability of these measures, including that of the data used 
in the study, was also emphasised. 
The data analysis and research results, followed by the summary and findings 
regarding the relationship between financial performance and directors’ remuneration, 
will be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, a detailed discussion was provided on the research process 
of the study, in order to address the research question. Chapter 5 presents the findings 
of the study and focuses on the research results obtained through the various steps 
explained in Chapter 4. 
The hypotheses developed for the study tested whether a relationship existed between 
the remuneration of directors of the selected firms, and the financial performance of 
those firms. To test whether the hypotheses should be rejected or not rejected, various 
statistical models and measures were used for the data set. 
Chapter 5 will commence by further discussing the descriptive statistics for the study. 
The results in the first section of the chapter illustrate the basic features of the data 
and provide simple summaries about the sample. In addition, skewness and kurtosis 
were tested to determine the distribution of the data. 
The second section of Chapter 5 will focus on the inferential statistics estimated for the 
data set. In this section panel data analyses were conducted, which included multiple 
regression analyses, significance tests and tests for heteroskedasticity. All of these 
analyses enabled the researcher to test the relationship, if any, as well as the strength 
of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in this study. All 
the results obtained relate to the research objectives listed in Chapter 4. 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: REMUNERATION 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, numerical descriptive statistics were used to summarise 
and display the data. By using descriptive statistics, the data can be optimally used 
when determining which inferential measures will be most suited for the study as well 
as compiling and strengthening statistical findings obtained in this study. 
The first section in Chapter 5 focused on the dependent variable in this study. The 
dependent variable, namely the total amount of directors’ remuneration, was observed 
to investigate changes in the remuneration for the period of this study. As identified in 
Chapter 4, the dependent variable was divided into four remuneration sub-
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components. These four sub-components were classified as basic salary, bonuses, 
share gains or share options exercised, and other remuneration. 
This section will commence by focusing on the total remuneration to investigate the 
overall movement in directors’ remuneration. Subsequently the focus is shifted to the 
four sub-components for a more focused approach, investigating each sub-component 
individually. 
The descriptive statistics section includes tables and graphs displaying the mean, 
median, minimum and maximum values (range), variance, and standard deviation of 
the data set. Detailed discussions following each table and graph provide greater 
clarity regarding the data set. 
It must be noted that it was frequently necessary to differentiate between executive 
and non-executive directors for reasons that will be motivated in each section. The 
tables that follow display a condensed summary of the data set. By analysing and 
examining the statistics, justified conclusions can be made. Factors such as 
distribution, growth, competitive tactics and industry benchmarks all affect directors’ 
remuneration, influencing the findings. These topics are all addressed in this section. 
This section concludes by testing for skewness and kurtosis in the data set, which 
contributes to identifying possible measures that might be utilised for the inferential 
statistical section that follows. 
5.2.1 Total Remuneration 
The entire data set comprised a total of 6 146 observations. Every observation 
contained all the dependent and independent variables considered in this study. Each 
observation disclosed the director’s individual remuneration, which was divided into 
the dependent variable’s four sub-components and then compared to all the 
independent performance variables identified. The section first investigates the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and its sub-components provided and 
will follow with the independent variables’ descriptive statistics in the next section. 
(a) All Directors 
The starting point for the descriptive statistics in this study is to focus on the total 
remuneration all directors combined received. This enabled the researcher to create 
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an overall view of remuneration results before splitting the directors into executive and 
non-executive directors, and focusing specifically on the different remuneration 
methods. 
Table 5.1 below illustrates the total remuneration paid to all directors for the period 
2002 until 2009, displaying the various descriptive measures utilised in this study. 
TABLE 5.1: All directors: Total remuneration 
All directors 
Total remuneration 
Year N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 639 782 263 0 14 272   1 482 213  1217 
2003 652 935 300 0 15 723   2 155 735  1 468  
2004 655 1 023  273 0 15 657   2 389 585  1 546  
2005 618 1 275  331 0 12 249   3 934 841  1 984  
2006 607 1 807  327 0 26 680  11 082 214  3 329  
2007 664 1 991  300 0 99 181  31 027 010  5 570  
2008 763 1 711  293 0 47 780  13 633 948  3 692  
2009 809 1 630  316 0 93 996  20 601 930  4 539  
2010 739 1 559  352 0 26 766   7 015 069  2 649  
Overall 6 146  1 426  309 0 99 181  10 869 031  3 297  
Note: All figures except for N (number of directors) are given in thousands, and refer to South 
African Rands 
Table 5.1 displays the total number of directors, both executive and non-executive, as 
identified in this study over the nine-year period. Before investigating the descriptive 
statistics, it is important to consider the change in the overall number of directors 
appointed during this selected period. The number of directors increased overall from 
2002 until 2010 by 100 directors. The number of directors fluctuated during the study 
period due to various internal and external factors affecting the firms and the industry. 
Internal factors influencing these changes included restructuring of organograms in 
management, growth in the firm and business strategy changes whereas external 
factors such as economic changes and competitors also influenced these changes. 
The number of directors was almost unchanged for most parts of the early 2000s, and 
grew significantly over the last few years of the decade. At this stage, it must be noted 
that these findings show the total change in the number of directors, thus considering 
the overall change for executive and non-executive directors collectively. 
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The average remuneration paid to a director more or less doubled from 2002 to 2010, 
while the median value rose by almost 17 per cent. These results illustrate a gradual 
increase in total remuneration over the nine-year period. When considering the first 
half and the second half of the study period, however, it can be observed that the 
greatest increases in the remuneration occurred during the first part of the period, 
followed by a slight decline during the mid-2000s. The decline in remuneration may be 
a result of the global financial crisis in 2008. The difference between the mean and 
median may point towards a skew distribution of the data. 
The minimum remuneration values reported in most of the tables that follow are zero 
mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, the fact that non-executive directors’ remuneration 
was included in these tables, and secondly, that some directors were listed in the firms’ 
remuneration annexures, but did not receive any remuneration for specific time frames 
(e.g. global financial crisis period). The standard deviation indicates that a significant 
level of variation is apparent when calculating the coefficient of variance. The relatively 
large standard deviation substantiates the concern that the data set may contain outlier 
values. 
Now that all directors’ total remuneration has been considered, Figure 5.1 graphically 
illustrates the difference between the annual mean and annual median for 
remuneration paid to the all directors during the period 2002 until 2010. The mean in 
Figure 5.1 almost doubled in the study’s period. The overall mean for the period is also 
significantly higher compared to the first year of the study. This suggests that significant 
growth in directors’ remuneration is visible for the period under review. The median 
stayed in a closer range not being as volatile as the mean, although a gradual increase 
occurred throughout the study. 
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FIGURE 5.1: All directors’ Total remuneration: Mean, median and overall mean 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the clear gap between the mean and median values for the 
collected data, which was also observed in Table 5.1. For most parts of this study, the 
gap grew annually, but significantly changed in the mid-2000s, with a steep increase. 
For the first few years the annual mean values are lower than the mean for the overall 
period. From 2005 onwards the annual mean increased and stayed above the average 
mean for the duration of this study. The first potential reason for this appearance would 
be that all types of directors, both executive and non-executive, are included in this 
graph and as seen in the previous table, non-executive directors earned significantly 
less than executive directors. The second justifiable reason may be that a small 
number of the directors earned considerably more than other directors from 2005 in 
the Industrial Sector, thus increasing the average for the sector. 
In order to differentiate between the different forms of directorship within the firms and 
industry, the directors were sub-divided into two types, namely executive and non-
executive directors, to compare remuneration paid. 
(b) Executive Directors 
Executive and non-executive directors are remunerated differently, according to their 
functions in a firm. Table 5.2 shows more detailed information regarding the total 
remuneration of the executive directors. 
  
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Mean Median Overall mean
R
e
m
u
n
e
ra
tio
n
 ‘0
0
0
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
142 
 
Table 5.2: Executive directors: Total remuneration 
Executive directors 
Total remuneration 
Year N0 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 339 1 394 992 0 14 272 1 962 950 1 401 
2003 341 1 673 1 220 0 15 723 2 898 116 1 702 
2004 326 1 919 1 255 0 15 657 3 146 447 1 774 
2005 300 2 400 1 503 0 12 249 5 411 974 2 326 
2006 292 3 472 1 769 0 26 680 17 070 468 4 132 
2007 308 3 997 2 015 0 99 181 58 375 329 7 640 
2008 334 3 590 2 290 0 47 780 23 645 607 4 863 
2009 341 3 502 2 202 0 93 996 42 219 020 6 498 
2010 304 3 382  2 421  0 26 766  11 020 035  3 320  
Overall 2 885  2 792  2 006  0 99 181  19 141 018  4 375  
Note: All figures except N0 (number of executive directors) are given in thousands, and refer to 
South African Rands. 
From Table 5.2, it can be seen that the number of executive directors remained stable 
for most parts of the study. At the same time, the mean remuneration almost trebled 
over the same period. The mean increased significantly by 142.61% from 2002 until 
2010. Table 5.2 suggests that a relatively smaller group of executive directors received 
substantially higher pay. The same large range between the maximum and minimum 
remuneration paid that was observed in Table 5.1 is observed for executive directors 
in 2007 and 2009, indicating that these large amounts were paid to executive directors. 
The overall high variance in pay was also observed for this period. By comparing Table 
5.1 with Table 5.2 it becomes evident that the largest portion of all remuneration paid 
to directors is allocated to executive directors, because they are responsible for the 
firms’ daily operations and performance.  
(c) Non-executive Directors 
Since non-executive directors are being remunerated differently than executive 
directors, their descriptive statistics are investigated separately in Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3 focuses on the total remuneration non-executive directors received for the 
study’s time period. It must be noted that some non-executive directors did receive 
basic salary, bonus/performance and share gains over and above their remuneration 
received as part of the other remuneration.  
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TABLE 5.3: Non-executive directors: Total remuneration 
Non-executive directors 
Total remuneration 
Year N1 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 300 91 46 0 2 181 39 789 199 
2003 311 126 60 0 4 204 92 721 305 
2004 329 136 80 0 2 322 60 144 245 
2005 318 213 90 0 4 599 224 992 474 
2006 315 263 120 0 9 057 599 231 774 
2007 356 256 120 0 13 550 953 778 977 
2008 429 248 130 0 19 267 975 557 988 
2009 468 267 150 0 11 544 486 515 698 
2010 435 285 175 0 6 890 279 429 529 
Overall 3 261  217 103 0 19 267  441 338  664 
Note: All figures except for N1 (number of non-executive directors) are given in thousands and refer to 
South African Rands 
Table 5.3 illustrates an emerging trend in the directorship strategy of the firms included 
in this study. Overall, the number of non-executive directors increased noticeably 
during the selected time period, while the number of executive directors decreased. 
Non-executive directors’ total remuneration is significantly lower than was the case for 
the executive directors in Table 5.2, as these directors are not involved in the daily 
operations and management of the firms. This type of directorship is mostly 
remunerated for services rendered, consultative sessions and meetings that are 
attended. During the nine-year timeframe of this study, the mean for the total 
remuneration paid to non-executive directors increased by 213.19%. 
Investigating the descriptive statistics, the average remuneration for non-executive 
directors increased more than three times during the selected time period, displaying 
substantial growth compared to executive directors’ remuneration. Another outcome is 
the changes and fluctuations in the range of remuneration paid to the non-executive 
directors for the time period. These are justified by several cases where non-executive 
directors received basic salaries, bonuses, share gains, or other remuneration. 
Due to the presence of outliers, as already identified by examining Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 
5.3, the median values may be a more suitable measure to interpret when evaluating 
remuneration. The reasoning behind this decision is that the median is not as sensitive 
to extreme values as the mean. Mean values will however not be ignored in this study, 
and will be considered in combination with the median since it strengthens the view of 
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skew remuneration trends. The sections that follow focus on the four sub-components 
of total remuneration as identified in Chapter 4. 
5.2.2 Basic Salary 
In general, basic salaries are only paid to executive directors, but due to some 
individual non-executives also receiving basic salaries, all directors’ basic salaries are 
reflected below. 
(a) All directors 
The basic salaries paid to all directors are shown in Table 5.4. Only a small number of 
non-executive directors received basic salaries. This is mainly due to non-executives 
acting as executive directors for short periods of time or retiring within the financial 
year and switching from executive to non-executive directors. Table 5.4 below makes 
a distinction between executive and non-executive directors in the second and third 
columns to show the small impact non-executive directors’ basic salary has on the 
overall total of basic salaries paid to all directors. 
TABLE 5.4: All directors: Total basic salary 
All directors 
Basic salary 
Year Nₒ N₁ Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 325 6 759 620 27 5 326   347 392 589 
2003 322 10 889 781 18 4 108   399 696 632 
2004 315 11 961 799 26 4 168   405 430 637 
2005 293 16 1 005 841 15 4 870   484 714 696 
2006 281 8 1 190 978 15 5 988    697 184 835 
2007 287 4 1 301  1 107 44 6 660    860 267 928 
2008 311 9 1 443  1 220 24 6 692    868 623 932 
2009 325 14 1 500  1 266 60 7 200 1 084 734 1 042 
2010 296 8 1 704  1 507 30 8 062  1 211 418  1 101 
Overall 2 755  86 1 190  306 15 8 062  790 462  889 
Note: All figures except for N0 and N1 (number of directors) are given in thousands, and refer to South 
African Rands 
To differentiate between the two types of directors, Table 5.4 has two N columns. The 
first column (N0) represents the number of executive directors that received a basic 
salary, while the second column (N1) represents non-executive directors that received 
basic salaries. All directors’ basic salaries are reflected in the mean and median. As 
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Table 5.4 illustrates, the basic salary component of directors’ total remuneration is 
predominantly aimed at the executive directors. In this study, non-executive 
remuneration falls under the component other remuneration and is therefore not 
included in this table. There are, however special cases where non-executive directors 
did receive a basic salary, but it is not considered normal practice. 
Table 5.4 reflects minimum values larger than zero because only directors receiving 
remuneration in the form of this specific sub-component of remuneration were 
included. It is evident that, on average, the largest percentage of directors’ 
remuneration comes from this component. Table 5.4 clearly illustrates that the basic 
salary sub-component more than doubled during the study’s time period from 2002 
until 2010. The variance and standard deviation gap widened gradually throughout the 
years, mainly due to a mean value that more than doubled for the period. 
5.2.3 Bonus/performance bonus 
Bonuses and performance bonuses are usually one of the first areas where 
researchers and analysts would start to test for a relationship between financial 
performance and directors’ remuneration in a firm. In general, bonuses are paid to 
directors when the goals that were set are exceeded, or when they achieved 
performance over and above the agreed targets. This idea suggests that Table 5.5 is 
an important focus area in this study. 
(a) All directors 
As mentioned earlier, a differentiation between executive and non-executive directors 
was made due to the fact that non-executive directors are generally not remunerated 
with this type of remuneration. This can be seen in Table 5.5, where only a few non-
executive directors are indicated. However, some exceptions were noticed in this 
study.  
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TABLE 5.5: All directors: Bonus/performance bonus 
All directors 
Bonus/Performance bonus 
Year Nₒ N₁ Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 205 0 434 325 -80  2 646   176 986 421 
2003 237 3 568 313 6 12 191 1 045 668 1 023 
2004 216 4 606 437 1   3 310   377 527 614 
2005 217 7 798 500 1  7 819   923 925 961 
2006 201 3 1 158 784 5 10 958 2 097 360 1 448 
2007 224 3 1 307 705 4 13 862 3 249 353 1 803 
2008 231 3 1 418 876 -162 34 885 6 806 536 2 609 
2009 254 3 1 176 500 1 31 972 5 736 228 2 395 
2010 216 0 1 283 672 14   9 173 3 012 940 1 736 
Overall 2 001  26 978 500 -162 34 885  2 804 753  1 675  
Note: All figures except for N0 and N1 (number of executive and non-executive directors respectively) 
are given in thousands, and refer to South African Rands 
In Table 5.5 continuous up and down movements were observed while investigating 
the number of executive directors receiving bonuses over the study period. The slight 
overall increase, when comparing the first year (2002) and the last year of the study 
period (2010), stands in contrast with the decrease in the number of executive directors 
identified in Table 5.2. This increase in bonuses paid can either be an indication of a 
trend or benchmark set in this sector, or that firms were orientated to pay bonuses 
based on financial performance that occurred or increased during the period 2006 until 
2009. One reason for the increase in the amount and number of bonuses paid might 
be that it was used as an aggressive performance measure, during and around the 
global financial crisis period in 2008. 
In Table 5.5 negative amounts are identified as minimum values. These are due to 
some directors who resigned and had to repay remuneration from their bonus accounts 
back to the firms. 
(b) Executive directors 
Bonuses in general are paid to executive directors for performing better than agreed 
and/or excellent management. Table 5.6 illustrates the number of executive directors 
receiving bonuses as a remuneration component compared to those not receiving any 
bonuses component as part of their remuneration package for each year of the study 
period. 
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Table 5.6: Executive directors: Bonuses 
Executive directors 
Bonus/Performance bonus 
Year YES NO N0 % Receiving 
2002 205 134 339 60.47% 
2003 237 104 341 69.50% 
2004 216 110 326 66.26% 
2005 217 83 300 72.33% 
2006 201 91 292 68.84% 
2007 224 84 308 72.72% 
2008 231 103 334 69.16% 
2009 254 87 341 74.49% 
2010 216 88 304 71.05% 
Overall 2 001 884 2 885 69.42% 
Note: N0 = Total number of executive directors 
Table 5.6 shows the percentage of executive directors receiving bonuses compared to 
the total number of executive directors. This percentage increased over the nine-year 
period but generally fluctuated between the 60 and 75 percentage range. For eight 
years of the nine-year study period, approximately 70 per cent of directors received 
annual bonuses with little change in this trend; the only exception being 2009 where a 
value close to 75 per cent was observed. Table 5.6 could be used to compare 
executive directors receiving bonuses to the financial performance of the firms. If the 
financial performances of the firms also have insignificant fluctuations during the period 
of this study, a strong relationship may exist. If not, there might not be a relationship 
between this sub-component and the financial performance of the firm. 
5.2.4 Other remuneration/incentives 
Another sub-component of the dependent variable is other remuneration/incentives 
which consist of various allowances and benefits. This sub-component is important, 
since non-executives are being remunerated for their services rendered to firms from 
this remuneration sub-component as well. For this purpose it is necessary to first 
investigate all directors’ remuneration paid as part of this sub-component and then 
separating all directors into executive and non-executive directors, since the 
remuneration paid to these two types of directors differs. 
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(a) All directors 
Other remuneration/incentives comprise various smaller forms of remunerations like 
motor, medical and pension contributions that executive directors receive. The 
remuneration that non-executives directors receive for services rendered to the firm 
also forms part of this sub-component of total remuneration. It must be emphasised 
that executive directors’ allowances and benefits are added in conjunction with non-
executive directors’ total remuneration in Table 5.7. In general non-executive directors’ 
entire remuneration forms part of this sub-component. 
TABLE 5.7: All directors: Total other remuneration/incentives 
All directors 
Other remuneration/incentives 
Year N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 639 168 67 0 6 300 121 607 349 
2003 652 206 96 0 6 464 181 095 426 
2004 655 202 110 0   5 035 106 237 326 
2005 618 216 120 0   5 732 127 349 357 
2006 607 251 147 0   4 448 146 256 382 
2007 664 288 150 0 19 649 870 486 933 
2008 763 287 168 0  9 390 409 088 640 
2009 809 290 175 0 10 615 320 057 566 
2010 739 339 201 0 10 558 492 359 702 
Overall 6 146 253 140 0 19 649 318 944 565 
Note: All figures except for N (number of directors) are given in thousands, and refer to South African 
Rands 
From Table 5.7 it is also clear that this type of remuneration became more popular 
throughout the nine-year period. It becomes very difficult to report on a component that 
was based on such a broad spectrum of different remuneration formats. To simplify 
the interpretation of this component, it was considered best to separate executive and 
non-executive directors to investigate the two groups of directors separately. 
(b) Executive directors 
Executive directors are often remunerated with other remuneration/incentive types, 
which primarily comprise medical, pension, travel and telephone allowances. All of 
these other remuneration/incentives form part of the total remuneration package 
executive directors receives. Other remuneration plays an important role when 
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investigating the descriptive statistics. This sub-component might play an important 
role in this study since other remuneration fluctuates more easily than fixed 
remuneration like basic salary when tested against the performance of the firm. Firms 
can create more attractive packages for directors, over and above the benchmarked 
basic salary and bonuses set in the firm’s environment. 
Table 5.8 outlines other remuneration/incentives for executive directors. Comparing 
Table 5.2 with Table 5.8, it can be seen that this sub-component of remuneration 
covers a large portion of the entire package executive directors receive. All executive 
directors were included when Table 5.8 was compiled in order to investigate whether 
trends existed within this sub-component. 
Table 5.8: Executive directors – Total amount of other remuneration 
Executive directors 
Total amount of other remuneration 
Year N0 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 339 245 164 0  6 300    185 279 430 
2003 341 302 187 0  6 464    301 964 550 
2004 326 299 211 0  5035    169 012 411 
2005 300 304 213 0  5 732    201 192 449 
2006 292 354 235 0  4 448    233 439 483 
2007 308 419 227 0 19 649 1 762 954 1328 
2008 334 431 246 0  9390    825 939 909 
2009 341 420 247 0 10 615    673 727 821 
2010 304 465 263 0 10 558    913 680 956 
Overall 2 885 359 217 0 19 649    584 488 765 
Note: All figures except for N0 (number of executive directors) are given in thousands, and refer to 
South African Rands 
It could be argued that this type of remuneration is used as a motivational measure for 
financial performance. This is suggested when comparing the results in Table 5.8 with 
Table 5.4, reflecting basic salary, which only gradually increased throughout the 
study’s timeframe compared to the volatile changes in other remuneration. This type 
of remuneration might be linked to the changes in financial performance of the firms or 
external forces like benchmarking in the industry that drive this sub-component. 
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(c) Non-executive directors 
Generally, the total remuneration for non-executive directors is all allocated under 
other remuneration, making it necessary to compile Table 5.9. The remuneration paid 
to these non-executive directors is mainly for attending board meetings, consulting and 
strategising. 
TABLE 5.9: Non-executive directors – Total amount of other remuneration 
Non-executive directors 
Total amount of other remuneration 
Year N1 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 300 82 40 0 2 181 35 895 189 
2003 311 100 60 0 1 674 27 695 166 
2004 329 107 72 0 1 823 25 939 161 
2005 318 133 83 0 2 069 43796 209 
2006 315 155 112 0 2 206 46 865 216 
2007 356 175 116 0 3 730 73 513 271 
2008 429 175 120 0 3 316 57 004 239 
2009 468 196 145 0 1 706 42 119 205 
2010 435 251 170 0 6 890 180 344 425 
Overall 3 261 159 100 0 6 890 65 451 256 
Note: All figures except for N1 (number of non-executive directors) are given in thousands, and refer to 
South African Rands 
Table 5.9 only focuses on non-executive directors. A few non-executive directors, 
however, served for specific periods without any compensation due to various reasons, 
as reflected by the minimum values of zero. 
Non-executive remuneration is becoming expensive when observing the range, where 
maximum amounts received by non-executives are sometimes very high. The average 
remuneration paid to non-executive directors increased more than three times during 
this study’s period. 
5.2.5 Share gains/options 
The final sub-component of total remuneration refers to the amount of share 
gains/options collected by directors. The descriptive statistics for this sub-component 
are provided in Table 5.10. 
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(a) All directors 
Share gains/options are included in the sub-component that is the most challenging to 
investigate, since the transparency and disclosure for this type of remuneration are 
limited. Limited share gains/option data, especially during the first part of this study, 
was identified. Table 5.10 below displays the number of executive and non-executive 
directors separately, and reflects the interest these directors had regarding share 
gains/options in the firm. 
TABLE 5.10: All directors: Total amount of share gains or share options 
exercised  
All directors 
Total amount of share gains/share options exercised 
Year N0 N1 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 72 17 607 318 2   3 746       481 853      694 
2003 59 5 667 347 13   3 000       578 746      761 
2004 75 12 1 063 500 17 11 233    2 439 843   1 562 
2005 89 11 1 652 1 023 3   8 085    2 270 185   1 507 
2006 124 11 2 700 949 28 17 325   13 937 904   3 733 
2007 119 6 3 537 1 053 9 90 181   97 469 352   9 873 
2008 91 9 3 007 998 16 37 430   32 174 310   5 672 
2009 68 4 3 797 790 39 88 989 137 047 794 11 707 
2010 70 4 1 440 488 15 18 487     6 505 672  2 551 
Overall 767 79 2 177 725 2 90 181  34 230 624  5 851 
Note: All figures except for N0 (number of executive directors) and N1 (number of non-executive 
directors) are given in thousands, and refer to South African Rands 
Share gains/options are probably some of the most influential remuneration measures 
firms can use to encourage directors to improve the financial performance of a firm. 
Only those directors (executive and non-executive) who benefited from selling their 
shares or exercising their share options as well as disclosing it in the financial 
statements of a firm are included in Table 5.10. As mentioned earlier in this section, 
acquiring share gains and profits was not common during the first part of the study’s 
selected time period, since a lack of this type of disclosure was apparent. Table 5.10 
displays significant fluctuations in the maximum values of this form of remuneration 
during the study period. 
A few non-executive directors received share gains although it is generally recognised 
that only executive directors should receive this type of remuneration. One reason for 
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this happening is that previous executive directors became non-executive directors 
and still had the share options that they may exercise. Share options and share gains 
are very volatile in that it is not a type of fixed remuneration like basic salary. It depends 
on individual firms on how they are planning to use this remuneration method as a 
competitive advantage. It must also be noted that this type of remuneration might have 
a lag effect, meaning remuneration may be paid to directors for previous years’ 
financial performance. 
In Table 5.10 the median fluctuated between years and skewness in the data set might 
be expected. Comparing this type of remuneration with other incentives like bonuses 
in Table 5.6, it is possible that share options are not as popular to use as the other 
sub-components.  
In addition to all the findings in Table 5.10 it was further noted that quite a few directors 
exercised their share options in 2006 and 2007 just before the global financial crisis, 
as can be clearly seen by considering the mean and median values for these years in 
Table 5.10. The question whether this was a coincidence or whether some directors 
were aware of the global financial crisis in advance could be raised. 
This section concludes by measuring the skewness and kurtosis for the data set used 
in this study. These measures identify the data set’s distribution and shape. 
5.2.6 Skewness and kurtosis 
Skewness is a measure used to describe a data set's distribution by means of 
symmetry or lack of symmetry, while kurtosis measures whether data is peaked or flat 
relative to a normal distribution. In some instances these two measures are very useful 
for statistical testing. Table 5.11 illustrates the skewness and kurtosis measures for all 
the dependent variables included in the study. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
153 
 
TABLE 5.11: Dependent variables: Skewness and kurtosis 
Dependent variables N SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 
      
Total remuneration 6 146 12.023 270.428 
Basic salary 6 146   2.322     8.448 
Bonuses 6 146 13.091 328.448 
Other 6 146 14.440 338.066 
Share gains 6 146 24.919 841.960 
Note: N is the number of individual observations in the data set 
A normal (symmetric) distributed data set would have two halve identical mirror 
replicas on either side of the centre, thus making the skewness equal to zero. As 
illustrated in Table 5.11 the data set in this study is not normally distributed, because 
none of the skewness values in the table are zero. The dependent variable’s sub-
components are all skew to the right, making them positively skewed. This means that 
the tail for this distribution will be longer to the right due to all the positive values. 
The relative peakedness or flatness of a data set is identified by comparing it to the 
normal distribution, and is called kurtosis. Findings vary depending on the calculation 
used when determining what kurtosis for a normal distribution must be. Some sources 
use the value three and others zero (Weisstein, 2002). For this research study the 
reference value was three.  
By looking at the results shown in Table 5.11, it is evident that the kurtosis for all 
dependent variables in Table 5.11 is larger than the reference value of zero, indicating 
that the values’ distributions are leptokurtic. This suggests that the distributions are 
more peaked than normal distributions and have flatter tails as well. It is, however, 
noted that share gains have a very high peak when comparing it to the normal 
distribution. All variables except basic salary convey extreme excess kurtosis in Table 
5.11. 
To conclude, the skewness and kurtosis of this study’s dependent variables indicate 
that the variables are not normally distributed, thus classifying the data as non-
parametric. In the case of non-parametric data the focus is placed more on the median 
than the mean due to skewed data points. Now that the descriptive statistics for 
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directors’ remuneration are complete, the focus in the next section is shifted towards 
the descriptive statistics for the financial performance measures included in this study. 
5.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The information and tables that follow provide a breakdown of the descriptive statistics 
for the independent variables. The same table structure and measures for descriptive 
statistics were used than for the dependent variables in Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
The four independent variables used to measure the financial performance of the firms 
in this study were turnover, EPS, MVA and TSR. The reason for the different financial 
performance measures was to evaluate different aspects of financial performance. 
Three types of financial performance measures, namely accounting-, market- and 
value-based measures are therefore included in this section. The following four 
sections will report the descriptive statistics for each financial performance measure 
individually. 
5.3.1 Turnover 
Turnover is the simplest financial performance measure, since it is an accounting 
measure directly obtained from the financial statements of the firm. Table 5.12 provide 
turnover’s relevant descriptive statistics. 
TABLE 5.12: Descriptive statistics: Turnover 
Turnover (R'000) 
 Year Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
2002 6 196 134 1 284 962 8 226 41 950 388 11 313 419 
2003 6 852 169 1 402 718 5 815 47 073 375 11 988 123 
2004 6 490 217 1 386 954 5 989 51 262 212 12 081 419 
2005 7 695 118 1 713 583 31 010 62 937 216 14 831 216 
2006 10 807 881 1 973 245 33 756 77 426 248 19 617 709 
2007 11 098 133 1 697 900 38 000 95 857 250 21 803 100 
2008 11 800 072 2 135 788 43 748 110 719 474 22 800 733 
2009 10 673 065 1 958 000 140 459 112 673 433 21 696 367 
2010 11 325 195 2 530 972 139 906 110 027 004 22 049 103 
Overall 9 334 599 1 713 583 5 815 112 673 433 18 584 463 
As illustrated in Table 5.12, there is a big difference in the size of the selected firms in 
this study when considering their turnover. Firms having a turnover from R5.81 million 
up to R112.67 billion per year were included. This shows that the median would be a 
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better indicator than the mean, as the turnover varied substantially between all the 
firms, as also reflected by the high annual standard deviations. Overall, large growth 
occurred in the sector for the selected nine-year period, considering the substantial 
increases in the minimum and maximum values in the range. 
5.3.2 Earnings per share (EPS) 
EPS is also an accounting measure and used by investors regularly, showing the 
portion of profit allocated to each outstanding share of common stock. Table 5.13 
provides the descriptive statistics for EPS on an annual basis. 
TABLE 5.13: Descriptive statistics: Earnings per share (EPS) 
Table 5.13 demonstrates large standard deviations for the duration of the study period. 
These fluctuations for this period could be due to the change in the global economic 
climate in which the study was conducted. Another finding in Table 5.13 is the 
increasing trend in the mean from 2002 until 2007 and then the decrease towards 2010 
due to the global financial crisis. Negative EPS values are visible for each year in the 
study in the minimum column. This indicated that one or more firms had a lost in 
earnings for each year.  
5.3.3 Total share return (TSR) 
TSR is a market-based measure. This measure reflects the market’s perception of the 
firm’s financial performance. Table 5.14 provides the relevant descriptive statistics for 
the measure during the period under review. 
Earnings per share (EPS) (cents/share) 
Year Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 152.19 68.80 -230.30   829.50 42 384.48 205.71 
2003 153.35 90.00 -383.80   945.80 56 121.34 236.71 
2004 186.40 71.80 -179.40   937.60 72 016.90 268.15 
2005 187.87 110.60 -114.30 1 069.10 65 932.16 256.56 
2006 188.02 89.60 -259.50 1 312.30 79 101.09 280.99 
2007 199.23 83.30 -297.90 1 489.70 91 369.20 302.02 
2008 197.33 65.70 -143.90 1 056.00 63 513.74 251.84 
2009 191.18 53.40 -316.80   987.70 84 310.97 290.18 
2010 177.26 40.70 -220.70 1 131.30 70 822.58 265.94 
Overall 181.60 70.40 -383.80 1 489.70 69 781.18 264.14 
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TABLE 5.14: Descriptive statistics: Total share return (TSR) 
Total share return (TSR) (%) 
Year Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 25.81 14.00 -75.73 272.55 3 854.05 62.03 
2003 42.31 28.22 -97.93 371.43 4 809.00 69.29 
2004 50.65 43.22 -100.00 232.58 4 135.27 64.26 
2005 34.83 26.82 -70.00 840.00 6 410.22 80.00 
2006 42.68 36.36 -36.36 270.59 2 414.59 49.10 
2007 11.25 -1.10 -88.57 190.17 3 445.51 58.65 
2008 -30.73 -38.60 -100.00 64.57 1 400.12 37.39 
2009 15.08 13.64 -88.24 165.96 1 361.37 36.87 
2010 16.05 11.36 -99.33 540.00 4 448.50 66.65 
Overall 21.60 15.63 -100.00 840.00 4 049.78 63.63 
In Table 5.14, the TSR varies over time. The main reason for these fluctuations is that 
shareholders earn different levels of return on their investments depending on risk and 
good performance of a firm. TSR is given as a percentage figure. Thus it is possible 
that TSR can be compared between firms (taking risk adjustments into consideration). 
As expected, there was a decrease in the TSR during the global financial crisis period 
in 2008. The maximum TSR value more than doubled in this study’s period from 2002 
to 2010, with an overall maximum of 840%, suggesting that a skew distribution exists 
when compared to the minimum percentage value that are fixed at -100% for share 
returns. The difference between the mean and the median also supports possible 
skewness in the data. Overall Table 5.14 may suggest that the number of firms 
generating higher TSR is on the decrease for the period of this study. 
5.3.4 Market value added (MVA) 
MVA was identified as a value-based measure of financial performance, and it can be 
used as a measure of the shareholders’ value that was created. Table 5.15 displays 
the descriptive statistics for the measure over time. 
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TABLE 5.15: Descriptive statistics: Market value added (MVA) 
Market value added (MVA) (<or > than 1) 
Year Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Std. Dev. 
2002 0.72 1.10 -28.57 3.08 12.15 3.48 
2003 1.26 1.16 -7.68 6.86 1.27 1.13 
2004 1.75 1.41 0.13 23.86 4.36 2.09 
2005 1.95 1.69 0.51 6.72 1.23 1.11 
2006 2.29 1.83 0.74 26.01 4.88 2.21 
2007 2.57 1.95 0.59 15.62 2.68 1.64 
2008 1.70 1.38 0.38 5.45 1.03 1.02 
2009 1.22 1.05 0.44 5.40 0.60 0.78 
2010 1.35 1.12 0.33 5.08 0.63 0.79 
Overall 1.63 1.38 -28.57 26.01 3.32 1.82 
In Table 5.15, the MVA values reflect the difference between the current market value 
of the firm and its book value. If a firm’s MVA is larger than one, it indicates that the 
firm created value, since it managed to increase the value of the external capital 
invested in it. Similarly, any value lower than one would be an indication that the firm 
destroyed shareholders’ value. It is evident from the minimum values that every year 
some firms destroyed value in the industry. It is also noted that MVA is substantially 
lower after the global financial crisis in 2008 for the entire sector. The smaller range 
between minimum and maximum values indicates that, the mean and median are 
closer in alignment and the decrease in standard deviation suggest this trend. The 
annual standard deviations from 2008 onwards are relatively small, thus showing lower 
distribution volatility. 
All the tables discussed until now in Chapter 5 provided the required data to enable 
the researcher to test for skewness and kurtosis. These tests identify the distribution 
and peakedness of the data set’s variables for the study. 
5.3.5 Skewness and kurtosis 
Similar to the dependent variables, tests for skewness and kurtosis were conducted 
for the independent variables. As illustrated in Table 5.16, it is evident that the 
independent variables are not normally distributed. 
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TABLE 5.16: Independent variables: Skewness and kurtosis 
Independent variables 
 
N 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
      
Turnover 6 146 3.322   12.458 
EPS 6 146 1.706     2.880 
TSR 6 146 3.450   30.645 
MVA 6 146 
- 2.560 137.906 
Note: N is the number of individual observations in the data set 
As previously explained in Section 5.2.6 for skewness, three of the independent 
variables are skewed to the right, making them positively skewed. There is, however, 
a difference when MVA is considered. This market-based measure is skewed to the 
left due to the result of distribution that lies more towards the negative side than a 
normal distribution. This specific tail for distribution will be longer to the left due to the 
negative values. 
When calculating kurtosis for the independent variables, the results for TSR, MVA and 
turnover are all larger than the critical value of a three associated with a normal 
distribution, making the measures’ distributions leptokurtic. However, EPS’s kurtosis 
result is very close to the general standard set for a normal distribution. 
5.3.6 Descriptive statistics summary   
In the previous sections the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables included in this study were provided. By observing all the tables and figures 
included in these sections, interesting findings were already made by just conducting 
the descriptive statistics based on the data set. These findings and comments are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Two factors could be clearly identified which 
assisted the researcher to determine the appropriate inferential statistics that follow. 
Firstly, the time-series cross-sectional nature of the data has important implications for 
analysis. Secondly, there were a number of cases where potential outliers were 
identified. Testing for skewness and kurtosis, as well as the minimum and maximum 
values identifying the range of the variables, also gave a clear indication that outliers 
may exist. This has important implications for the next stage of the research process, 
where regression analyses were used to investigate the relationship between 
remuneration and financial performance. The directors were once again separated into 
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executive and non-executive groups in order to simplify and retrieve more specific 
information regarding the data set. 
5.4 INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
To achieve the objectives of the study, it was necessary to conduct inferential statistics. 
Secondary objectives first had to be addressed in order to achieve the study’s primary 
objective. For this reason the relationship between directors’ remuneration and the 
financial performance of firms had to be determined. In order to test the relationship, 
regression analysis was conducted. Chapter 4 dealt with the identification and 
selection of the appropriate regression models and techniques used to obtain the best 
results from the specific data set used in the research study. In the following section, 
the regression between total directors’ remuneration and financial performance is 
discussed in detail. This detailed discussion serves as an example of the process that 
was followed to ensure that the most appropriate regression models were identified, 
and illustrates how results were adjusted if required. 
5.4.1 Introduction 
After the descriptive statistical analysis and data identification, the best suited 
inferential tests and models were identified for the study’s data set. As discussed in 
Section 4.13, regarding inferential tests, the researcher first identified the outliers and 
then applied trimming to the data set, since it was found to be skewed and not normally 
distributed. 
The next step was to find the most appropriate regression model for the panel data. 
The F-test for fixed effects and the Hausman test for random effects were used in order 
to determine the best fit model to use for the regression analysis. Additional testing 
was performed by applying the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to determine 
whether the results should be adjusted for heteroskedasticity. These tests were done 
by means of the Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) package. 
In Section 5.5, the regression analyses and tests for heteroskedasticity on data for all 
directors, executive directors, and non-executive directors respectively are discussed 
in order to investigate the relationship between directors’ remuneration and firms’ 
financial performance. 
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5.4.2 Outlier testing and procedure 
Before regression tests were conducted, descriptive statistics pointed towards 
potential outlier values in the data set. Figure 5.2 provides a histogram of the basic 
salary component for all directors. This serves as an example to illustrate how outliers 
were identified for all the variables in this study. 
The first thing that should be noticed in Figure 5.2 is that the data are widely spread. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates that most of the observations fall within the three standard 
deviation range from the median in the histogram. As described in Chapter 4, all the 
observations that did not fall within this range (more than three standard deviations 
away indicated as pink triangles) were identified as outliers. 
FIGURE 5.2: Identifying outliers 
 
Source: Adapted SAS (2012) 
By applying winsorised-trimming, all of these outliers were brought closer to the 
median by replacing the value of the outlier with a value equal to the mean, plus or 
minus three times the standard deviation. The outliers were thus not excluded from the 
study, but adjusted. 
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5.4.3 Process followed to conduct regression analysis 
In the inferential statistics section of this study a process structure was followed to test 
the data. First, the data used in this study were trimmed as explained in Section 5.4.2 
to ensure that the results from the regression tests have more substantial significance. 
Secondly, before the regression test could commence the most appropriate regression 
models had to be determined. Three regression models were identified, namely pooled 
OLS models, fixed-effects models and random-effects models. A fixed-effects or 
random-effects regression model was selected by means of conducting an F-test for 
fixed effects and a Hausman test for random effects. After selecting the preferred 
regression model, the researcher conducted a regression analysis to determine the 
relationship between the variables. To conclude, a test for heteroskedasticity was 
performed for all the variables, which assisted in obtaining better results when 
heteroskedasticity was found in the data. 
In the next section, the regression test followed in the study is presented. This test 
consists of four steps, and is illustrated in detail by investigating the relationship 
between directors’ remuneration and the firms’ financial performance variables. These 
steps are then also applied for executive directors and non-executive directors 
separately, in order to seek relationships between the two types of directors and the 
financial independent variables. 
5.5 REGRESSION TESTS 
The first regression analysis that was conducted is discussed extensively as an 
example to demonstrate the process and steps followed in this study to obtain the final 
results. 
5.5.1 All directors 
In this section the regression model selection and subsequent regression analysis 
were based on all directors included in the study, and considered the relationship 
between total remuneration and the four measures of financial performance combined. 
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(a) Total remuneration 
(i)  Step 1: Test for the most appropriate regression model: 
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 6.680        0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 4.650 0.325 
Result: Most appropriate model is a random effects model 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level 
The F-test for fixed effects had an F-value of 6.680 and a p-value of 0.000. When 
conducting the Hausman test for random effects, the F-value equalled 4.650 with a p-
value of 0.325. When referring back to the Hausman test theory in Chapter 4, Section 
4.14.3 (b) a random effects model will therefore be the best fit model for the data under 
consideration. 
(ii)  Step 2: Conducting the most appropriate regression model: 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4,476) = 63.070 0.000*** 0.340 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level 
As identified in Step 1, a random effects model was selected as the preferred model 
when the regression testing was in progress. The findings show that the fit of this model 
was good with an F-value (4,476) = 63.070 and p = .00, thus having a high level of 
significance. The researcher worked with a 95% confidence interval, creating a hurdle 
level of significance represented by p = .05. The adjusted R2 was equal to 0.340, 
showing that the four independent variables selected for this study explain 34% of the 
variance in the dependent variable. The regression results obtained from the random 
effects model are shown in Table 5.17 below. 
(iii)  Step 3: Regression analysis results (trimmed) 
The regression results in Figure 5.17 were obtained before heteroskedasticity was 
tested for. 
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TABLE 5.17: All directors –Total remuneration regression results 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 3606.999 851.233 4.237 0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.002 0.000 10.889 0.000*** 
EPS (trimmed) 6.700 2.320 2.888 0.004*** 
TSR (trimmed) -13.029 4.341 -3.002 0.003*** 
MVA (trimmed) 1259.668 329.305 3.825 0.000*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level 
In Table 5.17 it can be seen that the regression coefficients obtained for all four the 
independent variables included in the study are highly significant. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4 though, these results are highly sensitive to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the data. To determine if this was the case, the Breusch-Pagan 
test for heteroskedasticity was therefore applied in the next step. 
(iv)  Step 4: Test for Heteroskedasticity: Breusch-Pagan test 
Test for Heteroskedasticity: 
Breusch-Pagan p-value 
BP = 482.130 0.000*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level 
By conducting the test for heteroskedasticity, the statistical results obtained (BP = 
482.130 and p = .00) indicated that this test is statistically significant and that there is 
heteroskedasticity in the data. The results therefore suggest that the regression results 
obtained in the previous step needed to be adjusted accordingly as shown in Table 
5.18. 
TABLE 5.18: Regression analysis test and results: All directors’ total 
remuneration  
  
Estimate 
Adjusted 
Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 3606.999 779.783 4.626   0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.002 0.000 8.237   0.000*** 
EPS (trimmed) 6.700 2.987 2.243 0.025** 
TSR (trimmed) -13.029 3.878 -3.360   0.001*** 
MVA (trimmed) 1259.668 435.770 2.891   0.004*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
164 
 
The differences between Tables 5.17 and 5.18 are that the t-values are adjusted in 
Table 5.18, resulting in different p-values. The regression coefficients are consistent 
throughout both tables; the only major difference is observed in terms of the level of 
significance for EPS which decreased from the 1% to the 5% level. Table 5.18 
therefore illustrates that the regression coefficients obtained for all four the 
independent variables are all highly significant since they all have a probability 
significance (p-value) of less than .05. Table 5.18 reports that the regression 
coefficients for MVA, EPS and Turnover are positive, reflecting a positive relationship 
with total remuneration. TSR’s relationship is negative, thus not what is generally 
expected. This negative relationship might be due to a lag period between when 
directors are remunerated and the firms’ share performance. Although MVA’s 
regression coefficient seems extremely high compared to the other performance 
measures, it should not be compared directly with the other measures since the 
performance measures are reflected in different units of measurement and are 
investigated individually towards remuneration and not towards each other. 
The four steps discussed above were applied to three sub-components (basic salary, 
bonus/performance bonus and other remuneration/incentives) of the dependent 
variable, as well as for the executive and non-executive directors separately. Share 
gains/options were not utilised and tested in this section due to limited information on 
data made available with regards to share gains/options, the small amount being 
remunerated from this component as well as the vast number of outliers identified when 
tested, thus being able to mislead and jeopardise the study’s findings. In each of the 
sections below a comprehensive table with the complete regression tests and results 
are provided. 
(b) Basic salary 
A comprehensive table of the regression results obtained for all directors: basic salary 
is provided below. Table 5.19 contains all the steps listed above, formulated and 
summarised into one table. Table 5.19 commences with the selection of the most 
appropriate regression model, determining the fit of the selected model, obtaining the 
regression results and testing for heteroskedasticity in order to obtain adjusted 
regression results when heteroskedasticity is found in the data set. 
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TABLE 5.19: Regression analysis test and results: Basic salary  
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 12.510       0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 6.880 0.143 
Most appropriate model Random effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4.476) = 44.330 0.000*** 0.270 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
BP = 339.150 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 3147.820 351.667 8.951       0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.001     0.000 5.636        0.000*** 
EPS (trimmed) 0.878     1.183 0.742 0.458 
TSR (trimmed) -4.843     1.439 -3.365       0.001*** 
MVA (trimmed) -9.784 124.924 -0.078 0.938 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level 
The Hausman test yielded an F-value with an insignificant p-value thus a random 
effects model was selected as indicated in Table 5.18. When the random effects 
regression model’s quality of fit was tested, an F-value (4,476) of 44.330 was obtained. 
The data were tested for heteroskedasticity by using the Breusch-Pagan test. This 
yielded a highly significant test statistic (BP = 339.150; p-value = .00), which pointed 
towards the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data. The final results for the random 
effects model, after being adjusted for heteroskedasticity are thus shown in Table 5.19. 
Table 5.19 displays a significant negative relationship for TSR’s regression coefficient. 
It thus seems an inverse relationship exists between TSR and basic salary for all 
directors. Since TSR is a market-based measure, the market determines the 
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relationship, with relatively little influence from managers. Turnover’s regression 
coefficient is highly significant. The observed positive relationship between turnover 
and basic salary shows that firms with high turnover remunerate with high basic 
salaries for directors. 
As indicated in Table 5.19, MVA and EPS’s regression coefficients are not significant, 
since both p-values exceed .05. For MVA this is not normal, because when firms grow, 
directors are hypothetically remunerated more, not when the MVA ratio is on the 
decrease. An insignificant EPS regression coefficient was unexpected, since one 
would assume basic salaries for directors will increase when earnings for shareholder 
increase in a firm. 
(c) Bonus/performance bonus 
Table 5.20 below presents a comprehensive summary of the regression results 
obtained for the sub-component: bonus/performance bonus. 
TABLE 5.20:  Regression analysis test and results: Bonuses  
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 7.930        0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 4.790 0.309 
Most appropriate model 
Random effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4,476) = 52.450 0.000*** 0.300 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value 
 
 
    BP = 407.03 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 15.008 194.434 0.077           0.939 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.000 0.000 5.321  0.000*** 
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EPS (trimmed) 3.343 1.077 3.104  0.002*** 
TSR (trimmed)   -2.564     1.233 -2.079 0.038** 
MVA (trimmed) 445.936 104.627 4.262  0.000*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
Table 5.20 illustrates that all the independent variables’ regression coefficients are 
significant, but when examining the intercept, it is not significant. As seen in Table 5.20 
EPS’s regression coefficient is positive and highly significant, suggesting that directors 
are remunerated with bonuses instead of basic salaries as seen in Table 5.19 when 
earnings increase. 
As was seen earlier in Table 5.18 and 5.19, TSR once again exhibits a negative 
relationship to the remuneration sub-component included as the dependent variable. 
This negative relationship might be due to the fact that TSR is a market-based measure 
and cannot be directly controlled by the firms’ management. The turnover coefficient 
is zero thus being significant continuously with no standard error. In Table 5.20 the 
MVA had a positive regression coefficient that was highly significant. This suggests 
that bonuses are awarded when the firm’s MVA increases. 
(d) Other remuneration/incentives 
Other remuneration/incentives comprise non-executive directors’ source of income as 
well as executive directors’ other remuneration sub-component. Table 5.21 displays 
regression results for this sub-component of remuneration and the financial 
performance measures. 
TABLE 5.21: Regression analysis test and results: Other remuneration  
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 9.320 0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 11.400 0.022** 
Most appropriate model Fixed effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4,411) = 16.160 0.000*** 0.120 
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Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
BP = 440.68 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.000 0.000 3.137     0.002*** 
EPS (trimmed) 0.464 0.684 0.679 0.498 
TSR (trimmed) -2.081 0.647 -3.217     0.001*** 
MVA (trimmed) 63.634 64.661 0.984 0.326 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
As seen from Table 5.21 the adjusted R2 reflects that the independent variables only 
account for 12% of the variance in the dependent variable. The regression analysis’s 
overall results seem to be weak since executive and non-executive directors 
remuneration are both included in this sub-component of total remuneration. This sub-
component will have more relevance later when it is divided between executive 
directors’ other remuneration in Section 5.5.2 (d) and non-executive directors’ other 
remuneration in Section 5.5.3 (b). 
In Table 5.21 the regression coefficient indicated that both MVA and EPS are 
insignificant due to the high probability exceeding the .05 level. The TSR shows a 
negative relationship to other remuneration/incentives paid, which could have been 
expected to some degree since other remuneration includes medical, pension and 
other benefits that are not directly influenced by the TSR investors earned on the firm’s 
shares. Similar to Table 5.20, turnover’s regression coefficient is positive and 
significant, but with a value of zero, not having an effect on the variable (all directors’ 
other remuneration).  
5.5.2 Executive directors 
Executive directors are managing the daily operations of the firms. This section is 
therefore an important indication of whether the remuneration of executive directors 
reflects a relationship with the financial performance of the firms. 
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(a) Total remuneration 
In order to investigate more accurately whether the remuneration paid to directors and 
the financial performance of firms are related, directors need to be categorised 
according to type in order to obtain more relevant results. Table 5.22 below starts this 
section by first considering the relationship between total remuneration paid to 
executive directors and the financial performance variables in this study. 
TABLE 5.22:  Regression analysis test and results: Executive directors’ total 
remuneration 
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 7.530     0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 5.230 0.265 
Most appropriate model Random effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4.475) = 63.310 0.000*** 0.340 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
BP = 471.840 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 3 286.151 773.231   4.250 0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed)        0.002      0.000 8.045 0.000*** 
EPS (trimmed)       6.437     2.763  2.330 0.020** 
TSR (trimmed)   -12.836     3.887 -3.302 0.001*** 
MVA (trimmed) 1 218.615 467.022   2.609 0.009*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
In Table 5.22, the Hausman test had an insignificant result with a p-value larger than 
.05. This result indicated that a random effects model was best suited for the data set. 
All the regression coefficients in this table were significant. As in all the previous tables 
included in Section 5.5, the individual regression coefficient for TSR is still negative. 
This suggests that when TSR decreases, executive directors’ total remuneration 
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increases. Positive relationships therefore exist between executive directors’ total 
remuneration and MVA, EPS and Turnover. EPS’s positive regression coefficient is 
expected since EPS is an accounting-based measure that could be influenced by a 
firm’s management.  
(b) Basic salary 
Table 5.23 illustrates the results of the regression based on executive directors’ basic 
salaries. 
TABLE 5.23: Regression analysis test and results: Executive directors’ basic 
salary 
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 
13.010       0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 6.720 0.151 
Most appropriate model Random effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4.475) = 46.840 0.000*** 0.280 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
BP = 333.280 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 3101.745 357.075 8.687     0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.001 0.000 5.621     0.000*** 
EPS (trimmed) 0.816 1.175 0.694 0.488 
TSR (trimmed) -5.322 1.473 -3.613     0.000*** 
MVA (trimmed) 13.522 137.376 0.098 0.922 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level 
In Table 5.23, two of the independent variables’ (TSR and turnover) regression 
coefficients had p-values that are below .05, reflecting that these coefficients are 
significant, while the other two independent variables (MVA and EPS) yielded 
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regression coefficients that are not significant. The regression coefficient for TSR is 
negative, implying that as share returns decreased, the basic salaries of executive 
directors still increased. The negative result observed for TSR may be due to various 
reasons. One of these reasons may be because of a lag between the remuneration 
paid to executive directors and the TSR earned. 
Comparing Table 5.23 with Table 5.19, it is evident that the amount of basic salary 
non-executive directors received compared to executive directors, contributed very 
little towards the overall outcome of the regression coefficients’ significance levels.  
(c) Bonus/performance bonus 
Bonuses are in principle only to be paid to executive directors managing the firms, 
having achieved goals or performing over and above of what was expected in a period 
of time. Table 5.24 shows the relationship this sub-component of the executive 
directors’ overall remuneration has with the financial performance measures that were 
included in this study. 
TABLE 5.24:  Regression analysis test and results: Executive directors’ bonuses 
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 8.030        0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 4.800 0.308 
Most appropriate model 
Random effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4.475) = 53.32 0.000*** 0.310 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
 
 BP = 453.710 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 2.305 193.239   0.012 0.990 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.000 0.000 5.341       0.000*** 
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EPS (trimmed) 3.311 1.072 3.088       0.002*** 
TSR (trimmed) -2.747    1.232 -2.229     0.026** 
MVA (trimmed) 448.373 105.706   4.242        0.000*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
In Table 5.24, a random effects model was again selected as the most appropriate 
regression model, based on similar results for the Hausman test as those reported in 
Table 5.22. All the regression coefficients indicate a significant relationship towards 
bonuses. The regression coefficient for MVA is significant in relation to the standard 
error identified, resulting in a higher t-value compared to Table 5.23’s results. The 
regression coefficient for EPS is also positive and significant, suggesting that when 
EPS increases, the bonuses paid to directors also increase. 
(d) Other remuneration/incentives 
Executive directors’ other remuneration/incentives consists of various types of 
components, all accumulated in this sub-component. The results reported in Table 
5.25 should indicate whether a relationship between this sub-component and the 
financial variables exists. 
TABLE 5.25: Regression analysis test and results: Executive directors’ other 
remuneration 
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 11.220 0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 19.410 0.001*** 
Most appropriate model Fixed effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4.410) = 7.440 0.000*** 0.060 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
BP = 453.710 0.000*** 
   Adjusted  
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
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Turnover (trimmed) 0.000 0.000 2.660     0.008*** 
EPS (trimmed) 0.151 0.504 0.301 0.764 
TSR (trimmed) -1.148 0.533 -2.155    0.032** 
MVA (trimmed) 36.257 48.355 0.750 0.454 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
In Table 5.25, a fixed effects model was considered most appropriate based on the 
results of the Hausman test being statistically significant. Significant regression 
coefficients can be seen for the two independent variables TSR and turnover. In 
contrast, MVA and EPS yielded regression coefficients that are not significant, which 
would imply that these two variables do not hold any significant relationships with the 
other remuneration/incentives that executive directors receive. This might suggest that 
executive directors received other remuneration irrespective of increasing MVA or EPS 
for shareholders. 
5.5.3 Non-executive directors 
Non-executives directors are not involved in the daily management of the firm, thus 
generally receiving fees for attending meetings and consultative work done for the firm. 
This type of remuneration falls under “other” remuneration and therefore only total 
remuneration of non-executive directors and other remuneration will be analysed to 
determine whether a relationship exists between the remuneration non-executive 
directors received and the firm’s financial performance 
(a) Total remuneration 
Total remuneration for non-executive directors primarily consists of fees paid for 
attending meetings and services rendered to the firm; however a few non-executive 
directors received a basic salary. All remuneration paid to non-executive directors in 
relationship to the financial measures is identified in Table 5.26. 
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TABLE 5.26:  Regression analysis test and results: Non-executive directors’ total 
remuneration 
 F-value p-value 
 
F-test for fixed effects 5.650        0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 0.820 0.935 
Most appropriate model 
Random effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4.463) = 31.400 0.000*** 0.210 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
 
 
BP = 283.450 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 275.290 72.011 3.823     0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.000 0.000 5.908     0.000*** 
EPS (trimmed) 0.054 0.330 0.164 0.870 
TSR (trimmed)  -0.925   0.360 -2.572     0.010*** 
MVA (trimmed) 121.926 46.665 2.613     0.009*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level 
In Table 5.26, the results from the Hausman test justified the selection of a random 
effects model. Three of the independent variables’ regression coefficients reflect 
significant relationships with the total remuneration non-executive directors received. 
As expected EPS does not hold a significant relationship with total remuneration for 
non-executive directors since these directors are not actively involved in the 
operational management of firms and consequently not remunerated based on these 
earnings. The reason for the highly significant yet small regression coefficient for 
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turnover can be ascribed to turnover being measured in Rand and illustrated in millions, 
compared to TSR which was shown as a percentage. 
(b) Other remuneration 
As mentioned in Section 5.5.1 (d), the sub-component classified as other remuneration 
is the primary remuneration source for non-executive directors. In Table 5.27 the focus 
was placed on the remuneration non-executive directors received for the activities and 
services they performed in the firm in relation to the four financial performance variable 
measures identified. 
TABLE 5.27: Regression analysis test and results: Non-executive directors’ 
other remuneration 
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 6.050        0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects 1.660 0.798 
Most appropriate model Random effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(4.463) = 37.870 0.000*** 0.240 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
BP = 396.210 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Intercept 273.756 60.848 4.499     0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.000 0.000 6.261     0.000*** 
EPS (trimmed) 0.046 0.275 0.166 0.868 
TSR (trimmed) -0.944 0.287 -3.292     0.001*** 
MVA (trimmed) 56.828 28.811 1.972    0.049** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
In Table 5.27, a random effects model was selected. The regression coefficients of 
three of the independent variables, namely TSR, MVA and turnover, suggested that 
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these variables exhibited a significant relationship with the non-executive directors’ 
other remuneration. In contrast, a regression coefficient with a probability exceeding 
the hurdle rate of .05 used in this study is observed for EPS, thus making the positive 
relationship between EPS and the other compensation sub-component of total 
remuneration insignificant. The same argument that was provided to explain the 
insignificant regression coefficient for EPS in Table 5.26 could apply for Table 5.27. 
TSR has a negative coefficient once again, and therefore corresponds to the results 
reported in previous tables. The results reported in Table 5.26 and Table 5.27 are very 
similar due to the fact that the largest portion of total remuneration received by non-
executive directors is allocated from this sub-component. 
Table 5.28 provides a summary of the expected relationship types and signs compared 
to the results observed for the regression tests that were conducted. First the 
comparisons between the expected and actual results for all directors’ total 
remuneration are displayed, and then for both types of directors (executive and non-
executive directors) separately. 
TABLE 5.28: Observed relationship summary – All directors 
Total remuneration : All directors 
 Expected Observed results 
Relationship  Sign Relationship Sign 
Turnover Yes Positive Yes Positive 
EPS Yes Positive Yes Positive 
TSR Yes Positive Yes Negative 
MVA Yes Positive Yes Positive 
Total remuneration: Executive directors 
 Expected Observed results 
Relationship Sign Relationship Sign 
Turnover Yes Positive Yes Positive 
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EPS Yes Positive Yes Positive 
TSR Yes Positive Yes Negative 
MVA Yes Positive Yes Positive 
Total remuneration: Non-executive directors 
 Expected Observed results 
Relationship Sign Relationship Sign 
Turnover Yes Positive Yes Positive 
EPS No N/A No N/A 
TSR No N/A Yes Negative 
MVA No N/A Yes Positive 
One of the most unexpected results as displayed in Table 5.28 is the negative 
relationship between TSR and total remuneration for executive directors. In general it 
would be assumed that remuneration for executive directors will increase when TSR 
increases, satisfying shareholders. Other unexpected findings included the 
relationship between non-executive directors’ remuneration and TSR, as well as the 
relationship towards MVA. Non-executive directors are assumed to be remunerated 
according to services rendered and not in relation to TSR and MVA.  
Quite often, directors are being remunerated or might receive incentives in accordance 
with performance that already occurred. For this reason, the researcher conducted a 
one-year lag test to evaluate whether remuneration was paid one year after the 
financial performance occurred in the firm. 
5.6 LAG TESTS 
According to Box, Jenkins and Reinsel (1994) lag tests are important for two reasons: 
firstly when investigating relationships and, secondly, when working with time-series. 
One time series variable may have a delayed period response to another time-series 
variable, or a delayed response to a common stimulus that affects both time-series 
variables. By investigating the response of one variable towards others, an outside 
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stimulus may be “smeared” in time, such that a stimulus restricted to one observation 
elicits a response at multiple observations. 
By comparing a normal regression for all the independent variables with a lag 
regression test, a study by Boschen and Smith (1995:577) concluded that using 
lagging to investigate past financial performance seems to have a substantial influence 
on current remuneration. However, the effect is not permanent, based on observations 
on 16 firms in the late 1940s up until the early 1990s. The study of Boschen and Smith 
(1995:577) also indicated changes in the performance sensitivity of remuneration over 
the four decades covered by their data set. Tai’s (2008:555) research examining the 
lagged relationships between a CEO’s remuneration and the financial performance of 
selected firms indicated a synchronous and lagged relationship between remuneration 
and financial performance. 
A study by Joskow and Rose (1994:2) found that current remuneration responds to 
past financial performance outcomes, but that the effect decays considerably within a 
two-year period. Their study suggested that both accounting and market performance 
measures influence directors’ remuneration, and that the basic salary and bonus sub-
components of remuneration, as well as total director’s remuneration, have become 
more sensitive to a firm’s financial performance over the past few decades. 
As this study investigated the relationship between the financial performance of firms 
and the remuneration their directors received over time, time could be considered as 
a separate variable. Logically, it comes to mind that from a financial and economical 
point of view, a lag may be apparent since financial years continuously flow into each 
other. Although firms have different financial year ends and rewards are usually given 
to those who already performed or achieved the set objectives, an overall annual 
relationship may be determined. 
Lag testing was therefore included in this study to investigate firms’ financial 
performance one year prior to directors being remunerated. In order to do a lag test, 
the time between years are identified as an additional independent variable. 
The regression testing started by investigating what the lag effect was on all directors’ 
remuneration followed by sub-dividing the directors into executive and non-executive 
directors due to the difference in the remuneration these two types of directors 
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received. As frequently mentioned earlier in this study, the data were not normally 
distributed, thus the regression testing was again adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Lag testing was performed in a similar process as the TSCSREG multi-regression 
testing conducted in Section 5.4 above. The two types of directors were again sub-
divided when the regression results were discussed. The three sections consisted of 
all directors, executive directors and non-executive directors. The researcher 
investigated the possibility of a lag between the dependent and independent variables 
to determine whether the regression tests would deliver even stronger relationship 
results than those already tested in the preceding sections. The results are reported in 
the following three sections of this study. 
5.6.1 All directors 
All directors’ total remuneration for performance achieved one year prior to the 
remuneration were tested with a regression model in order to determine the possible 
relationship, if any, type and strength as displayed in Table 5.29. 
TABLE 5.29: Total number of directors: Total remuneration (lag) 
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 2.020 0.000*** 
Hausman test for 
random effects 
Error occurred n/a 
Most appropriate 
model 
Fixed effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(5.332) = 24.600 
0.000*** 
 
0.270 
 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan p-value  
BP = 491.44 0.000*** 
 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
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Total (trimmed) lag1 0.240 0.072 3.349 0.001*** 
TSR (trimmed) -11.346 4.154 -2.732 0.007*** 
MVA trimmed) 1 138.898 3.958 2.878 0.004*** 
EPS (trimmed) 0.001 0.000 2.948 0.003*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 9.053 2.450 3.695 0.000*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level 
In Table 5.29, the Hausman test resulted in an error, thus a fixed effects model was 
applied. All the regression coefficients are highly significant, and the overall results are 
similar to those reported for the same-year remuneration testing conducted in the 
preceding sections as shown in Table 5.18. The total (trimmed) lag1’s positive 
regression coefficient with its high level of statistical significance indicates that this 
year’s remuneration is strongly related to the previous year’s remuneration. TSR is the 
only variable with a negative regression coefficient. By comparing the lag results 
reported in Table 5.29 with the original regression test as shown in Table 5.18, it is 
evident from the two tables that the relationship between the financial performance 
variables and director remuneration is stronger in Table 5.18 than in Table 5.29, 
indicating a stronger relationship between the same year’s total remuneration and 
financial performance. This finding is motivated by comparing and interpreting the 
regression coefficient’s significance. There are however significant relationships 
between all the performance measures and the total directors’ remuneration in Table 
5.29 which suggest that lag relationships could exist between firm’s performance and 
the remuneration all directors receive. 
5.6.2 Executive directors 
Focusing only on the executive directors, a narrower approach might result in stronger 
regression results when incorporating a lag year into the regression model. Executive 
directors are more performance driven with day to day management in a firm and may 
be remunerated for performance results that occurred, thus resulting in a lag period 
before being remunerated for performance. Table 5.30 reports the results of tests 
conducted on the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the 
financial performance measures. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
181 
 
TABLE 5.30: Executive directors: Total remuneration (lag)  
 F-value p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 2.270 0.000*** 
Hausman test for random effects Error occurred n/a 
Most appropriate model Fixed effects model 
Fit of Model 
F-value p-value Adjusted R2 
F(5.331) = 31.490 0.000*** 0.270 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
BP = 499.550 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Total (trimmed) lag1 0.301 0.069 4.354  0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.001 0.000 2.696  0.007*** 
EPS (trimmed) 8.523 2.131 3.999  0.000*** 
TSR (trimmed) -10.054 3.910 -2.571 0.011** 
MVA (trimmed) 1 142.604 389.605 2.933  0.004*** 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
In Table 5.30, the Hausman test resulted in an error similar to Table 5.29. The 
regression coefficient of TSR is negative, corresponding to the results of the regression 
lag test conducted on all directors’ remuneration in the previous section. The high 
significance of the EPS regression coefficient could be due to the fact that executive 
directors are remunerated higher when shareholders’ earnings increased during the 
previous year. Similar to the results reported in Table 5.22, turnover once again yielded 
a low regression coefficient. The total (trimmed) lag1’s regression coefficient indicates 
a positive significant relationship similar to Table 5.29. 
Table 5.30 provides a good indication that executive directors may be partially 
remunerated by viewing the previous years’ financial performance results. 
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5.6.3 Non-executive directors 
In general, non-executive directors are not being remunerated for performance from 
prior years. When applying a lag regression test on non-executive directors’ total 
remuneration, no significant findings are therefore expected to be identified. Table 5.31 
below reports the results of such a lag regression conducted for the sub-group of non-
executive directors. 
TABLE 5.31: Non-executive directors: Total remuneration (lag) 
  
F-value 
 
p-value 
F-test for fixed effects 1.760 0.001*** 
Hausman test for random effects Error occurred n/a 
Most appropriate model Fixed effects model 
Fit of Model 
 
F-value 
 
p-value 
 
Adjusted R2 
F(5.321) = 19.340 0.000*** 0.230 
Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan  p-value  
BP = 399.010 0.000*** 
  Adjusted 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>t) 
Total (trimmed) lag1 0.377 0.0823 4.582       0.000*** 
Turnover (trimmed) 0.000 0.000 2.356     0.019** 
EPS (trimmed) -0.126 0.247 -0.509 0.611 
TSR (trimmed) -0.713 0.4319 -1.651 0.100 
MVA (trimmed) 36.649 41.683 0.879 0.380 
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level 
From Table 5.31 it becomes evident that non-executive directors are in general not 
remunerated by means of TSR, MVA and EPS. Turnover’s regression coefficient 
however was positive and significant at a 5% significance level, thus the only financial 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
183 
 
measure that is significant. Similar to Table 5.29 and 5.30, total (trimmed) lag1’s 
regression coefficient shows a significant positive relationship. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
In Chapter 5, the research objectives of the study were investigated and addressed. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics results were provided in table format and these results 
suggest that the data set consisted of non-parametric data, containing a number of 
outliers and exhibiting random fluctuations that occurred during the selected research 
period. 
The descriptive statistics were followed by inferential statistics applying TSCSREG 
multiple regression testing. Both the F-test for fixed effects and the Hausman test for 
random effects were applied to determine the most appropriate regression model. For 
the regression analyses, the TSCSREG procedure was applied due to the panel data 
nature of the data that was investigated in this study. The regression tests were 
conducted to determine whether a relationship exists between directors’ remuneration 
(dependent variable) and firms’ financial performance (independent variables). 
Furthermore, the purpose was to define the nature and the strength of the relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables by considering the sign and the 
level of significance of the regression coefficients. The regression analyses also 
provided estimations of how much of the variation in the dependent variable was 
explained by the variation in the independent variables by considering the adjusted R2 
values obtained. 
Regression analyses were conducted in three main segments and the results are 
reported in Section 5.5 and Section 5.6. The first segment started with all directors 
combined, followed by splitting the directors into executive and non-executive directors 
for a more focused approach. The relevant regression analyses were then conducted 
within each of these three segments to investigate the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and the four financial performance measures. 
After examining the data, it was found that the possibility of a lag between the 
dependent and independent variables may exist. To test this theory, the data were 
evaluated again, but this time with a one-year lag between directors’ remuneration and 
the financial performance variables. Results suggested that significant relationships do 
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exist between financial performance and the total remuneration for all directors and 
executive directors, but that these relationships are not as strong as was the case 
when comparing the same year’s dependent and independent variables with each 
other. 
In the following chapter, the summary and conclusions of the study are provided. The 
objectives of the study are aligned with the results discussed in Chapter 5, before 
Chapter 6 is concluded with an overview of limitations faced in the study and 
recommendations for future studies in this field. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of 
firms is often questioned (Bender, 2002:16). Through the centuries the issue of 
directors’ remuneration has attracted considerable attention. On the one hand, the job 
of directors becomes more difficult due to the volatile market conditions under which 
modern firms operate. On the other hand, a rise in directors’ remuneration has been 
regarded as a concern since it could contribute to excessive income inequality. The 
question arises whether a healthy relationship, if any, exists between the remuneration 
paid to directors and a firm’s financial performance? 
Unfounded perceptions and debates have been continuing for decades as 
shareholders claim that directors are not remunerated according to the firms’ 
performance, but rather for their own personal gain (agency theory). As mentioned in 
this study, directors’ remuneration remains a controversial topic, especially in the light 
of the wide wealth gap between rich and poor in South Africa, which is continuously 
widening (Wray, 2008). 
A study conducted by Kube (1994:57) in the United States suggested that a 
relationship exists between the remuneration of directors and the performance of firms. 
Furthermore, the study’s results revealed that financial performance outcomes are 
significantly influenced by the composition of the remuneration package. A study 
conducted by Dommisse (2011:2) also found a strong relationship between the 
remuneration of directors and a firm’s overall performance for the largest listed firms 
in South Africa. 
The primary objective for most firms is to maximise shareholders' value. One possible 
method to achieve this objective is for firms to establish and align an appropriate 
relationship between the remuneration its directors receive and the financial 
performance the firm achieved. Various studies that were conducted in countries 
throughout the world reported mixed relationships between the remuneration of 
directors and firms’ financial performance (see, for instance, the study by Windsor and 
Cybinski (2013:197) which was conducted in Australia). Comparisons between studies 
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conducted globally are difficult since the variety of individual studies all selected 
specific performance measures, which the particular researcher believed were 
important measures to obtain the best results. In addition to these measures other 
factors influencing the relationship included aspects such as corporate governance of 
the country, type of sector in which the study was conducted and the economic market 
climate. Irrespective of all these factors, the studies conducted globally focused 
specifically on the relationship between directors’ remuneration and firms’ 
performance. 
The majority of previous studies primarily investigated directors’ remuneration as one 
total amount (one variable), and did not focus specifically on the four main sub-
components within remuneration (Van der Linde, 2007:1). In addition to this, focusing 
on the different types of directors should also contribute towards increased clarity and 
improved understanding of the relationship between the remuneration of directors and 
the financial performance of a firm. 
The objective of this study was first and foremost to establish whether a relationship 
exists between directors’ remuneration and firms’ financial performance in the 
Industrial Sector of the JSE; furthermore, to determine the type of relationship, if any, 
by focusing more on the sub-components of the dependent variable and distinguishing 
between the different types of directors in a firm. Secondly, this study was conducted 
to enhance the knowledge in the research field of financial performance and 
remuneration. 
This study considered a sample of listed and delisted firms on the Industrial Sector of 
the JSE for the period 2002 to 2010. Variables for this period were first determined, 
distinguishing between the dependent variables (directors’ remuneration and its sub-
components) and the independent variables (four financial performance measures of 
a firm). All the data collected from the firms included in the sample were captured and 
formatted to use in this study. After restructuring and adjusting the data layout in 
compatible and basic form, the researcher was able to start the investigation and test 
for possible relationships between the dependent and independent variables. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, a brief overview of each chapter 
in this study is provided. Important topics from the literature review are highlighted and 
revisited. Secondly, the empirical investigation elaborates on the important findings of 
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the descriptive and inferential statistical research results. Thirdly, remarks and 
additional findings identified throughout the study are mentioned, thus over and above 
those required to achieve the primary and secondary objectives in the study. Finally, 
the study concludes with a section outlining the limitations of the study and providing 
recommendations for future research. 
6.2 SUMMARY 
A brief overview on the objectives that were formulated, literature strengthening the 
purpose and research design of the study, as well as the methodology used are 
discussed in this section. 
6.2.1 Research objectives 
The primary objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of Industrial Sector firms listed 
on the JSE for the period 2002 until 2010. 
In line with the problem statement and the primary objective, the following hypotheses 
were formulated: 
H0: There is no relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of the firms. 
H1: There is a relationship between directors’ remuneration and the financial 
performance of the firms. 
Furthermore, the following secondary objectives were identified for the study: 
• Identifying the different sub-components of the total directors’ remuneration; 
• Investigating the contribution of the various sub-components towards total 
remuneration; 
• Investigating the relationship between the various sub-components of directors’ 
remuneration and firms’ financial performance variables selected; 
• Comparing the total and the sub-component remuneration of executive directors 
with the financial performance variables of the firms; and 
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• Comparing total non-executive directors’ remuneration with the performance of 
the firms. 
6.2.2 Research design and methodology 
Previous studies conducted in this field of finance mainly investigated executive 
directors’ total remuneration compared to the financial performance of firms. Various 
variables and measurement methods were initially considered for this study, looking at 
studies from all over the world. Scholtz and Smit (2012:22), for example, focused on 
firms listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX) board of the JSE in South Africa, while 
Dommisse (2012:2) examined the total remuneration of the top 120 JSE-listed firms’ 
executive directors in South Africa. Amess and Drake (2003:2) investigated the 
relationship between the board of directors and the size of the firm in the United 
Kingdom, whereas Windsor and Cybinski (2013:197) concentrated on ROE and EPS 
in the Australian business environment. The question, however, remained whether 
there is a relationship between the remuneration of directors and the financial 
performance of the firms selected for this study. If so, what is the nature of the 
relationship and how are directors remunerated? 
As explained in Section 4.3, a ten-step research approach was followed for this 
quantitative study. Secondary data were gathered and judgement sampling was used. 
JSE listed and delisted firms from the Industrial Sector were selected. The reason for 
including delisted firms is to reduce survivor bias. All firms needed to be listed for at 
least three consecutive years and had to have the adequate required financial data, 
within the selected period, to be included. 
The time period 2002 until 2010 was selected for the study. The main reason for this 
time period is the format of the annual financial statements which remained consistent 
to compare for this period. In addition, corporate governance also improved (e.g. The 
King II report to the King III report). Data used in the study is classified as panel data 
(cross-sectional and time-series dimension data). After considering all prerequisite 
conditions, the study ended with a final sample of 93 firms, representing 6 109 
complete observations lines for the required data in the set. Each line identified the 
specific year, the firm’s name, director’s name, type of director (executive or non-
executive), all the dependent variable’s sub-components, namely basic salary, 
bonuses (performance), share gains/options and other remuneration as well as the 
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financial independent variables of the firm (turnover, EPS, MVA and TSR). The two 
accounting-based ratios (namely turnover and EPS) and the two market-based ratios 
(namely MVA and TSR) were selected as measures of sample firms’ financial 
performance. This research study is described as a quantitative study, due to the 
financial numerical data used, directors’ remuneration amounts, as well as 
fundamental financial statement data used to conduct the study. McGregor BFA (Pty) 
Ltd (2012) was used to obtain standardised financial statements, which were 
necessary to calculate the different financial ratios, and TimBukOne (2012) to acquire 
the directors’ remuneration data. For the descriptive statistics, Microsoft Excel (2012) 
was used and for the inferential testing, SPSS Statistics (2013) was utilised to analyse 
the data set. All the statistical and regression tests were conducted for all firms and 
their directors that were included in the data set to achieve the overall required results. 
The secondary data were analysed by means of both descriptive and inferential 
statistics in order to obtain the necessary results. The descriptive statistics included 
measures such as the mean, median, minimum and maximum values, variance, 
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for all variables. The descriptive statistics 
section also illustrated by means of a histogram how trimming was performed to 
identify outliers for the dependent and independent variables. 
Inferential statistics, which included multiple regressions and one-year lag testing, 
were used to achieve the study’s objectives as well as to obtain the findings of the 
study. The F-test for fixed effects and the Hausman test for random effects were used 
to determine which regression model is most appropriate for the regression test. The 
regression coefficient and its level of significance was then determined to see whether 
there is a relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In order to 
be accurate, the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity was used to test for 
heteroskedasticity in the panel data since the descriptive statistics indicated that the 
data set contained non-parametric data. 
For comprehensiveness of the study, one-year lag periods were built into the preferred 
regression models, since past studies suggested that directors were remunerated only 
after financial performance already occurred (Amess & Drake, 2003). Lag testing 
strengthened the researcher’s findings for this study. 
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The statistical analysis results obtained in this study were provided in various tables in 
Chapter 5. These results were discussed for the entire period under review, including 
the economic crisis that occurred within the review period. 
6.3 RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section the main empirical findings of the study are summarised. After 
investigating all the dependent and independent variables identified in this study, 
findings were made. The following findings were concluded after analysing the data 
set for descriptive statistics. 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
(a) Dependent variable findings 
(i)  All directors: Table 5.1 
There is a large gap within directors’ remuneration itself. When comparing the mean 
and median, there were only a small number of directors earning substantially larger 
amounts compared to the rest, whose earnings were in a closer proximity range. The 
high mean when compared to the median, focuses on the maximum amounts earned 
by top directors. It must be noted that executive and non-executive directors are 
collectively reported in Table 5.1. Therefore, it was also necessary to investigate all 
the sub-components of remuneration for executive and non-executive directors 
separately to determine possible relationships for the two types of director. 
The total number of directors in the Industrial Sector increased by only 100 directors 
over the nine-year study period; unexpectedly it even increased during the global 
financial crisis. An explanation for the increase during the crisis period could be that 
competent management was utilised to save the firms from downfall, making the firms 
more competitive during the global financial crisis period. From Table 5.1 it was still 
not possible to be identify which type of directorship increased during the global 
financial crisis period. These descriptive statistics are difficult to analyse due to the fact 
that the findings were very broad by including all directors in Table 5.1. The split was 
however made between the two types of directors in Section 5.2.1 (b) for executive 
directors and Section 5.2.1 (c) for non-executive directors. 
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It seems that a large range exists between the remuneration of some Industrial Sector 
firms and other ones. This divergence in remuneration seems to be growing. One 
reason for this remuneration trend could be the shortage of competent directors. This 
pushes up the remuneration of directors in some firms, resulting in their remuneration 
becoming more competitive and widening the pay gap between firms continuously. 
Derived from the mean for remuneration, a significant increase is visible between 2005 
and 2006, since total remuneration increased significantly from the previous four years. 
This growth period was of short duration, since the global financial crisis followed in 
2008, lowering the mean of total remuneration until the end of the study’s period. 
As mentioned above, the directors had to be sub-divided to achieve a better 
understanding of what the remuneration packages for both types of directors consisted 
of, and what remuneration trends could be observed over the study’s period. Below, 
executive and non-executive directors’ findings are discussed separately. 
(ii)  Total remuneration of executive directors: Table 5.2 
Focusing on total remuneration for all directors, it was evident that the largest portion 
of remuneration was allocated to the executive directors, which is general practice in 
firms. Furthermore, it must be noted that the number of executive directors managing 
the firms declined over the nine years within the study period by an average of 10% 
over the nine years. This could be due to cost-saving measures, by making use of 
more consultants and appointing more non-executive directors that are less expensive 
with lower long-term remuneration commitments. The executive directors on average 
formed 47% of the total number of directors, but accounted for more than 90% of the 
total remuneration paid to all the directors included in this research study. 
Although the overall number of executive directors decreased, the amount of 
remuneration paid to these directors still increased by more than 10% annually which 
is relatively high. This does not only indicate that directors’ remuneration increased 
more than the average salary increase rate in South Africa, but that the gap between 
the highest paid workers in South Africa and the lowest is still widening. 
The wide range between minimum and maximum remuneration values might be 
justified when considering the difference in firm sizes in the Industrial Sector. It could 
be possible that some executive directors knew what was going to happen in the 
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foreseeable future regarding the global financial crisis. It may seem that some directors 
allegedly used this opportunity to make large profits just before the global financial 
crisis occurred. This behaviour is directly in conflict with shareholders’ value creation.  
From the increasing gap between the mean and median remuneration values in Table 
5.2, it can be concluded that the majority of executive directors’ remuneration 
increased slower, while a few individuals had rapid increases, resulting in a spike in 
the mean compared to the median. This is illustrated by looking at the standard 
deviation which expanded to more than three times the original value in 2002, thus 
illustrating that remuneration paid to directors moved further away from the mean. 
(iii)  Total remuneration of non-executive directors: Table 5.3 
The number of non-executive directors increased significantly for the overall period of 
the study, and even more so during the global financial crisis with a total growth rate 
of 45% in the number of non-executive directors. Although remuneration paid to non-
executive directors was considerably smaller, and generally compensated them for 
attending meetings, consulting and rendering services to the firm, the remuneration for 
these directors increased more rapidly than those paid to executive directors. When 
inspecting the maximum amounts paid to non-executives, there were individuals who 
received various sub-components of remuneration which are not standard for non-
executive directors as being displayed in Table 5.3. This unusual remuneration usually 
occurs when an executive directors retires and changes to non-executive directorship, 
thus still having share options or still managing as an executive director for short 
periods in a year, but is listed as a non-executive on the financial statements of the 
firm. 
The standard deviation for non-executive directors’ remuneration spiked during the 
global financial crisis period. This might be due to the fact that the number of non-
executives in firms increased significantly, which may suggest that firms needed 
assistance during the crisis period and were willing to remunerate non-executive 
directors to ensure that the firms survived. 
(iv)  Executive and non-executive directors’ sub-components: Table 5.4 - Table 5.9 
Focusing on the various components of the remuneration for all directors, it was found 
that approximately 3% of non-executive directors received a basic salary, which is 
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unusual. Possible reasons for these occurrences may include part-time acting or 
switching during the financial year from executive to non-executive directorship, as 
mentioned previously. Due to the fact that directors in Table 5.4 received a basic 
salary, thus having a value higher than zero, the difference between the minimum 
values and maximum values are identified. These amounts still show a large 
remuneration gap between directors, but can be attributed to non-executives earning 
small basic salaries. This remuneration gap, however, is not known with certainty by 
the researcher, and only assumptions can be made. Another reason for the wide range 
difference might be the differences in size between firms included in the study. In 
general the larger firms could remunerate their directors with larger incentives, since 
more responsibility and accountability are required. 
The basic salary sub-component is more a fixed set compared to remuneration such 
as bonuses, share options and gains that seem to be more flexible (variable 
remuneration). It might be that these variable remuneration sub-components are 
generally more closely related to the financial performance of a firm, possibly resulting 
in stronger positive relationships when investigating the inferential statistics section. 
Bonuses paid to all directors continuously increased during the study’s period, except 
in the global financial crisis period. The standard deviation fluctuated during the entire 
timeframe and increased more than four times since the start of the study as illustrated 
in Table 5.5. This increase can be due to enormous bonuses that emerged as indicated 
by the large maximum values. In general, more than two thirds of executive directors 
received a bonus annually as displayed in Table 5.6. It must be noted that it does not 
necessarily mean that the one third of directors not receiving bonus remuneration, are 
not being remunerated otherwise and vice versa. The bonus trend of remuneration 
showed a slight increase from 2002 until 2008. It is suggested that bonuses are still 
the most popular performance motivation method for remunerating executive directors. 
They could either have received share options, higher basic salaries or benefits 
classified under other remuneration. 
Interestingly, two rare incidents occurred during the study’s period, where executive 
directors had to pay back their bonuses to the firms. Reasons may include borrowing 
on their bonuses at the firm, or being overcompensated previously. The most likely 
reason is that directors resigned and had to repay money to the firm. By considering 
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the descriptive statistics, it seems that firms motivated their directors strongly during 
the global financial crisis period to perform by offering larger bonuses. The situation 
stabilised in 2008, with a significant decrease in bonuses paid during the last years of 
the study. 
The sub-component, other remuneration, consists of medical, pension, motor, phone 
and travel allowances for directors. Although it is not assumed to be a popular 
remuneration method to reward directors for the financial performance of firms, it still 
contributes to a large amount of remuneration received by directors. It is surprising that 
a large number of directors in the industry earned up to R19.65 million in the sub-
component other remuneration in 2007. It seems as if more firms remunerated their 
directors indirectly with allowances than by only compensating them with a basic salary 
and bonus. In terms of executive directors, the standard deviation also expanded 
wider, meaning that the gap is increasing between the highest and lowest paid 
directors, when examining the mean and other remuneration received by executive 
directors. 
In terms of non-executive directors, other remuneration was found to be their main 
source of remuneration, since Table 5.4 and 5.5 identified the small number of non-
executive directors receiving remuneration from basic salaries and bonuses. Non-
executive directors’ other remuneration increased substantially as can be seen in 
Table 5.9. Interestingly, a few non-executive directors did not receive remuneration for 
services rendered to the firms during the nine years as seen in Table 5.9’s minimum 
column. This observation was clear during the global financial crisis period, where it 
was noted that a few directors did not receive remuneration for that period. Two 
possible explanations may be considered. The first reason might be that the non-
executive directors were willing to render services and assistance for free. The second 
may be that firms merely postponed payment or did not use non-executive service, 
which is highly unlikely. The mean remuneration for these non-executive directors 
increased from an average of R82 000 to R251 000 over the nine-year study period. 
Table 5.9 shows an increase in average remuneration which is exceptionally high, in 
that it is more than three times the starting amount in 2002. 
Share profits or gains data were difficult to obtain from firms due to the lack of 
disclosure, transparency and limited governance guidelines in the directors’ 
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remuneration field, especially for the first few years of the study. Usually, studies tend 
to ignore share profits or gains, but this is actually where the interesting findings could 
emerge. On average about 27% of all executive directors benefited from share profits 
or gains during the study’s research period as indicated in Table 5.10. The number of 
directors benefiting from share gains and profits are considerably less than those 
receiving bonuses, suggesting that this type of remuneration is not as popular. This 
type of directors' remuneration may however be more focused as a long-term 
performance incentive. It must be mentioned, however, that this statement is only a 
theory. Only 2.4% of the non-executive directors had profit gains or share options. This 
might be due to the fact that they resigned from their executive positions earlier or as 
motivation incentives to ensure that non-executives are committed to the firm. As can 
be seen in Table 5.10, the difference between share gains minimum and maximum 
amounts is widely spread, and could indicate that directors had the option to decide 
how many shares they wanted to sell, when they wanted to sell these shares or rather 
to exercise their share options. 
An observation creating suspicion is that a significant amount of share gains was 
collected just before the global crisis. Even the number of directors exercising share 
options was far above average, and all of these profits formed part of the total 
remuneration paid to directors, as can be seen in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 in Chapter 5. 
Occurrences like this might be by purely accidental or random, but opinions may differ, 
especially so close to the global financial crisis. The share gains varied significantly 
during the study’s period, and executive directors retiring should also be taken into 
consideration. Although most data on shares gains were available for the study, the 
researcher stated that with better regulation and legislation regarding disclosure of 
director remuneration, more sophisticated information on profit shares could have been 
retrieved from the selected firms during the study’s research period. 
Tests for skewness and kurtosis for the dependent variables indicated that all the 
variables are skewed to the right, meaning they are positively skewed. All the variables 
are also leptokurtic, meaning they are more peaked than a normal distribution. The 
dependent variable’s sub-component, basic salary, was the least peaked and therefore 
the closest to a normal distribution. From this information it was concluded that the 
descriptive statistics analysis should focus more on the mean than the median values 
due to the skewness identified in the data.  
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(b) Independent variables’ findings: Financial performance measures 
(i)  Turnover 
As illustrated in Table 5.12 in Chapter 5, it was evident that turnover in general 
increased in the Industrial Sector during the study period. A general overview can be 
drawn from the descriptive statistics done in Section 5.3.1 regarding the turnover 
variable. The descriptive statistics show an overall healthy growth picture, starting with 
an economic boom period between 2003 and 2005, followed by a three-year 
stagnating period, due to the global financial crisis. As can be seen in Table 5.12, the 
standard deviation widens as the years continued, indicating that firms over- or 
underperformed in comparison with the sector itself. 
(ii)  EPS – Earnings per share 
EPS fluctuated during the study’s selected time period because it is not a standardised 
measure. It is safer to rather consider the general overview of the time period than 
making conclusions by focusing on the minimum and maximum values. Throughout 
the study’s period, the median for EPS is significantly lower than the mean. This might 
be due to a few firms significantly outperforming others in the sector, spiking the mean. 
Overall, the median remains low, due to most firms having a low EPS. The change in 
the variance is also difficult to discuss and problems like these are dealt with more 
comprehensively in Section 6.3.2 in Chapter 6 regarding the inferential tests. 
(iii)  MVA – Market value added 
As illustrated in Table 5.15, the minimum and maximum MVA values are positive for 
all the years except for the first two years of the study, 2002 and 2003. This suggests 
that the majority of firms added value throughout the study’s period. The two minimum 
negative values identified in Table 5.15 are most probably outliers in the data set. MVA 
maximum values, however, fluctuated significantly throughout the study’s time period 
compared to the minimum values that are in a small radius of each other. Observing 
the means’ incline and decline trends in this time period, the relationship between the 
MVA and total directors’ remuneration seems to be positive, comparing Tables 5.1 and 
5.15. It might however still be coincidental that both increased for these periods, thus 
a regression test was done to determine whether a significant relationship existed 
between this independent variable and the dependent variable’s sub-component.  
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Finally, the standard deviation in Table 5.15 also shows an overall significant decline 
from 2002 until 2010, indicating that firms in general created MVA more collectively as 
a sector than individually. 
(iv)  TSR – Total share return 
Significant changes occurred in 2007 for TSR, as illustrated in Table 5.14, where the 
median is negative due to the global financial crisis impact. This trend improved in 
2008, where the median and mean were still negative, but with a smaller standard 
deviation for 2008 and 2009. These findings may suggest that a small number of the 
selected firms in this study’s sample outperformed the industry during the global 
financial crisis period. During this period, the maximum TSR decreased by two-thirds 
compared to the previous year and was in a decline phase from 2006 until 2008. 
Overall, the mean and median TSR values sometimes decline during the period, 
starting strong in the early 2000s with hyper returns between 2003 and 2005, but 
declined to a much lower mean and median value in the last few years of the study. 
Unfortunately each of the years some firms lost significant share returns as seen in 
Table 5.14 since the bottom percentage set for the TSR is fixed at -100% in the 
minimum column. This is mainly due to slow economic growth and factors like interest 
rates and exchange rates directly affecting the TSR. The TSR is one of the market-
based measures included in this study, and is affected by the external economic 
environment of the firms. The decline in the TSR during the period and an increase in 
the total directors’ remuneration (Table 5.1) suggested a negative relationship between 
these two variables. The relationship status was established in the inferential section. 
(c) Independent variables: Skewness and kurtosis 
As illustrated in Table 5.16, the skewness for TSR, EPS and turnover was positive, 
thus positive skewness suggests that frequent small negative outcomes occur. For 
TSR this makes sense since the lower limit on returns is only -100%. MVA, on the 
opposite side, has a negatively skewed distribution with a long left tail, which suggests 
that greater chances of extremely negative outcomes are possible. Thus, skewness 
testing assists in determining the location and variability of a data set. The test proved 
that the data set is not normally distributed, and assisted the researcher to select the 
correct inferential methodology to analyse the data set. 
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Table 5.16 also shows that kurtosis for TSR, MVA and turnover is very high and not 
close to a normal distribution. This may be due to the wide scattering of data points 
further away from the mean, thus indicating heavy tails in the distribution of the data. 
The descriptive statistics describe the basic features of the data and are of particular 
importance for statistical research. It enables the researcher to discover new findings 
and trends, and visualising a bigger scope around the data set used in this study. 
6.3.2 Inferential statistics 
In this study, regression analysis was preferred as it enabled the researcher to 
determine not only the relationship between two or more variables (whether positive or 
negative), but also to determine the strength of the relationship (Johnson & Kuby, 
2007:173). The F-test for fixed effects and the Hausman test for random effects were 
selected to test for the most appropriate regression model for the data set. Outliers 
were eliminated through applying trimming, thus the data were trimmed to three 
standard deviations to each side from the centre of the data. For better results the data 
set was also tested for heteroskedasticity, which in all instances was present and 
adjusted accordingly. 
Finally a one-year lag test was performed in order to identify possible delays between 
the selected financial performance of the firms and directors’ remuneration in order to 
determine the possibility of stronger positive or negative relationships between the 
independent variables and the sub-components of the dependent variable. 
In Table 5.28, differentiating between the two types of directors, namely executive and 
non-executive, as well as comparing the expected findings to actual findings are 
displayed. Investigating the sub-components of directors’ remuneration’s relationships 
to the financial performance measures identified in this study was overall the most 
insightful of all the findings. 
(a) All directors 
Definite relationships between the firm’s financial performance measures and the total 
remuneration paid to all directors were found. There are, however, individual cases 
where the findings showed a negative relationship as indicated in Table 5.17. In order 
to understand the relationships between the variables in the study, the inferential 
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results in Chapter 5 were used to identify findings and state the suggested 
recommendations for the study. Table 6.1 below summarises the relationship, if any, 
as well as the type of relationship between the financial performance variables and the 
dependent variable with its sub-components. 
TABLE 6.1: Relationship situation and type: Directors’ total remuneration –TSR, 
MVA, EPS and turnover 
Relationship 
+ / – or “no relationship” 
Total 
Remuneration 
Basic Salary Bonus Other 
Remuneration 
Turnover + + + + 
EPS + No Relationship + No Relationship 
TSR - - - - 
MVA + No Relationship + No Relationship 
Based on the regression analysis, the majority of the relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables were found to be significantly positive or 
negative. From Table 6.1 it seems that bonuses paid to directors are the remuneration 
sub-component with the most positive relationships to the performance measures 
selected in the study. Bonuses are also the most influential and most popular form of 
remuneration as discussed in Section 5.5.2 (c). This finding is also supported by 
looking at Table 5.20 where the adjusted R2 was calculated, indicating that 30% of the 
variance in the dependable variable can be explained by means of the independent 
variables selected. This variance was the highest value observed out of all the tables 
in Chapter 5. 
Basic salary and other remuneration had similar overall relationship results, having 
negative significant relationships with TSR and positive significant relationships with 
turnover. Other remuneration at this stage was still reflecting the executive and non-
executive directors’ remuneration combined, thus findings can be better concluded 
below when executive and non-executive are interpreted separately. 
(b) Executive directors 
The findings reported in Table 6.2 below are similar to those in Table 6.1 above. This 
comes as no surprise, since only executive directors are supposed to receive basic 
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salary and bonuses. Due to the substantial amount of remuneration executive directors 
receive in relation to the total amount of remuneration paid to all directors, no significant 
changes regarding the relationship situation between the dependent and independent 
variables were observed. 
TABLE 6.2: Relationship situation and type: Executive directors’ total 
remuneration - TSR, MVA, EPS and turnover 
Relationship 
+ / – or “no relationship” 
Total 
Remuneration 
Basic Salary Bonus Other Remuneration 
Turnover + + + + 
EPS + No relationship + No relationship  
TSR - - - - 
MVA + No relationship + No relationship  
Since the same discussion as stated in the paragraph below Table 6.1 can be applied 
here, additional discussions on executive remuneration as displayed in Table 6.2 were 
conducted. TSR have a significant negative relationship throughout all the regression 
tests done in Chapter 5. This suggests that when TSR is negatively influenced, 
remuneration for directors increased. This relationship could possibly be explained as 
follows: TSR focuses on the long-term performance of a firm while directors are 
rewarded primarily for the short-term performance. It is suggested by all of these 
findings for executive directors that firms need to start placing caps on remuneration 
pay-outs and need to develop and use a more balanced approach between cash and 
equity. Firms should also not only focus on short-term performance measures like 
EPS, and this should reduce the amount of risk taking and build better long-term 
financial sustainability in the firm. 
(c) Non-executive directors 
In this research study the non-executive directors’ remuneration was included in other 
remuneration. However non-executive directors also received additional remuneration 
similar to those of executive directors’ remuneration. For this reason Table 6.3 below 
included both remuneration columns. 
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TABLE 6.3: Relationship situation and type: Non-executive directors’ total 
remuneration - TSR, MVA, EPS and turnover 
Relationship 
+ / – or “no relationship” 
Total Remuneration Other Remuneration 
Turnover + + 
EPS No relationship No relationship 
TSR - - 
MVA + + 
Although the results reflected in the total remuneration and other remuneration 
columns are identical, there were changes in the data set that almost changed the 
relationship situation when investigating the MVA relationship in more detail as 
illustrated in Table 5.27. EPS does not have a significant relationship with the 
remuneration paid to non-executive directors. This relationship makes sense since 
non-executive directors are not remunerated like executive directors by promoting EPS 
in a firm. The turnover performance measure yields a positive relationship, as 
throughout all the regression tests done in this study, with a very strong significance in 
relationship. This suggests that when the turnover of the firms increased, so did the 
remuneration paid to directors. 
(d) Lag testing results 
Lag testing suggested that significant relationships existed between the dependent and 
independent variables in this study; the relationship, however, was overall less 
significant than when the same year’s directors’ remuneration and performance were 
tested. These findings were motivated by comparing the adjusted R2 values from the 
same year regression testing between the variables with the one-year lag test 
conducted in which remuneration is paid one year after financial performance occurred 
in the firms. By comparing Table 5.18 with Table 5.29, Table 5.22 with Table 5.30 and 
lastly comparing Table 5.26 with Table 5.31, the above findings were made. The overall 
findings remained the same as illustrated in Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, and only the 
strength of the relationships between the dependent and independent variables differs 
slightly. 
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It is apparent from these results that the majority of the firms had an effective 
remuneration strategy in place in order to promote financial performance and growth 
of the firms. This statement can be concluded from the relationships identified in the 
tables in Chapter 5. For the purpose of the study, the focus was on the relationship 
between directors’ remuneration and financial performance of firms only, thus, the 
relationship was viewed in isolation, excluding other internal or external factors that 
might influence firms’ financial performance resulting in change in the remuneration 
paid to directors. 
The data set produced multiple results since the independent variables consisted of 
four financial measures that were aligned to the dependent variable, consisting of four 
remuneration sub-components. In order to understand the directors’ remuneration 
better, a distinction between executive and non-executive directors was made due to 
their functions and remuneration structures that differ. 
Within the study’s time period a global financial crisis emerged which provided the 
researcher with the opportunity to see what effects might occur in unusual economic 
circumstances. The next section highlights the findings from this global financial crisis 
period. 
6.3.3 The influence of the global financial crisis on the study’s findings 
The poor financial results reported during the global financial crisis period generated 
heightened attention to directors’ remuneration and gave firms a reality check to once 
again go and investigate the remuneration paid to all directors and whether the 
remuneration is linked or aligned to financial performance. It seems that firms started 
realising that in order to recover from the global financial crisis more decisive retaining 
and motivational remuneration packages were needed for directors. However, the 
losses shareholders incurred during the global financial crisis period as well as how 
the firm would adapt in the changing economy also need to be acknowledged when 
compiling the remuneration packages. 
The global financial crisis impacted findings from descriptive and inferential statistical 
tests’ results. Directors’ remuneration and the firms’ financial performance were 
affected as follows: 
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• More non-executive directors were appointed and the number of executive 
directors was reduced in the sector; 
• One of the trends identified in this study’s time period is that firms started to 
emphasise the restriction of shares to directors. Directors were making money 
alongside investors in the short term, but firms had to start focusing more on the 
long-term financial sustainability of the firms; 
• Better internal controls and looking at previous scenarios (global financial crisis 
of the 1980s) to have the proper steps in place to minimise risk, like having 
proper remuneration metrics, stress testing potential remuneration like 
remuneration pay-outs in various economic scenarios to minimise risk; and 
• More aggressive remuneration strategies were exercised by individual firms with 
excessive remuneration packages to ensure growth during the global financial 
crisis period. 
In Section 6.3 the results and discussion of the findings made in this study were 
explained and discussed in order to place the data set’s results in context. Chapter 6 
concludes by discussing additional interesting findings, limitations experienced in this 
study as well as suggestions for future research in the field of directors’ remuneration 
and financial performance of firms. 
6.4 ADDITIONAL INTERESTING FINDINGS 
The following additional findings were made: 
• Executive remuneration levels showed some restraint. Currently, planning in 
terms of remuneration seems to be more thorough so that firms can prove to 
shareholders that overcompensation should not be an issue; 
• The remuneration gaps between directors in the sector are still widening, and 
this could partially be due to the difference in size between the firms. In addition, 
the remuneration directors receive increases annually at a rate exceeding 
inflation in South Africa, as well as what the general public receives for ordinary 
work; 
• Disclosure and transparency for directors’ remuneration and especially some of 
the sub-components were difficult to obtain for the first few years of the study. 
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The King III report which builds on the King II report assisted in ensuring that 
governance in firms improves, thus improving on the meaningfulness, 
disclosure and transparency with regards to remuneration for directors; 
• The focus should be on corporate performance dictating remuneration, to 
ensure that objectives for the firms are met; 
• It is evident that shareholder activism is growing and that firms must prepare 
themselves to be more transparent and disclose all financial activities in order 
to prevent being a target for the media; 
• Executive directors’ remuneration differs considerably across the Industrial 
Sector, in terms of both the size and the structure of the remuneration packages; 
• Executive directors’ remuneration followed a steep upward trend since the early 
2000s, even with the global financial crisis in-between; 
• Evidence on the extent to which executive remuneration reflects firm 
performance displayed mixed results; this might be due to a time period lag in 
remuneration for performance; 
• Share ownership is often dispersed, making it difficult for shareholders to 
effectively oppose unreasonable remuneration packages; 
• Individual shareholders do not necessarily have much influence on executive 
remuneration as it is limited by factors like benchmarking and trends; and 
• Share-based remuneration is often inefficient, as it only refers to the 
performance of the firm as a whole and not to the individual performance of the 
director. Therefore, directors may benefit from the growth of the firm’s shares 
even if their own performance was poor. 
To conclude, it is obvious that directors’ remuneration differed considerably between 
Industrial Sector firms when considering, amongst others, size, management style, 
disclosure, and the composition of the remuneration package. This study has shown 
that a clear and distinct relationship could be confirmed between directors’ 
remuneration and the firm’s financial performance, despite some evidence to the 
contrary in this respect. Not all the relationships are positive, since negative 
relationships also existed. The objective of the study was met, by determining that a 
relationship exists between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of 
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firms. Furthermore, the study also identified several other positive and negative 
relationships between the types of directors, their remuneration sub-components and 
the financial performance variables selected in this study. 
In addition to all the above findings, the study also suggests some important questions 
that could be addressed in future research since directors’ remuneration in relation to 
firms’ financial performance is such a relevant global topic. 
6.5 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following limitations were identified during this study: 
• Financial data of certain firms were very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. 
This is due to acquisitions or mergers that took place in the selected time period 
in the Industrial Sector, or due to firms switching from various sectors on the 
JSE; 
• Only Industrial Sector firms, listed and delisted, on the JSE were used for the 
study due to the lack of privately-owned firms’ available financial performance 
information and proper disclosure; 
• The financial information of a few firms was not available for certain years in the 
study period although these firms were active and running; 
• Only one lag year was included in the study, and this can be investigated for 
longer time durations; 
• Financial figures and statements could only be used up to 2010 due to the 
changes in the standardisation of financial statements; hence comparison 
issues would have occurred; and 
• It was difficult to determine the overall non-executive remuneration range or gap 
since a few of these directors were being remunerated by other remuneration 
methods as well. 
Despite the limitations, the research findings still contributed towards the 
knowledgebase within the financial field focusing on the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and a firm’s financial performance. 
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The following research areas could be further explored: 
• A follow-up study could be compiled to determine whether the relationship 
between financial performance of firms and directors’ remuneration improved or 
deteriorated for the period after the introduction of the King III report; 
• The study could be expanded to include corporate governance as this issue is 
directly influenced by the issue raised, better known as the agency theory; 
• The relationship between firm performance and directors’ remuneration in 
various other sectors and countries could be investigated and compared, to 
identify whether the results are similar to or unique to South Africa; 
• Long-term and short-term incentives could be investigated to ascertain whether 
firms prefer to focus on short-term remuneration for short-term performance 
periods, or long-term remuneration for long-term performance in firms; and 
• The study could be expanded to be more specific, by focusing on each 
dependent variable separately, and developing each variable separately into an 
individual hypothesis, thus focusing on each component of directors’ 
remuneration in more detail. 
All the research possibilities listed above will enrich the field of study and may 
strengthen the findings obtained from this study. 
---oo000oo--- 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
207 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abhijeet, S. 2010. Nature of secondary data [Online]. Available: http://www.manage 
mentparadise.com/forums/marketing-research-mr/200409-nature-secondary-
data.html [2013, May 06]. 
AECI. 2013. Remuneration report [Online]. Available: 
http://www.aeci.co.za/cc_rem_report.php [2014, September 06]. 
Aglietta, M. & Reberioux, A. 2005. Corporate governance adrift: A critique of 
shareholder value. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Incorporated. 
Allen, A.T. 1999. SAS/ETS User's guide. Version 8. North Carolina: SAS Institute. 
Amess, K. & Drake, L. 2003. Executive remuneration and firm performance: 
Evidence from a panel of mutual organizations [Online]. Available: 
http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp03-13.pdf 
[2013, August 02]. 
Anderson, N., Ones, D.S., Sinangil, H.K. & Viswesvaran, C. (Eds.). 2002. Handbook 
of industrial, work and organizational psychology. London: Sage. 
Appelbaum, E., Batt, R. & Clark, I. 2011. Financial capitalism, breach of trust, and 
collateral damage [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications /financial-capitalism-2011-11.pdf 
[2013, January 14]. 
Arthur, S. & Sheffrin, S.M. 2003. Economics: Principles in action. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall. 
Ashley, A.S. & Yang, S.S.M. 2004. Executive compensation and earnings 
persistence. Journal of Business Ethics, 50(4):369-382. 
Aswathappa, K. 2003. Human resource management. New Delhi: Prentice Hall. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2013. Statistical language [Online]. Available: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/a3121120.nsf/home/statistical+language+-
+census+and+sample [2013, March 24]. 
Barber, N., Ghiselli, R. & Deale, C. 2006. Assessing the relationship of CEO 
compensation and company financial performance in the restaurant segment 
of the hospitality industry. Journal of Food Service Business Research, 
9(4):65-82. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
208 
 
Barkema, H.G. & Gomez-Mejia, L.R. 1998. Managerial compensation and firm 
performance: A general research framework. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 41(2):135-145. 
Barnett, V. & Lewis, T. 1994. Outliers in statistical data (3rd edition). New York: Wiley. 
Bartels, B. 2008. Beyond fixed versus random effects: A framework for improving 
substantive and statistical analysis of panel, time-series cross-sectional, and 
multilevel data [Online]. Available: 
http://www.polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/Polmeth2008paper-Bartels.pdf 
[2013, February 15]. 
Basu, S., Hwang, L., Mitsudome, T. & Weintrop, J. 2004. Corporate governance, top 
executive compensation and firm performance in Japan. Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, 15(1):56-79. 
Baumol, W. 1967. Business behaviour, value and growth. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World. 
BDO International. 2010. Examine the link between executive pay and company 
performance in 10 top American cities: BDO compensation study by city. 
Career Journal, 16(1):1-5. 
Bebchuk, L.A. & Fried, J.M. 2003. Executive compensation as an agency problem. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(3):71-92. 
Bebchuk, L.A. & Fried, J.M. 2004. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise 
of executive compensation [Online]. Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=761970 [2013, July 19]. 
Bebchuk, L.A. & Fried, D. J.M. 2006. Pay without performance: Overview of the 
issues. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 20(1):5-24. 
Beck, N. 2006. Time-series–cross-section methods [Online]. Available: 
http://fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2576/beck.pdf [2013, May 25]. 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M.M. & Zimmermann, H. 2006. An integrated 
framework of corporate governance and firm valuation. European Financial 
Management, 12(1):249-283. 
Bender, R.F. 2002. Directors' pay: Feeding fat cats or rewarding achievement. 
Eclectic, 10(1):16-20. 
Bender, R. & Porter, B. 2003. Setting executive directors’ remuneration in listed 
companies. Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, 11(3):27-
28. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
209 
 
Bender, R. & Ward, K. 2008. Corporate financial strategy (3rd edition). Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Bistrova, J. & Lace, N. 2012. Defining key factors to sustain maximum shareholders’ 
value. Journal of Financial Studies and Research, 2012(1):5-14. 
Blair, M.M. 2003. Shareholder value, corporate governance and corporate 
performance: A post-Enron reassessment of the conventional wisdom. 
Corporate governance and capital flows in a global economy. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Blank, S.S. 1968. Descriptive statistics. University of Michigan: Digitised. 
Blattberg, C. 2004. Welfare towards the patriotic corporation. From pluralist to 
patriotic politics: Putting practice first. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bognanno, M. 2010. Executive compensation: A brief review [Online]. Available: 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/tem/wpaper/1002.html [2013, 29 May]. 
Boschen, F.J. & Smith, J.K. 1995. You can pay me now and you can pay me later: 
The dynamic response of executive compensation to firm performance. The 
Journal of Business, 69(1):577-608. 
Boston Consulting Group. 2008. Missing link - Focusing corporate strategy on value 
creation. The 2008 value creators report [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bcg.com/documents/file15314.pdf [2013, 30 May]. 
Box, G.E.P., Jenkins, G.M. & Reinsel, G.C. 1994. Time series analysis: Forecasting 
and control (3rd edition). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Boyce, J. 2002. Market research in practice. Roseville: McGraw-Hill Australia Pty 
Limited. 
Bradley, S. 2012. Chief executive officer compensation and the effect on company 
performance in a South African context. Published master’s dissertation. 
Grahamstown: Rhodes University. 
Brains, C.L., Willnat, L., Manheim, J.B. & Rich, R.C. 2011. Empirical political 
analysis. Quantitative and qualitative research methods (8th edition). New 
York: Longman. 
Branca, M. & Imelmann, S. 2010. Executive remuneration [Online]. Available: 
http://www.apg.nl/en/article/executive-remuneration/530 [2013, September 
14]. 
Brigham, E.F. & Daves, P.R. 2010. Intermediate financial management (11th edition). 
Florida: Thompson. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
210 
 
Buffet, W. 2009. Berkshire-Hathaway Annual Report [Online]. Available: 
www.berkshirehathaway.com/2009ar/2009ar.pdf [2012, November 22]. 
Building better organizations. 2013. Society for Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology [Online]. Available: http://www.siop.org/visibilitybrochure 
/memberbrochure.aspx [2013, September 03]. 
Business Dictionary. 2012. Directors remuneration [Online]. Available: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/remuneration-of-directors.html 
[2012, November 12]. 
Business Dictionary. 2013a. Financial Performance [Online]. Available: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/financial-performance.html 
[2013, April 12]. 
Business Dictionary. 2013b. Primary data [Online]. Available: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/primary-data.html#ixzz2V3 
SfBvQP [2013, May 10]. 
Business Dictionary. 2013c. Performance bonus [Online]. Available: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/performance-
bonus.html#ixzz2XD2svnoQ [2013, May 10]. 
Bussin, M., Blair, C. & France, C. 1998. The conflict of remuneration disclosure: More 
is not necessarily better [Online]. Available: 
http://www.workinfo.com/free/downloads/188.htm [2012, July 23]. 
Cambridge Dictionary. 2012. Carrot and stick method [Online]. Available: 
http://www.dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/learner-english/carrot-and-
stick [2013, May 08]. 
Cant, M.C., Gerber-Nel, C., Nel, N. & Kotzé, T. 2005. Marketing research (2nd 
edition). Claremont: New Africa Education. 
Carlos, A.M. & Nicolas, S. 1996. Theory and history: Seventeenth century joint-stock 
trading companies. Journal of Economic History, 56(4):916-924. 
Carr, L.L. 1997. Strategic determinants of executive compensation in small publicly 
traded firms. Journal of Small Business Management, 35(2):1-12. 
Carton, R.B. & Hofer, C.W. 2006. Measuring organizational performance: Metrics for 
entrepreneurship and strategic management research [Online]. Available: 
http://www.alliedacademies.org/Publications/Papers/AEJ %20Vol 
%2016%20No%201%202010%20p%201-22.pdf [2012, June 24]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
211 
 
Cleary, P.D. 2001. Kurtosis [Online]. Available: http://www.pqsystems.com/eline/ 
2001/02/b.htm [2014, January 16]. 
Clementi, G.L., Cooley, T.F. & Wang, C. 2006. Stock grants as a commitment device. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 30(11):2191-2216. 
Closer scrutiny of executive remuneration. 2009. Enterprise Risk, 3(7):1-18. 
Coldwell, D. & Herbst, F. 2004. Business research. Cape Town: JUTA Academic. 
Collins English Dictionary. 2009. Remuneration [Online]. Available: 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/remuneration [2013, August 15]. 
Conyon, M. 1998. Directors’ pay and turnover: An application to a sample of large UK 
firms. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60(1):485-507. 
Conyon, M.J. 2006. Executive compensation and incentives. The Academy of 
Management Perspectives, 20(1):25-44. 
Coombes, S.M.T. 2008. Board of directors and non-profit entrepreneurial orientation. 
Ann Arbor: UMI. 
Cooper, D.R. & Schindler, P.S. 2006. Business research methods (9th edition). New 
York: Irwin McGraw-Hill. 
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W. & Larcker, D.F. 1999. Corporate governance, chief 
executive officer compensation, and firm performance, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 51(1):371-406. 
Corsi, C., Dale, G., Daum, J.H. & Schoppen, W. 2010. Five things board directors 
should be thinking about [Online]. Available: 
http://www.spencerstuart.com/research /articles/1475 [2012, December 06]. 
Crutchley, E.C. & Minnick, K. 2012. Cash versus incentive compensation: Lawsuit 
and director pay. Journal of Business Research, 65(7):907-913. 
Dalton, D.R. & Daily, C.M. 2001. Executive briefing. Corporate Governance Digest, 
44(2):3-5. 
Davies, P.L. 2000. The board of directors: composition, structure duties, and powers. 
London: School of Economics and Political Sciences. 
Dean, S. & Illowsky, B. 2012. Descriptive statistics: Skewness and the mean, and 
mode [Online]. Available: http://cnx.org/contents/6c4fb0df-8562-40db-8e48-
3d91d7dd65f7@9@9 [2013, November 11]. 
DeFond, M.L. & Hung, M. 2004. Investor protection and corporate governance: 
Evidence from worldwide CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting Research, 
42(2):269-312. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
212 
 
DeFusco, R.A., McLeavey, D.W., Pinto, J.E. & Runkle, D.E. 2004. Statistical 
concepts and market returns in CFA Institute. Ethical and Professional 
Standards and Quantitative Methods. Ohio: Pearson Custom Publishing. 
Design of directors' remuneration packages. 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.out-law.com/page-11145 [2013, October 11]. 
Design of share incentive plans. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.out-
law.com/page-11146 [2013, October 12]. 
Devers, C.E., Cannella, A.A.A., Reilly, G.P. & Yoder, M.E. 2007. Executive 
compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments. Journal of 
Management, 33(1):1016-1072. 
De Wet, J.H.C.H. 2004. Weakness of accounting indicators and economic methods 
of value determination. Unpublished research report. Pretoria: University of 
Pretoria. 
Dickie, C. & Dubey, A. 2008. What researchers mean by primary data and secondary 
data. At Work Journal, 54(1):1-4. 
Diggle, P.J., Heagerty, P., Liang, K. & Zeger, S.L. 2002. Analysis of longitudinal data. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Directors’ remuneration. 2003. Business Day, 3 November:13. 
Dodge, Y. 2003. The Oxford Dictionary of Statistical Terms. Switzerland: University of 
Neuchâtel. 
Dommisse, J. 2011. Is die vergoeding van die uitvoerende hoofde van die 120 top-
maatskappye van die Johannesburgse Aandelebeurs in verhouding tot hul 
omset, inkomste of wins voor rente en belasting geregverdig? Master’s 
thesis, Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University.  
Doyle, G. & Griffin, C. 2010. The role of business research [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cengage.com/marketing/book_content/1439080674_zikmund/boo
k/ch01.pdf [2013, May 05]. 
Dummit, D.S. & Foote, R.M. 2004. Abstract Algebra. New York: Wiley. 
Dutra, J.S. 2002. Management-Gestão depessoas. Sau Paulo: Atlas. 
Easton, V.J. & McColl, J.H. 2010. Presenting data [Online]. Available: http://www. 
stats.gla.ac.uk/steps/glossary/presenting_data.html [2013, May 19]. 
Ebert, F.C., Torres, R. & Papadakis, K. 2008. Executive compensation: Trends and 
policy issues. Geneva: Institute for Labour Studies. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
213 
 
Elton, E.J., Gruber, M.J., & Blake, C.R. 1996. Survivorship bias and mutual fund 
performance. Review of financial studies, 9(4):1097-1120. 
Eriksson, T. & Lausten, M. 2000. Managerial pay and firm performance. 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3):269-286. 
Farris, J. & McDermott, P. 2006. Group performance measurement in executive 
incentive programs [Online]. Available: http://www.ceoforum.com [2013, April 
19]. 
Farrugia, P., Petrisor, B.A., Farrokhyar, F. & Bhandari, M. 2010. Research questions, 
hypotheses and objectives. Canadian Journal of Surgery, 53(4):278-281. 
Faulkender, M., Kadyrzhanova, D., Prabhala, N. & Senbet, L. 2010. Executive 
compensation: An overview of research on corporate practices and proposed 
reforms. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 22(1):107-118. 
Feltham, G. & Fu, M. 2001. Incentive efficiency of stock versus option. Review of 
Accounting Studies, 6(1):7-28. 
Fernandez, P. 2013. A definition of shareholder value creation [Online]. Available: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.268129 [2014, January 20]. 
Financial Dictionary. 2012. Independent variable [Online]. Available: http://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Independent+Variable [2013, November 10]. 
Florackis, C. 2008. Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms: Evidence 
for UK firms. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 4(1):37-59. 
Freeman, E.R., Wicks, A.C. & Parmar, B. 2004. Stakeholder theory and the 
corporate objective revisited. Organizational Science, 16(1):364-369. 
Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Friedman, M. 1970. The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The 
New York Times Magazine [Online]. Available: http://www. colorado.edu/ 
studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html [2012, 
December 10]. 
Gagne, M. & Forest, J. 2008. The study of compensation systems through the lens of 
self-determination theory: Reconciling 35 years of debate. Canadian 
Psychology, 49(3):225-232. 
Gallagher, T.J. & Andrew, J.D. 2003. Financial management principles and practices 
(3rd edition). New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Gardiner, J.C., Luo, Z., Roman, L. 2009. Fixed effects, random effects and GEE. 
Statistics in Medicine, 28(1):221-239. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
214 
 
Garvey, G.T. & Milbourn, T.T. 2006. Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: 
Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 82(1):197-226. 
Gerber-Nel, C. 2004. Determination of the brand equity of the provincial, regional and 
national rugby teams of South Africa. Doctoral dissertation. Pretoria: 
University of South Africa. 
Gentry, R.J. & Shen, W. 2010. The relationship between accounting and market 
measures of a firm’s financial performance. Journal of Management, 
22(4):514-530. 
Gerhart, B. & Milkovich, G.T. 1990. Organizational differences in managerial 
compensation and financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 
33(4):663-691. 
Graham, M.D., Roth, T.A. & Dugan, D. 2008. Effective executive compensation. New 
York: AMACOM. 
Grasselli, M. & Henderson, V. 2009. Risk aversion and block exercise of executive 
stock options. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 33(1):109-127. 
Greene, W.H. 2002. Econometric analysis (5th edition). New York: Prentice Hall. 
Gregg, P., Jewell, S. & Tonks, I. 2005. Executive pay and performance in the UK 
1994-2002. CMPO Working Paper Series 5(122). [Online]. Available: 
http://people.exeter.ac.uk/ipt201/research/Executive%20PayPerformanceupd
ate6.pdf [2013, February 26]. 
Gregg, P., Machin, S. & Szymanski, S. 1993. The disappearing relationship between 
directors’ pay and corporate performance. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 31(1):255-283. 
Grinyer, A. 2009. The ethics of the secondary analysis and further use of qualitative 
data. Social Research Update 56(1):1-4. 
Grubbs, F.E. 1969. Procedures for detecting outlying observations in samples. 
Technometrics, 11(1):1-21. 
Gugler, K. 2008. The economics of corporate governance and mergers. Cape Town: 
Van Schaik. 
Hahlo, H. 1991. Hahlo’s South African Company Law. Cape Town: Juta and Co. 
Hair, J.F., Bush, R. & Ortinua, D. 2006. Marketing research within a changing 
environment (3rd edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
215 
 
Hambrick, D. & Jackson, E. 2000. Outside directors with a stake: The linchpin in 
improving governance. California Management Review, 42(4):108-127. 
Hansen, G.S. & Wernerfelt, B. 1989. Determinants of firm performance: The relative 
importance of economic and organizational factors. Strategic Management 
Journal, 10(5):399-411. 
Hanzlick, M. 2013. Management control systems and cross-cultural research. Berlin: 
Europe Business School Berlin. 
Hasings, C., Mosteller, F., Tukey, J.W. & Winsor, C.P. 1947. Low moments for small 
samples: A comparative study of order statistics. Annals of Mathematical 
Statistics, 18(3):413-426. 
Hausman, J.A. 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6):1251-
1271. 
Hawkins, D.M. 1980. Identification of outliers. London: Chapman and Hall. 
Hoskisson, R., Johnson, R. & Moesel, D. 1994. Corporate divestiture intensity in 
restructuring firms: Effects of governance, strategy and performance. 
Academy of Management Journal, 37(5):1207-1251. 
Ibbetson, J.F. & Whitmore, D.A. 1977. The management of motivation and 
remuneration. London: London Business Books. 
IBM, 2013. Account for uncertainty in predictive models: Financial performance 
definition [Online]. Available: http://www.businessdictionary.com/ 
definition/financial-performance.html [2013, June 10]. 
Ibrahim, H. & Samad, F.M.A. 2009. Corporate governance and agency costs: 
Evidence from public listed family firms in Malaysia [Online]. Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292182 [2012, 
December 12]. 
Institute of Directors South Africa. 2009. King Report on Governance for South Africa 
[Online]. Available: http://african.ipapercms.dk/IOD/KINGII /kingIIreport/ 
[2013, February 14]. 
International Labour Organization. 2008. Income inequalities in the age of financial 
globalization, International Institute of Labour Studies. World of Work Report 
2008, November: 20-23. 
Jarrell, M.G. 1994. A comparison of two procedures, the Mahalanobis distance and 
the Andrews-Pregibon statistic, for identifying multivariate outliers. Research 
in the Schools, 1(1):49-58. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
216 
 
Jensen, M.C. 2001. Value maximisation, stakeholder theory, and the corporate 
objective function. European Financial Management, 7(3):297-317. 
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, 
agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 
3(4):305-360. 
Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J. 1990. Performance pay and top management 
incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2):225-265. 
Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J. 2004. Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how we got to 
here, what are the problems, and how to fix them [Online]. Available: 
http://www2.gsu.edu/~wwwseh/Remuneration%20Where 
%20Weve%20Been.pdf [2013, August 12]. 
Jesse, B. & Curral, S.C. 2011. A model for focusing executives on long-term value 
creation. Harvard Business Review [Online]. Available: http://blogs.hbr. org/ 
cs/2011/10/a_model_for_ focusing_executive.html [2012, March 07]. 
Johnson, R.R. & Kuby, P. 2007. Elementary statistics (10th edition). Pacific Grove: 
Thomson Learning. 
Johnson, W. 2013. The advantages of the maximisation of shareholder wealth 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ehow.com [2013, January 23]. 
Jones, I. & Gratton, C. 2010. Research methods for sport studies [Online]. Available: 
http://books.google.co.za/books?id=h9CnY9lBlGMC&pg= 
PA8&dq=primary+research&hl=af&sa=X&ei=hYJnU4KvN6mw7AbtwICQCQ&
ved=0CFEQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=primary%20research&f=false [2013, 
January 15]. 
Joskow, P.L. & Rose, N.L. 1994. CEO pay and firm performance: Dynamics, 
asymmetries and alternatives, Economic Research. Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology:1-5. 
Kato, H.K., Lemmon, M., Luo, M. & Schallheim, J. 2005. An empirical examination of 
the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 78 (1):435-461. 
Kato, T., Kim, W. & Lee, J.H. 2007. Executive compensation, firm performance, and 
Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal, 15:36-55. 
Keller, G. 2005. Statistics for management and economics (7th edition). Belmont, CA: 
Thomson Higher Education. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
217 
 
Kennerly, M.S. 2010. eBay vs. Newmark: Al Franken was right, corporations are 
legally required to maximize profits [Online]. Available: 
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2010/09/articles/series/special-
comment/ebay-v-newmark-al-franken-was-right-corporations-are-legally-
required-to-maximize-profits [2012, September 13]. 
Kenney, J.F. & Keeping, E.S. 1962. Linear regression and correlation. Mathematics 
of statistics. Princeton: Van Nostrand. 
Keown, A.J., Scott, D.F., Martin, J. & Petty, W.J. 1998. The logic and practice of 
financial management. Foundation of Finance. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Keselman, H.J., Wilcox, R.R., Lix, L.M., Algina, J. & Fradette, K. 2007. Adaptive 
robust estimation and testing. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical 
Psychology, 60(1):267-293. 
Kimberlin, C.L. & Winterstein, A.G. 2008. Validity and reliability of measurement 
instruments [Online]. Available: http://www.ashpfoundation.org/MainMenu 
Categories/ResearchResourceCenter/FosteringYoungInvestigators/AJHPRe
searchFundamentalsSeries/KimberlinArticle.aspx [2013, April 23]. 
King Committee on Corporate Governance. 2002. Parktown: Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa. 
Krauter, E. & de Sousa, A.F. 2008. The relationship between executives’ 
remuneration and corporate financial performance. International Review of 
Business Research Papers, 5(1):163-173. 
Kruskal, W.H. & Tanur, J.M. (ed.). 1978. Linear hypotheses: International 
Encyclopaedia of Statistics. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Kube, B. 1994. CEO Compensation and firm performance: Are they related? The 
Park Place Economist, 2(1):57-68. 
Kubo, K. 2000. The determinants of executive compensation and its effects on 
company performance in Japan and in the UK. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Lamb, C., Hair, J., McDaniel, C., Boshoff, C., Terblanche, N., Elliott, R. & Klopper, 
H.B. 2010. Marketing (4th edition). Oxford: Oxford Press. 
Larkin, I. Lamar, P. & Francesca, G. 2012. The psychological costs of pay-for-
performance: Implications for the strategic compensation of employees. 
Strategic Management Journal, 33(10):1194-1214. 
Le Blanc, R. 2004. Preventing future hollingers. Ivey Business Journal, 69(1):1-9. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
218 
 
Lee, H. & Fung, K.Y. 1985. Behaviour of trimmed F and sine-wave F statistics in one-
way ANOVA. The Indian Journal of Statistics, 47(1):186-201. 
Linger, A. 2013. Why is it important to salary benchmark [Online]. Available: 
http://www.robertwalters.co.uk/executive-search/career-advice/why -is-it-
important-to-salary-benchmark.html [2013, September 21]. 
Lipman, F.D. 2010. Implementing risk-adjusted executive performance 
compensation. Directors and Boards, 34(2):55. Livy: the Periochae. 2013. 
[Online].  Available: http://www.livius.org/li-In/livy/periochae/periochae00.html 
[2013, August 05]. 
Lix, L.M. & Keselman, H.J. 1998. To trim or not to trim: Tests of mean equality under 
heteroskedasticity and non-normality. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 58(1):409-429. 
Long, T., Dulewicz, V. & Gay, K. 2005. The role of the non-executive director: 
findings of an empirical investigation into the differences between listed and 
unlisted UK boards. Henley: Henley Management College. 
Mac Naulty, A. 2005. Deep packets [Online]. Available: 
http://free.financialmail.co.za/05/1111/cover/coverstory.html [2012, February 
20]. 
Madden, B.J. 2010. Wealth creation: A systems mindset for building and investing in 
businesses for the long term. United Kingdom: Wiley Finance.  
Magnan, M., St-Onge, S. & Gélinas, P. 2009. Director compensation and firm value: 
A research synthesis. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 
7(1):28-41. 
Mallin, C. 2009. Corporate Governance: Directors’ performance and remuneration. 
Birmingham: University of Birmingham Business School. 
Manas, T. 2000. Combining reward elements for the right team chemistry workspan 
[Online]. Available: http://librarum.org/book/14388/220 [2012, November 25]. 
Martin, D.J., Petty, W.J. & Wallace, J.S. 2009. Value-based management with 
corporate social responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University. 
McClure, B. 2013. Using the price to book ratio to evaluate companies [Online]:  
Available: http://investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/03/112603.asp [2013, 
August 05]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
219 
 
McConvill, J.A. 2001. Positive corporate governance. American Business Law 
Journal [Online]: Available: http://ssrn.com/abstract=835185 [2013, January 
20]. 
McCulloch, J.H. 1985. On heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 53(2):483. 
McGregor BFA. 2012. Application database of company information [Online]. 
Available: http://www.mcgbfa.com [2012, March 14]. 
McGregor BFA Research Domain. 2012. Annual financial statements: Industrial 
sector, 2002-2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.mcgbfa.com [2012, March 
15]. 
Michael, R.S. 1999. Internal validity [Online]. Available http://www.indiana. 
edu/~p1013447/dictionary/intval.htm [2013, September 02]. 
Morgenson, G. 2013. If shareholders say ‘enough already,’ the board may listen. 
New York Times [Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/ 
business/shareholders-can-slow-the-executive-pay-express.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=1& [2013, June 04]. 
Morris, B. 2006. Tearing up the Jack Welch playbook [Online]. Available: 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/10magazines/fortune/index.htm [2012, June 
12]. 
Morrissey, D.J. 2009. Executive compensation and income inequality. William & Mary 
Business Law Review 3(2). [Online]. Available: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2048698 [2012, November 12]. 
Mouton, J. 1996. Understanding social research. Pretoria: Van Schaik. 
Murphy, K.J. 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 7:11-42. 
Murphy, K.J. 1999. Executive compensation. Handbook of labor economics, 
3(b):2485-2563. 
Osborne, J.W. & Overbay, A. 2004.The power of outliers. Practical assessment, 
research & evaluation, 9(6):1-12. 
Owen, K., Mundy, R., Guild, W. & Guild, R. 2001. Creating and sustaining the high 
performance organisation. Managing Service Quality, 11(1):10-21. 
Ozkan, N. 2005. Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO 
compensation: An empirical investigation of UK companies [Online]. 
Available: http://www.efmaefm.org/efma2006/papers/342973 [2012, 
November 23]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
220 
 
Pile, J. 2010. Open along performance. Financial Mail [Online]. Available: http:// 
www.fm.co.za/Article.aspx?id=118524 [2012, March 03]. 
Prescott, A. 2008. Advantages and disadvantages of secondary research [Online]. 
Available: http://www.prosandconsofsecondaryresearch.blog 
spot.com/2008/05/advantages-and-disadvantages-of-using.html [2013, May 
14]. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2009. King III – Chapter 14: Remuneration of directors 
[Online]. Available: http://www.pwc.com/za/en/king3/remuneration-of-
directors-and-senior-executives [2012, June 25]. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2011. Executives directors’ remuneration: Practices and 
trends [Online]. Available: http:www.pwc.co.za/en_za/za/assets/pdf/ 
Executive-Director-Report t2011.pdf [2012, February 19]. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2012. Making executive pay work: The psychology of 
incentives [Online]. Available: http://www.pwc.com.au/consulting/assets/ 
publications /Making-Executive-Pay-Work-Aust-May12.pdf [2013, June 16]. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2013. Non-executive directors: Practices and Fees Trends 
Report - South Africa 2014 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.pwc.co.za/en/publications/non-executive-directors-report.jhtml 
[2014, January 05]. 
Rappaport, A. 1998. Creating shareholder value: A guide for managers and 
investors. New York: The Free Press. 
Recruiting directors. 2012. Business Link [Online]. Available: http://www.business 
link.gov.uk [2012, March 04]. 
Remuneration committee. 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.ttigroup.com/en/ 
outcompany/corporategovernace/boardcommitees [2012, March 03]. 
Retief, E. 2011. Directors’ remuneration: Companies Act 2008 [Online]. Available: 
www.sabinet.co.za/abstracts/account/account_aug_sep_2011_a5.html [2012, 
June 20]. 
Rosen, S. 1992. Contract and the Market for Executives. Contract Economics. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Roxy, P., Olsen, C. & Devore, J.L. 2008. Introduction to statistics and data analysis. 
Canada: Cengage Learning. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
221 
 
Ruth, B. 2005. Just rewards for a new approach to pay. Financial Times [Online] 
Available: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d/d7319796-d379-11d9-ad4b-
00000e2511c8.html [2012, September 13]. 
Ryan, H.E. & Wiggins, R.A. 2001. The influence of firm- and manager-specific 
characteristics on the structure of executive compensation. Journal of 
corporate finance, 7(1):101-123. 
Rynes, S.L., Barry, G. & Minette, K.A. 2004. The importance of pay in employee 
motivation: Discrepancies between what people say and what they do. 
Human Resource Management, 43(3):381-394. 
Sage. 2012. The research process: A quick glance [Online]. Available: 
https://www.google.co.za/?gws_rd=ssl#q=research+problem%2C+destinatio
n%2Cjourney [2013, September 04]. 
SAPA. 2010. Executive directors’ pay rises slow [Online]. Available: http:// www. 
timeslive.co.za/business/article547608.ece/Exec-director-pay-rises-slow 
[2012, February 15]. 
Scholtz, H.E. & Smit, A. 2012. Executive remuneration and company performance for 
South African companies listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX). Southern 
African Business Review, 16(1):22-38. 
Sigler, K. 2011. CEO compensation and company performance. Business and 
Economics Journal, 31(1):1-8. 
Simms, J. 2001. Marketing for value. Marketing, June:34-35. 
Singh, M. & Davidson, W.A. 2003. Agency costs, ownership structures and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(1):793-816. 
Sinha, R. 2006. Corporate governance and shareholder value analysis. Windsor: 
University of Windsor. 
Sirkin, M.S. & Cagney, L.K. 2006. Executive compensation [Online]. Available: 
http://books.google.co.za/books?id=MOYpmC7xbb0C&pg=SA2-
PA20&dq=base+salary&hl=af&sa=X&ei=bZNnU7_3GIfG7AbOkIHoCw&ved=
0CD0Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=base%20salary&f=false [2013, April 15]. 
Smith, A. 1776. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Smith, A. 1776. The wealth of nations. Theory and Society, 32(1):607-631. 
Social research methods. 2006. Descriptive Statistics [Online]. Available: http://www. 
socialresearchmethods.net /kb/statdesc_php [2012, February 25]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
222 
 
South African Companies Act. 1973. The Companies Act, No. 61 of 1973 [Online]. 
Available: www.acts.co.za/companies-act-1973/index.html?ca_230_.php 
[2013, November 14]. 
South African Companies Act. 2008. The Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 [Online]. 
Available: www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction? id=98894 [2012, 
November 20]. 
Steven, M.S. 2003. Economics: principles in action. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice 
Hall. 
Stewart, G.B. 1991. The quest for value: A guide for senior managers. New York: 
Harper Business. 
Stobaugh, R.B. 2000. The role of the board in corporate strategy. Harvard Business 
School Working Knowledge [Online]. Available: http://hbswk.hbs.edu 
/archive/1849.html [2013, January 13]. 
Strangman, L. 2010. Defining the research problem. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.uwlax.edu/faculty/brooks/bus230/mod2/Defining%20the%20Rese
arch%20Problem.docx [2013, April 29]. 
Swart, O. 2010. Group remuneration committee [Online]. Available: 
http//:www.oldmutual.com/download/2680/Remuneration Committee.pdf 
[2012, March 03]. 
Sykes, A.O. 1992. An introduction to regression analysis [Online]. Available: 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/1309 [2013, April 20]. 
Tao, T. 2005. Non-linear dispersive equations: Local and global analysis. CBMS, 
106(1):129. 
Tchouassi, G. & Ouedraogo-Nosseyamba, B. 2011. Corporate governance and 
maximisation of shareholder value: Theoretical analysis from Francophone 
countries in Africa. Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research, 
3(6):198-206. 
The Sage Group plc. 2012. Remuneration Policy [Online]. Available: 
http:www.sage.com/ourbusiness/corporategovernance/remunerationpolic 
[2012, February 25]. 
Thornton, G. 2004. A Brief overview of King II [Online]. Available: http//www.gt. 
co.za/publications/Effective-directors-guide/kingII.asp [2012, February 16]. 
Tirole, J. 2001. Corporate governance, Econometrica, 69(1):1-35. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
223 
 
Torres-Reyna, O. 2009. Panel data analysis: Fixed & random effects [Online]. 
Available: http://www.princeton.edu/~otorres/Panel101.pdf [2013, August 15]. 
Trochim, W.M. 2006. Research methods knowledge base [Online]. Available: 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/index.php [2013, March 14]. 
Venanzi, D. 2011. Financial performance measures and value creation: the state of 
the art. London: Springer. 
Van der Linde, G.C. 2007. Executive remuneration and its effectiveness as an 
instrument to generate company growth in South Africa. MBA mini-thesis. 
Bellville: University of Stellenbosch Graduate School of Business. 
Van der Walt, J.C. 2003. The effect of incentives-based directors’ remuneration on 
ethical decision-making in organisations. Published master’s dissertation. 
Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.  
Venkatraman, N. & Ramanujam, V. 1987. Measurement of business economics 
performance: An examination of method convergence. Journal of 
Management, 13(1):109-122. 
Von Hippel, P.T. 2005. Mean, median, and skew: Correcting a textbook rule. Journal 
of Statistics Education, 13(2):79. 
Wainer, H. 1976. Robust statistics: A survey and some prescriptions. Journal of 
Educational Statistics, 1(4): 285-312. 
Weisstein, W.E. 2002. Kurtosis [Online]. Available: 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Kurtosis.html [2013, December 10]. 
Welch, J. 2009. Elaborates: Shareholder value. Bloomberg Business Week [Online]. 
Available: http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/ 
content/mar2009/db200903 16_630496.htm [2013, June 06]. 
White, H. 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48(4):817-838. 
Wiid, J. & Diggines, C. 2013. Marketing research (2nd edition) [Online]. Available: 
http://imm-online.s3.amazonaws.com/mr/MarketingResearch2e [2013, March 
15]. 
Williams, M.K. 2006. Research methods knowledge base [Online]. Available: 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/statdesc.php [2012, February 25]. 
Windsor, C. & Cybinski, P.J. 2013. Remuneration committee independence and CEO 
remuneration for firm financial performance. Accounting Research Journal, 
26(3):197-221. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
224 
 
Wray, Q. 2008. Deputy President warns on widening wealth gap. Business Report 
[Online]. Available: http://www.busrep.co.za [2012, March 30]. 
Yuki, G. 1994. Effective leadership in open systems: Leadership in organizations. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Zikmund, W.G. 2003. Business research methods (7th edition). Ohio: Thomson 
Learning. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
